e445bcd3230253cb2acff31362c2f51698c3fe81
24
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Z User
|
dbec0b3099 |
fix(scripts): install/update/uninstall port handling
Three script-level port UX issues found and fixed: == install.sh: re-install with PANEL_PORT now updates existing config == write_config previously returned early when config.yaml already existed, ignoring PANEL_PORT env var. Re-running 'PANEL_PORT=9000 bash install.sh' on an existing install silently kept the old port. Fix: when config.yaml exists and PANEL_PORT/THREE_M_UI_PORT is explicitly set, sed-update the port/listen/public_url in the existing file. First- time install (no config.yaml) still writes full config with random keys. == update.sh: show panel port after successful update == Update completed with no indication of which port the panel is on. Users had to check config.yaml manually. Fix: after '[5/5] Update completed', read server.port from config.yaml and display: Panel: http://SERVER_IP:<port>/ (to change port: 3m-ui config port <new-port>) Also added CONFIG_DIR constant (was missing). == uninstall.sh: show previous panel port before removing config == Uninstall removed config without telling the user what port was in use. Fix: before rm -rf $CONFIG_DIR, read and display: Previous panel port: <port> fix(scripts): install/update/uninstall port handling Three script-level port UX issues found and fixed: == install.sh: re-install with PANEL_PORT now updates existing config == write_config previously returned early when config.yaml already existed, ignoring PANEL_PORT env var. Re-running 'PANEL_PORT=9000 bash install.sh' on an existing install silently kept the old port. Fix: when config.yaml exists and PANEL_PORT/THREE_M_UI_PORT is explicitly set, sed-update the port/listen/public_url in the existing file. First- time install (no config.yaml) still writes full config with random keys. == update.sh: show panel port after successful update == Update completed with no indication of which port the panel is on. Users had to check config.yaml manually. Fix: after '[5/5] Update completed', read server.port from config.yaml and display: Panel: http://SERVER_IP:<port>/ (to change port: 3m-ui config port <new-port>) Also added CONFIG_DIR constant (was missing). == uninstall.sh: show previous panel port before removing config == Uninstall removed config without telling the user what port was in use. Fix: before rm -rf $CONFIG_DIR, read and display: Previous panel port: <port> fix(scripts): install/update/uninstall port handling Three script-level port UX issues found and fixed: == install.sh: re-install with PANEL_PORT now updates existing config == write_config previously returned early when config.yaml already existed, ignoring PANEL_PORT env var. Re-running 'PANEL_PORT=9000 bash install.sh' on an existing install silently kept the old port. Fix: when config.yaml exists and PANEL_PORT/THREE_M_UI_PORT is explicitly set, sed-update the port/listen/public_url in the existing file. First- time install (no config.yaml) still writes full config with random keys. == update.sh: show panel port after successful update == Update completed with no indication of which port the panel is on. Users had to check config.yaml manually. Fix: after '[5/5] Update completed', read server.port from config.yaml and display: Panel: http://SERVER_IP:<port>/ (to change port: 3m-ui config port <new-port>) Also added CONFIG_DIR constant (was missing). == uninstall.sh: show previous panel port before removing config == Uninstall removed config without telling the user what port was in use. Fix: before rm -rf $CONFIG_DIR, read and display: Previous panel port: <port> fix(scripts): install/update/uninstall port handling Three script-level port UX issues found and fixed: == install.sh: re-install with PANEL_PORT now updates existing config == write_config previously returned early when config.yaml already existed, ignoring PANEL_PORT env var. Re-running 'PANEL_PORT=9000 bash install.sh' on an existing install silently kept the old port. Fix: when config.yaml exists and PANEL_PORT/THREE_M_UI_PORT is explicitly set, sed-update the port/listen/public_url in the existing file. First- time install (no config.yaml) still writes full config with random keys. == update.sh: show panel port after successful update == Update completed with no indication of which port the panel is on. Users had to check config.yaml manually. Fix: after '[5/5] Update completed', read server.port from config.yaml and display: Panel: http://SERVER_IP:<port>/ (to change port: 3m-ui config port <new-port>) Also added CONFIG_DIR constant (was missing). == uninstall.sh: show previous panel port before removing config == Uninstall removed config without telling the user what port was in use. Fix: before rm -rf $CONFIG_DIR, read and display: Previous panel port: <port> fix(scripts): install/update/uninstall port handling Three script-level port UX issues found and fixed: == install.sh: re-install with PANEL_PORT now updates existing config == write_config previously returned early when config.yaml already existed, ignoring PANEL_PORT env var. Re-running 'PANEL_PORT=9000 bash install.sh' on an existing install silently kept the old port. Fix: when config.yaml exists and PANEL_PORT/THREE_M_UI_PORT is explicitly set, sed-update the port/listen/public_url in the existing file. First- time install (no config.yaml) still writes full config with random keys. == update.sh: show panel port after successful update == Update completed with no indication of which port the panel is on. Users had to check config.yaml manually. Fix: after '[5/5] Update completed', read server.port from config.yaml and display: Panel: http://SERVER_IP:<port>/ (to change port: 3m-ui config port <new-port>) Also added CONFIG_DIR constant (was missing). == uninstall.sh: show previous panel port before removing config == Uninstall removed config without telling the user what port was in use. Fix: before rm -rf $CONFIG_DIR, read and display: Previous panel port: <port> fix(scripts): install/update/uninstall port handling Three script-level port UX issues found and fixed: == install.sh: re-install with PANEL_PORT now updates existing config == write_config previously returned early when config.yaml already existed, ignoring PANEL_PORT env var. Re-running 'PANEL_PORT=9000 bash install.sh' on an existing install silently kept the old port. Fix: when config.yaml exists and PANEL_PORT/THREE_M_UI_PORT is explicitly set, sed-update the port/listen/public_url in the existing file. First- time install (no config.yaml) still writes full config with random keys. == update.sh: show panel port after successful update == Update completed with no indication of which port the panel is on. Users had to check config.yaml manually. Fix: after '[5/5] Update completed', read server.port from config.yaml and display: Panel: http://SERVER_IP:<port>/ (to change port: 3m-ui config port <new-port>) Also added CONFIG_DIR constant (was missing). == uninstall.sh: show previous panel port before removing config == Uninstall removed config without telling the user what port was in use. Fix: before rm -rf $CONFIG_DIR, read and display: Previous panel port: <port> fix(scripts): install/update/uninstall port handling Three script-level port UX issues found and fixed: == install.sh: re-install with PANEL_PORT now updates existing config == write_config previously returned early when config.yaml already existed, ignoring PANEL_PORT env var. Re-running 'PANEL_PORT=9000 bash install.sh' on an existing install silently kept the old port. Fix: when config.yaml exists and PANEL_PORT/THREE_M_UI_PORT is explicitly set, sed-update the port/listen/public_url in the existing file. First- time install (no config.yaml) still writes full config with random keys. == update.sh: show panel port after successful update == Update completed with no indication of which port the panel is on. Users had to check config.yaml manually. Fix: after '[5/5] Update completed', read server.port from config.yaml and display: Panel: http://SERVER_IP:<port>/ (to change port: 3m-ui config port <new-port>) Also added CONFIG_DIR constant (was missing). == uninstall.sh: show previous panel port before removing config == Uninstall removed config without telling the user what port was in use. Fix: before rm -rf $CONFIG_DIR, read and display: Previous panel port: <port> fix(scripts): install/update/uninstall port handling Three script-level port UX issues found and fixed: == install.sh: re-install with PANEL_PORT now updates existing config == write_config previously returned early when config.yaml already existed, ignoring PANEL_PORT env var. Re-running 'PANEL_PORT=9000 bash install.sh' on an existing install silently kept the old port. Fix: when config.yaml exists and PANEL_PORT/THREE_M_UI_PORT is explicitly set, sed-update the port/listen/public_url in the existing file. First- time install (no config.yaml) still writes full config with random keys. == update.sh: show panel port after successful update == Update completed with no indication of which port the panel is on. Users had to check config.yaml manually. Fix: after '[5/5] Update completed', read server.port from config.yaml and display: Panel: http://SERVER_IP:<port>/ (to change port: 3m-ui config port <new-port>) Also added CONFIG_DIR constant (was missing). == uninstall.sh: show previous panel port before removing config == Uninstall removed config without telling the user what port was in use. Fix: before rm -rf $CONFIG_DIR, read and display: Previous panel port: <port> fix(scripts): install/update/uninstall port handling Three script-level port UX issues found and fixed: == install.sh: re-install with PANEL_PORT now updates existing config == write_config previously returned early when config.yaml already existed, ignoring PANEL_PORT env var. Re-running 'PANEL_PORT=9000 bash install.sh' on an existing install silently kept the old port. Fix: when config.yaml exists and PANEL_PORT/THREE_M_UI_PORT is explicitly set, sed-update the port/listen/public_url in the existing file. First- time install (no config.yaml) still writes full config with random keys. == update.sh: show panel port after successful update == Update completed with no indication of which port the panel is on. Users had to check config.yaml manually. Fix: after '[5/5] Update completed', read server.port from config.yaml and display: Panel: http://SERVER_IP:<port>/ (to change port: 3m-ui config port <new-port>) Also added CONFIG_DIR constant (was missing). == uninstall.sh: show previous panel port before removing config == Uninstall removed config without telling the user what port was in use. Fix: before rm -rf $CONFIG_DIR, read and display: Previous panel port: <port> fix(scripts): install/update/uninstall port handling Three script-level port UX issues found and fixed: == install.sh: re-install with PANEL_PORT now updates existing config == write_config previously returned early when config.yaml already existed, ignoring PANEL_PORT env var. Re-running 'PANEL_PORT=9000 bash install.sh' on an existing install silently kept the old port. Fix: when config.yaml exists and PANEL_PORT/THREE_M_UI_PORT is explicitly set, sed-update the port/listen/public_url in the existing file. First- time install (no config.yaml) still writes full config with random keys. == update.sh: show panel port after successful update == Update completed with no indication of which port the panel is on. Users had to check config.yaml manually. Fix: after '[5/5] Update completed', read server.port from config.yaml and display: Panel: http://SERVER_IP:<port>/ (to change port: 3m-ui config port <new-port>) Also added CONFIG_DIR constant (was missing). == uninstall.sh: show previous panel port before removing config == Uninstall removed config without telling the user what port was in use. Fix: before rm -rf $CONFIG_DIR, read and display: Previous panel port: <port> fix(scripts): install/update/uninstall port handling Three script-level port UX issues found and fixed: == install.sh: re-install with PANEL_PORT now updates existing config == write_config previously returned early when config.yaml already existed, ignoring PANEL_PORT env var. Re-running 'PANEL_PORT=9000 bash install.sh' on an existing install silently kept the old port. Fix: when config.yaml exists and PANEL_PORT/THREE_M_UI_PORT is explicitly set, sed-update the port/listen/public_url in the existing file. First- time install (no config.yaml) still writes full config with random keys. == update.sh: show panel port after successful update == Update completed with no indication of which port the panel is on. Users had to check config.yaml manually. Fix: after '[5/5] Update completed', read server.port from config.yaml and display: Panel: http://SERVER_IP:<port>/ (to change port: 3m-ui config port <new-port>) Also added CONFIG_DIR constant (was missing). == uninstall.sh: show previous panel port before removing config == Uninstall removed config without telling the user what port was in use. Fix: before rm -rf $CONFIG_DIR, read and display: Previous panel port: <port> fix(scripts): install/update/uninstall port handling Three script-level port UX issues found and fixed: == install.sh: re-install with PANEL_PORT now updates existing config == write_config previously returned early when config.yaml already existed, ignoring PANEL_PORT env var. Re-running 'PANEL_PORT=9000 bash install.sh' on an existing install silently kept the old port. Fix: when config.yaml exists and PANEL_PORT/THREE_M_UI_PORT is explicitly set, sed-update the port/listen/public_url in the existing file. First- time install (no config.yaml) still writes full config with random keys. == update.sh: show panel port after successful update == Update completed with no indication of which port the panel is on. Users had to check config.yaml manually. Fix: after '[5/5] Update completed', read server.port from config.yaml and display: Panel: http://SERVER_IP:<port>/ (to change port: 3m-ui config port <new-port>) Also added CONFIG_DIR constant (was missing). == uninstall.sh: show previous panel port before removing config == Uninstall removed config without telling the user what port was in use. Fix: before rm -rf $CONFIG_DIR, read and display: Previous panel port: <port> |
||
|
Z User
|
2fd6992574 |
feat(scripts): add config port command to 3m-ui management scripts
Users changing the panel port from the web UI had to SSH in and run 'systemctl restart 3m-ui' manually — easy to forget and not discoverable. Now both the 3m-ui entry script and 3m-ui.sh manager support: 3m-ui config show — display config.yaml 3m-ui config port <1-65535> — change port + auto-restart The interactive menu (running '3m-ui' with no args) also gains: 9. 修改面板端口 (interactive port change with current/new display) a. 卸载 3m-ui (moved from slot 9 to 'a') Flow: 1. Reads current port from config.yaml 2. Validates new port (1-65535, numeric) 3. sed replaces ' port: N' line in config.yaml 4. Restarts the service 5. Waits 1s, checks if active 6. Prints new access URL or failure message This closes the UX gap: web UI saves port → user runs '3m-ui config port 9000' → script restarts and confirms. feat(scripts): add config port command to 3m-ui management scripts Users changing the panel port from the web UI had to SSH in and run 'systemctl restart 3m-ui' manually — easy to forget and not discoverable. Now both the 3m-ui entry script and 3m-ui.sh manager support: 3m-ui config show — display config.yaml 3m-ui config port <1-65535> — change port + auto-restart The interactive menu (running '3m-ui' with no args) also gains: 9. 修改面板端口 (interactive port change with current/new display) a. 卸载 3m-ui (moved from slot 9 to 'a') Flow: 1. Reads current port from config.yaml 2. Validates new port (1-65535, numeric) 3. sed replaces ' port: N' line in config.yaml 4. Restarts the service 5. Waits 1s, checks if active 6. Prints new access URL or failure message This closes the UX gap: web UI saves port → user runs '3m-ui config port 9000' → script restarts and confirms. feat(scripts): add config port command to 3m-ui management scripts Users changing the panel port from the web UI had to SSH in and run 'systemctl restart 3m-ui' manually — easy to forget and not discoverable. Now both the 3m-ui entry script and 3m-ui.sh manager support: 3m-ui config show — display config.yaml 3m-ui config port <1-65535> — change port + auto-restart The interactive menu (running '3m-ui' with no args) also gains: 9. 修改面板端口 (interactive port change with current/new display) a. 卸载 3m-ui (moved from slot 9 to 'a') Flow: 1. Reads current port from config.yaml 2. Validates new port (1-65535, numeric) 3. sed replaces ' port: N' line in config.yaml 4. Restarts the service 5. Waits 1s, checks if active 6. Prints new access URL or failure message This closes the UX gap: web UI saves port → user runs '3m-ui config port 9000' → script restarts and confirms. feat(scripts): add config port command to 3m-ui management scripts Users changing the panel port from the web UI had to SSH in and run 'systemctl restart 3m-ui' manually — easy to forget and not discoverable. Now both the 3m-ui entry script and 3m-ui.sh manager support: 3m-ui config show — display config.yaml 3m-ui config port <1-65535> — change port + auto-restart The interactive menu (running '3m-ui' with no args) also gains: 9. 修改面板端口 (interactive port change with current/new display) a. 卸载 3m-ui (moved from slot 9 to 'a') Flow: 1. Reads current port from config.yaml 2. Validates new port (1-65535, numeric) 3. sed replaces ' port: N' line in config.yaml 4. Restarts the service 5. Waits 1s, checks if active 6. Prints new access URL or failure message This closes the UX gap: web UI saves port → user runs '3m-ui config port 9000' → script restarts and confirms. feat(scripts): add config port command to 3m-ui management scripts Users changing the panel port from the web UI had to SSH in and run 'systemctl restart 3m-ui' manually — easy to forget and not discoverable. Now both the 3m-ui entry script and 3m-ui.sh manager support: 3m-ui config show — display config.yaml 3m-ui config port <1-65535> — change port + auto-restart The interactive menu (running '3m-ui' with no args) also gains: 9. 修改面板端口 (interactive port change with current/new display) a. 卸载 3m-ui (moved from slot 9 to 'a') Flow: 1. Reads current port from config.yaml 2. Validates new port (1-65535, numeric) 3. sed replaces ' port: N' line in config.yaml 4. Restarts the service 5. Waits 1s, checks if active 6. Prints new access URL or failure message This closes the UX gap: web UI saves port → user runs '3m-ui config port 9000' → script restarts and confirms. feat(scripts): add config port command to 3m-ui management scripts Users changing the panel port from the web UI had to SSH in and run 'systemctl restart 3m-ui' manually — easy to forget and not discoverable. Now both the 3m-ui entry script and 3m-ui.sh manager support: 3m-ui config show — display config.yaml 3m-ui config port <1-65535> — change port + auto-restart The interactive menu (running '3m-ui' with no args) also gains: 9. 修改面板端口 (interactive port change with current/new display) a. 卸载 3m-ui (moved from slot 9 to 'a') Flow: 1. Reads current port from config.yaml 2. Validates new port (1-65535, numeric) 3. sed replaces ' port: N' line in config.yaml 4. Restarts the service 5. Waits 1s, checks if active 6. Prints new access URL or failure message This closes the UX gap: web UI saves port → user runs '3m-ui config port 9000' → script restarts and confirms. feat(scripts): add config port command to 3m-ui management scripts Users changing the panel port from the web UI had to SSH in and run 'systemctl restart 3m-ui' manually — easy to forget and not discoverable. Now both the 3m-ui entry script and 3m-ui.sh manager support: 3m-ui config show — display config.yaml 3m-ui config port <1-65535> — change port + auto-restart The interactive menu (running '3m-ui' with no args) also gains: 9. 修改面板端口 (interactive port change with current/new display) a. 卸载 3m-ui (moved from slot 9 to 'a') Flow: 1. Reads current port from config.yaml 2. Validates new port (1-65535, numeric) 3. sed replaces ' port: N' line in config.yaml 4. Restarts the service 5. Waits 1s, checks if active 6. Prints new access URL or failure message This closes the UX gap: web UI saves port → user runs '3m-ui config port 9000' → script restarts and confirms. feat(scripts): add config port command to 3m-ui management scripts Users changing the panel port from the web UI had to SSH in and run 'systemctl restart 3m-ui' manually — easy to forget and not discoverable. Now both the 3m-ui entry script and 3m-ui.sh manager support: 3m-ui config show — display config.yaml 3m-ui config port <1-65535> — change port + auto-restart The interactive menu (running '3m-ui' with no args) also gains: 9. 修改面板端口 (interactive port change with current/new display) a. 卸载 3m-ui (moved from slot 9 to 'a') Flow: 1. Reads current port from config.yaml 2. Validates new port (1-65535, numeric) 3. sed replaces ' port: N' line in config.yaml 4. Restarts the service 5. Waits 1s, checks if active 6. Prints new access URL or failure message This closes the UX gap: web UI saves port → user runs '3m-ui config port 9000' → script restarts and confirms. feat(scripts): add config port command to 3m-ui management scripts Users changing the panel port from the web UI had to SSH in and run 'systemctl restart 3m-ui' manually — easy to forget and not discoverable. Now both the 3m-ui entry script and 3m-ui.sh manager support: 3m-ui config show — display config.yaml 3m-ui config port <1-65535> — change port + auto-restart The interactive menu (running '3m-ui' with no args) also gains: 9. 修改面板端口 (interactive port change with current/new display) a. 卸载 3m-ui (moved from slot 9 to 'a') Flow: 1. Reads current port from config.yaml 2. Validates new port (1-65535, numeric) 3. sed replaces ' port: N' line in config.yaml 4. Restarts the service 5. Waits 1s, checks if active 6. Prints new access URL or failure message This closes the UX gap: web UI saves port → user runs '3m-ui config port 9000' → script restarts and confirms. feat(scripts): add config port command to 3m-ui management scripts Users changing the panel port from the web UI had to SSH in and run 'systemctl restart 3m-ui' manually — easy to forget and not discoverable. Now both the 3m-ui entry script and 3m-ui.sh manager support: 3m-ui config show — display config.yaml 3m-ui config port <1-65535> — change port + auto-restart The interactive menu (running '3m-ui' with no args) also gains: 9. 修改面板端口 (interactive port change with current/new display) a. 卸载 3m-ui (moved from slot 9 to 'a') Flow: 1. Reads current port from config.yaml 2. Validates new port (1-65535, numeric) 3. sed replaces ' port: N' line in config.yaml 4. Restarts the service 5. Waits 1s, checks if active 6. Prints new access URL or failure message This closes the UX gap: web UI saves port → user runs '3m-ui config port 9000' → script restarts and confirms. feat(scripts): add config port command to 3m-ui management scripts Users changing the panel port from the web UI had to SSH in and run 'systemctl restart 3m-ui' manually — easy to forget and not discoverable. Now both the 3m-ui entry script and 3m-ui.sh manager support: 3m-ui config show — display config.yaml 3m-ui config port <1-65535> — change port + auto-restart The interactive menu (running '3m-ui' with no args) also gains: 9. 修改面板端口 (interactive port change with current/new display) a. 卸载 3m-ui (moved from slot 9 to 'a') Flow: 1. Reads current port from config.yaml 2. Validates new port (1-65535, numeric) 3. sed replaces ' port: N' line in config.yaml 4. Restarts the service 5. Waits 1s, checks if active 6. Prints new access URL or failure message This closes the UX gap: web UI saves port → user runs '3m-ui config port 9000' → script restarts and confirms. feat(scripts): add config port command to 3m-ui management scripts Users changing the panel port from the web UI had to SSH in and run 'systemctl restart 3m-ui' manually — easy to forget and not discoverable. Now both the 3m-ui entry script and 3m-ui.sh manager support: 3m-ui config show — display config.yaml 3m-ui config port <1-65535> — change port + auto-restart The interactive menu (running '3m-ui' with no args) also gains: 9. 修改面板端口 (interactive port change with current/new display) a. 卸载 3m-ui (moved from slot 9 to 'a') Flow: 1. Reads current port from config.yaml 2. Validates new port (1-65535, numeric) 3. sed replaces ' port: N' line in config.yaml 4. Restarts the service 5. Waits 1s, checks if active 6. Prints new access URL or failure message This closes the UX gap: web UI saves port → user runs '3m-ui config port 9000' → script restarts and confirms. |
||
|
風雪
|
7bc01e0298 |
fix(installers): Mihomo checksum via GitHub API digest, best-effort by default
The previous verify_mihomo_sha256 tried to download a SHA256SUMS file
from MetaCubeX/mihomo releases. Mihomo does NOT publish such a file
(verified across v1.17.0 — v1.19.30, all 404), so every install that
reached the Mihomo step failed with:
'Error: Mihomo checksum verification failed.
Set THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 to bypass (NOT recommended).'
Two-part fix:
1. Use GitHub's Release API per-asset 'digest' field instead of a
SHA256SUMS file. GitHub computes sha256 server-side when an asset
is uploaded, so the digest is authoritative even though Mihomo
itself publishes no checksums. Added github_asset_digest() helper
that queries /repos/{repo}/releases/tags/{tag} and parses the
matching asset's digest field (no jq dependency, pure awk).
2. Make Mihomo verification best-effort by default. Anonymous GitHub
API is rate-limited to 60 requests/hour/IP, so hard-failing would
break installs for anyone sharing a NAT IP or after a few retries.
The fail-closed guarantee already covers our own 3m-ui binary
(SHA256SUMS + cosign). Mihomo integrity is additionally protected
by HTTPS transport + the ELF smoke-test.
Users who want strict Mihomo verification can set
THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_MIHOMO=1 to make verification failures abort
(requires GitHub API to be reachable).
Threat model unchanged: our binary is fully verified end-to-end;
Mihomo is an independent project we can only best-effort verify.
The HTTPS download to GitHub + ELF check catches the realistic
threats (network MITM, truncated download, wrong file).
fix(installers): Mihomo checksum via GitHub API digest, best-effort by default
The previous verify_mihomo_sha256 tried to download a SHA256SUMS file
from MetaCubeX/mihomo releases. Mihomo does NOT publish such a file
(verified across v1.17.0 — v1.19.30, all 404), so every install that
reached the Mihomo step failed with:
'Error: Mihomo checksum verification failed.
Set THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 to bypass (NOT recommended).'
Two-part fix:
1. Use GitHub's Release API per-asset 'digest' field instead of a
SHA256SUMS file. GitHub computes sha256 server-side when an asset
is uploaded, so the digest is authoritative even though Mihomo
itself publishes no checksums. Added github_asset_digest() helper
that queries /repos/{repo}/releases/tags/{tag} and parses the
matching asset's digest field (no jq dependency, pure awk).
2. Make Mihomo verification best-effort by default. Anonymous GitHub
API is rate-limited to 60 requests/hour/IP, so hard-failing would
break installs for anyone sharing a NAT IP or after a few retries.
The fail-closed guarantee already covers our own 3m-ui binary
(SHA256SUMS + cosign). Mihomo integrity is additionally protected
by HTTPS transport + the ELF smoke-test.
Users who want strict Mihomo verification can set
THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_MIHOMO=1 to make verification failures abort
(requires GitHub API to be reachable).
Threat model unchanged: our binary is fully verified end-to-end;
Mihomo is an independent project we can only best-effort verify.
The HTTPS download to GitHub + ELF check catches the realistic
threats (network MITM, truncated download, wrong file).
fix(installers): Mihomo checksum via GitHub API digest, best-effort by default
The previous verify_mihomo_sha256 tried to download a SHA256SUMS file
from MetaCubeX/mihomo releases. Mihomo does NOT publish such a file
(verified across v1.17.0 — v1.19.30, all 404), so every install that
reached the Mihomo step failed with:
'Error: Mihomo checksum verification failed.
Set THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 to bypass (NOT recommended).'
Two-part fix:
1. Use GitHub's Release API per-asset 'digest' field instead of a
SHA256SUMS file. GitHub computes sha256 server-side when an asset
is uploaded, so the digest is authoritative even though Mihomo
itself publishes no checksums. Added github_asset_digest() helper
that queries /repos/{repo}/releases/tags/{tag} and parses the
matching asset's digest field (no jq dependency, pure awk).
2. Make Mihomo verification best-effort by default. Anonymous GitHub
API is rate-limited to 60 requests/hour/IP, so hard-failing would
break installs for anyone sharing a NAT IP or after a few retries.
The fail-closed guarantee already covers our own 3m-ui binary
(SHA256SUMS + cosign). Mihomo integrity is additionally protected
by HTTPS transport + the ELF smoke-test.
Users who want strict Mihomo verification can set
THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_MIHOMO=1 to make verification failures abort
(requires GitHub API to be reachable).
Threat model unchanged: our binary is fully verified end-to-end;
Mihomo is an independent project we can only best-effort verify.
The HTTPS download to GitHub + ELF check catches the realistic
threats (network MITM, truncated download, wrong file).
fix(installers): Mihomo checksum via GitHub API digest, best-effort by default
The previous verify_mihomo_sha256 tried to download a SHA256SUMS file
from MetaCubeX/mihomo releases. Mihomo does NOT publish such a file
(verified across v1.17.0 — v1.19.30, all 404), so every install that
reached the Mihomo step failed with:
'Error: Mihomo checksum verification failed.
Set THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 to bypass (NOT recommended).'
Two-part fix:
1. Use GitHub's Release API per-asset 'digest' field instead of a
SHA256SUMS file. GitHub computes sha256 server-side when an asset
is uploaded, so the digest is authoritative even though Mihomo
itself publishes no checksums. Added github_asset_digest() helper
that queries /repos/{repo}/releases/tags/{tag} and parses the
matching asset's digest field (no jq dependency, pure awk).
2. Make Mihomo verification best-effort by default. Anonymous GitHub
API is rate-limited to 60 requests/hour/IP, so hard-failing would
break installs for anyone sharing a NAT IP or after a few retries.
The fail-closed guarantee already covers our own 3m-ui binary
(SHA256SUMS + cosign). Mihomo integrity is additionally protected
by HTTPS transport + the ELF smoke-test.
Users who want strict Mihomo verification can set
THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_MIHOMO=1 to make verification failures abort
(requires GitHub API to be reachable).
Threat model unchanged: our binary is fully verified end-to-end;
Mihomo is an independent project we can only best-effort verify.
The HTTPS download to GitHub + ELF check catches the realistic
threats (network MITM, truncated download, wrong file).
fix(installers): Mihomo checksum via GitHub API digest, best-effort by default
The previous verify_mihomo_sha256 tried to download a SHA256SUMS file
from MetaCubeX/mihomo releases. Mihomo does NOT publish such a file
(verified across v1.17.0 — v1.19.30, all 404), so every install that
reached the Mihomo step failed with:
'Error: Mihomo checksum verification failed.
Set THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 to bypass (NOT recommended).'
Two-part fix:
1. Use GitHub's Release API per-asset 'digest' field instead of a
SHA256SUMS file. GitHub computes sha256 server-side when an asset
is uploaded, so the digest is authoritative even though Mihomo
itself publishes no checksums. Added github_asset_digest() helper
that queries /repos/{repo}/releases/tags/{tag} and parses the
matching asset's digest field (no jq dependency, pure awk).
2. Make Mihomo verification best-effort by default. Anonymous GitHub
API is rate-limited to 60 requests/hour/IP, so hard-failing would
break installs for anyone sharing a NAT IP or after a few retries.
The fail-closed guarantee already covers our own 3m-ui binary
(SHA256SUMS + cosign). Mihomo integrity is additionally protected
by HTTPS transport + the ELF smoke-test.
Users who want strict Mihomo verification can set
THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_MIHOMO=1 to make verification failures abort
(requires GitHub API to be reachable).
Threat model unchanged: our binary is fully verified end-to-end;
Mihomo is an independent project we can only best-effort verify.
The HTTPS download to GitHub + ELF check catches the realistic
threats (network MITM, truncated download, wrong file).
fix(installers): Mihomo checksum via GitHub API digest, best-effort by default
The previous verify_mihomo_sha256 tried to download a SHA256SUMS file
from MetaCubeX/mihomo releases. Mihomo does NOT publish such a file
(verified across v1.17.0 — v1.19.30, all 404), so every install that
reached the Mihomo step failed with:
'Error: Mihomo checksum verification failed.
Set THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 to bypass (NOT recommended).'
Two-part fix:
1. Use GitHub's Release API per-asset 'digest' field instead of a
SHA256SUMS file. GitHub computes sha256 server-side when an asset
is uploaded, so the digest is authoritative even though Mihomo
itself publishes no checksums. Added github_asset_digest() helper
that queries /repos/{repo}/releases/tags/{tag} and parses the
matching asset's digest field (no jq dependency, pure awk).
2. Make Mihomo verification best-effort by default. Anonymous GitHub
API is rate-limited to 60 requests/hour/IP, so hard-failing would
break installs for anyone sharing a NAT IP or after a few retries.
The fail-closed guarantee already covers our own 3m-ui binary
(SHA256SUMS + cosign). Mihomo integrity is additionally protected
by HTTPS transport + the ELF smoke-test.
Users who want strict Mihomo verification can set
THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_MIHOMO=1 to make verification failures abort
(requires GitHub API to be reachable).
Threat model unchanged: our binary is fully verified end-to-end;
Mihomo is an independent project we can only best-effort verify.
The HTTPS download to GitHub + ELF check catches the realistic
threats (network MITM, truncated download, wrong file).
fix(installers): Mihomo checksum via GitHub API digest, best-effort by default
The previous verify_mihomo_sha256 tried to download a SHA256SUMS file
from MetaCubeX/mihomo releases. Mihomo does NOT publish such a file
(verified across v1.17.0 — v1.19.30, all 404), so every install that
reached the Mihomo step failed with:
'Error: Mihomo checksum verification failed.
Set THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 to bypass (NOT recommended).'
Two-part fix:
1. Use GitHub's Release API per-asset 'digest' field instead of a
SHA256SUMS file. GitHub computes sha256 server-side when an asset
is uploaded, so the digest is authoritative even though Mihomo
itself publishes no checksums. Added github_asset_digest() helper
that queries /repos/{repo}/releases/tags/{tag} and parses the
matching asset's digest field (no jq dependency, pure awk).
2. Make Mihomo verification best-effort by default. Anonymous GitHub
API is rate-limited to 60 requests/hour/IP, so hard-failing would
break installs for anyone sharing a NAT IP or after a few retries.
The fail-closed guarantee already covers our own 3m-ui binary
(SHA256SUMS + cosign). Mihomo integrity is additionally protected
by HTTPS transport + the ELF smoke-test.
Users who want strict Mihomo verification can set
THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_MIHOMO=1 to make verification failures abort
(requires GitHub API to be reachable).
Threat model unchanged: our binary is fully verified end-to-end;
Mihomo is an independent project we can only best-effort verify.
The HTTPS download to GitHub + ELF check catches the realistic
threats (network MITM, truncated download, wrong file).
fix(installers): Mihomo checksum via GitHub API digest, best-effort by default
The previous verify_mihomo_sha256 tried to download a SHA256SUMS file
from MetaCubeX/mihomo releases. Mihomo does NOT publish such a file
(verified across v1.17.0 — v1.19.30, all 404), so every install that
reached the Mihomo step failed with:
'Error: Mihomo checksum verification failed.
Set THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 to bypass (NOT recommended).'
Two-part fix:
1. Use GitHub's Release API per-asset 'digest' field instead of a
SHA256SUMS file. GitHub computes sha256 server-side when an asset
is uploaded, so the digest is authoritative even though Mihomo
itself publishes no checksums. Added github_asset_digest() helper
that queries /repos/{repo}/releases/tags/{tag} and parses the
matching asset's digest field (no jq dependency, pure awk).
2. Make Mihomo verification best-effort by default. Anonymous GitHub
API is rate-limited to 60 requests/hour/IP, so hard-failing would
break installs for anyone sharing a NAT IP or after a few retries.
The fail-closed guarantee already covers our own 3m-ui binary
(SHA256SUMS + cosign). Mihomo integrity is additionally protected
by HTTPS transport + the ELF smoke-test.
Users who want strict Mihomo verification can set
THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_MIHOMO=1 to make verification failures abort
(requires GitHub API to be reachable).
Threat model unchanged: our binary is fully verified end-to-end;
Mihomo is an independent project we can only best-effort verify.
The HTTPS download to GitHub + ELF check catches the realistic
threats (network MITM, truncated download, wrong file).
fix(installers): Mihomo checksum via GitHub API digest, best-effort by default
The previous verify_mihomo_sha256 tried to download a SHA256SUMS file
from MetaCubeX/mihomo releases. Mihomo does NOT publish such a file
(verified across v1.17.0 — v1.19.30, all 404), so every install that
reached the Mihomo step failed with:
'Error: Mihomo checksum verification failed.
Set THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 to bypass (NOT recommended).'
Two-part fix:
1. Use GitHub's Release API per-asset 'digest' field instead of a
SHA256SUMS file. GitHub computes sha256 server-side when an asset
is uploaded, so the digest is authoritative even though Mihomo
itself publishes no checksums. Added github_asset_digest() helper
that queries /repos/{repo}/releases/tags/{tag} and parses the
matching asset's digest field (no jq dependency, pure awk).
2. Make Mihomo verification best-effort by default. Anonymous GitHub
API is rate-limited to 60 requests/hour/IP, so hard-failing would
break installs for anyone sharing a NAT IP or after a few retries.
The fail-closed guarantee already covers our own 3m-ui binary
(SHA256SUMS + cosign). Mihomo integrity is additionally protected
by HTTPS transport + the ELF smoke-test.
Users who want strict Mihomo verification can set
THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_MIHOMO=1 to make verification failures abort
(requires GitHub API to be reachable).
Threat model unchanged: our binary is fully verified end-to-end;
Mihomo is an independent project we can only best-effort verify.
The HTTPS download to GitHub + ELF check catches the realistic
threats (network MITM, truncated download, wrong file).
fix(installers): Mihomo checksum via GitHub API digest, best-effort by default
The previous verify_mihomo_sha256 tried to download a SHA256SUMS file
from MetaCubeX/mihomo releases. Mihomo does NOT publish such a file
(verified across v1.17.0 — v1.19.30, all 404), so every install that
reached the Mihomo step failed with:
'Error: Mihomo checksum verification failed.
Set THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 to bypass (NOT recommended).'
Two-part fix:
1. Use GitHub's Release API per-asset 'digest' field instead of a
SHA256SUMS file. GitHub computes sha256 server-side when an asset
is uploaded, so the digest is authoritative even though Mihomo
itself publishes no checksums. Added github_asset_digest() helper
that queries /repos/{repo}/releases/tags/{tag} and parses the
matching asset's digest field (no jq dependency, pure awk).
2. Make Mihomo verification best-effort by default. Anonymous GitHub
API is rate-limited to 60 requests/hour/IP, so hard-failing would
break installs for anyone sharing a NAT IP or after a few retries.
The fail-closed guarantee already covers our own 3m-ui binary
(SHA256SUMS + cosign). Mihomo integrity is additionally protected
by HTTPS transport + the ELF smoke-test.
Users who want strict Mihomo verification can set
THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_MIHOMO=1 to make verification failures abort
(requires GitHub API to be reachable).
Threat model unchanged: our binary is fully verified end-to-end;
Mihomo is an independent project we can only best-effort verify.
The HTTPS download to GitHub + ELF check catches the realistic
threats (network MITM, truncated download, wrong file).
fix(installers): Mihomo checksum via GitHub API digest, best-effort by default
The previous verify_mihomo_sha256 tried to download a SHA256SUMS file
from MetaCubeX/mihomo releases. Mihomo does NOT publish such a file
(verified across v1.17.0 — v1.19.30, all 404), so every install that
reached the Mihomo step failed with:
'Error: Mihomo checksum verification failed.
Set THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 to bypass (NOT recommended).'
Two-part fix:
1. Use GitHub's Release API per-asset 'digest' field instead of a
SHA256SUMS file. GitHub computes sha256 server-side when an asset
is uploaded, so the digest is authoritative even though Mihomo
itself publishes no checksums. Added github_asset_digest() helper
that queries /repos/{repo}/releases/tags/{tag} and parses the
matching asset's digest field (no jq dependency, pure awk).
2. Make Mihomo verification best-effort by default. Anonymous GitHub
API is rate-limited to 60 requests/hour/IP, so hard-failing would
break installs for anyone sharing a NAT IP or after a few retries.
The fail-closed guarantee already covers our own 3m-ui binary
(SHA256SUMS + cosign). Mihomo integrity is additionally protected
by HTTPS transport + the ELF smoke-test.
Users who want strict Mihomo verification can set
THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_MIHOMO=1 to make verification failures abort
(requires GitHub API to be reachable).
Threat model unchanged: our binary is fully verified end-to-end;
Mihomo is an independent project we can only best-effort verify.
The HTTPS download to GitHub + ELF check catches the realistic
threats (network MITM, truncated download, wrong file).
fix(installers): Mihomo checksum via GitHub API digest, best-effort by default
The previous verify_mihomo_sha256 tried to download a SHA256SUMS file
from MetaCubeX/mihomo releases. Mihomo does NOT publish such a file
(verified across v1.17.0 — v1.19.30, all 404), so every install that
reached the Mihomo step failed with:
'Error: Mihomo checksum verification failed.
Set THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 to bypass (NOT recommended).'
Two-part fix:
1. Use GitHub's Release API per-asset 'digest' field instead of a
SHA256SUMS file. GitHub computes sha256 server-side when an asset
is uploaded, so the digest is authoritative even though Mihomo
itself publishes no checksums. Added github_asset_digest() helper
that queries /repos/{repo}/releases/tags/{tag} and parses the
matching asset's digest field (no jq dependency, pure awk).
2. Make Mihomo verification best-effort by default. Anonymous GitHub
API is rate-limited to 60 requests/hour/IP, so hard-failing would
break installs for anyone sharing a NAT IP or after a few retries.
The fail-closed guarantee already covers our own 3m-ui binary
(SHA256SUMS + cosign). Mihomo integrity is additionally protected
by HTTPS transport + the ELF smoke-test.
Users who want strict Mihomo verification can set
THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_MIHOMO=1 to make verification failures abort
(requires GitHub API to be reachable).
Threat model unchanged: our binary is fully verified end-to-end;
Mihomo is an independent project we can only best-effort verify.
The HTTPS download to GitHub + ELF check catches the realistic
threats (network MITM, truncated download, wrong file).
|
||
|
風雪
|
8d730a2d08 |
fix(installers): cosign verify accepts tag-ref or main-branch identity
The back-filled v1.0.0 was signed via workflow_dispatch (ref=main), so its OIDC certificate identity is .../release.yml@refs/heads/main rather than the tag-ref identity .../release.yml@refs/tags/v1.0.0 that tag-pushed releases produce. Make verify_release_cosign try both identities so verification works for both normal tag-triggered releases and workflow_dispatch back-fills. If either matches, verification passes. fix(installers): cosign verify accepts tag-ref or main-branch identity The back-filled v1.0.0 was signed via workflow_dispatch (ref=main), so its OIDC certificate identity is .../release.yml@refs/heads/main rather than the tag-ref identity .../release.yml@refs/tags/v1.0.0 that tag-pushed releases produce. Make verify_release_cosign try both identities so verification works for both normal tag-triggered releases and workflow_dispatch back-fills. If either matches, verification passes. fix(installers): cosign verify accepts tag-ref or main-branch identity The back-filled v1.0.0 was signed via workflow_dispatch (ref=main), so its OIDC certificate identity is .../release.yml@refs/heads/main rather than the tag-ref identity .../release.yml@refs/tags/v1.0.0 that tag-pushed releases produce. Make verify_release_cosign try both identities so verification works for both normal tag-triggered releases and workflow_dispatch back-fills. If either matches, verification passes. fix(installers): cosign verify accepts tag-ref or main-branch identity The back-filled v1.0.0 was signed via workflow_dispatch (ref=main), so its OIDC certificate identity is .../release.yml@refs/heads/main rather than the tag-ref identity .../release.yml@refs/tags/v1.0.0 that tag-pushed releases produce. Make verify_release_cosign try both identities so verification works for both normal tag-triggered releases and workflow_dispatch back-fills. If either matches, verification passes. fix(installers): cosign verify accepts tag-ref or main-branch identity The back-filled v1.0.0 was signed via workflow_dispatch (ref=main), so its OIDC certificate identity is .../release.yml@refs/heads/main rather than the tag-ref identity .../release.yml@refs/tags/v1.0.0 that tag-pushed releases produce. Make verify_release_cosign try both identities so verification works for both normal tag-triggered releases and workflow_dispatch back-fills. If either matches, verification passes. fix(installers): cosign verify accepts tag-ref or main-branch identity The back-filled v1.0.0 was signed via workflow_dispatch (ref=main), so its OIDC certificate identity is .../release.yml@refs/heads/main rather than the tag-ref identity .../release.yml@refs/tags/v1.0.0 that tag-pushed releases produce. Make verify_release_cosign try both identities so verification works for both normal tag-triggered releases and workflow_dispatch back-fills. If either matches, verification passes. fix(installers): cosign verify accepts tag-ref or main-branch identity The back-filled v1.0.0 was signed via workflow_dispatch (ref=main), so its OIDC certificate identity is .../release.yml@refs/heads/main rather than the tag-ref identity .../release.yml@refs/tags/v1.0.0 that tag-pushed releases produce. Make verify_release_cosign try both identities so verification works for both normal tag-triggered releases and workflow_dispatch back-fills. If either matches, verification passes. fix(installers): cosign verify accepts tag-ref or main-branch identity The back-filled v1.0.0 was signed via workflow_dispatch (ref=main), so its OIDC certificate identity is .../release.yml@refs/heads/main rather than the tag-ref identity .../release.yml@refs/tags/v1.0.0 that tag-pushed releases produce. Make verify_release_cosign try both identities so verification works for both normal tag-triggered releases and workflow_dispatch back-fills. If either matches, verification passes. fix(installers): cosign verify accepts tag-ref or main-branch identity The back-filled v1.0.0 was signed via workflow_dispatch (ref=main), so its OIDC certificate identity is .../release.yml@refs/heads/main rather than the tag-ref identity .../release.yml@refs/tags/v1.0.0 that tag-pushed releases produce. Make verify_release_cosign try both identities so verification works for both normal tag-triggered releases and workflow_dispatch back-fills. If either matches, verification passes. fix(installers): cosign verify accepts tag-ref or main-branch identity The back-filled v1.0.0 was signed via workflow_dispatch (ref=main), so its OIDC certificate identity is .../release.yml@refs/heads/main rather than the tag-ref identity .../release.yml@refs/tags/v1.0.0 that tag-pushed releases produce. Make verify_release_cosign try both identities so verification works for both normal tag-triggered releases and workflow_dispatch back-fills. If either matches, verification passes. fix(installers): cosign verify accepts tag-ref or main-branch identity The back-filled v1.0.0 was signed via workflow_dispatch (ref=main), so its OIDC certificate identity is .../release.yml@refs/heads/main rather than the tag-ref identity .../release.yml@refs/tags/v1.0.0 that tag-pushed releases produce. Make verify_release_cosign try both identities so verification works for both normal tag-triggered releases and workflow_dispatch back-fills. If either matches, verification passes. fix(installers): cosign verify accepts tag-ref or main-branch identity The back-filled v1.0.0 was signed via workflow_dispatch (ref=main), so its OIDC certificate identity is .../release.yml@refs/heads/main rather than the tag-ref identity .../release.yml@refs/tags/v1.0.0 that tag-pushed releases produce. Make verify_release_cosign try both identities so verification works for both normal tag-triggered releases and workflow_dispatch back-fills. If either matches, verification passes. |
||
|
風雪
|
4f038eba42 |
feat(release): cosign keyless signing of SHA256SUMS
Closes M-10 (supply-chain authenticity). Replaces the TODO comment with a working cosign keyless OIDC signing flow. Workflow (release.yml): - Add id-token: write permission (required for GitHub OIDC token). - Add sigstore/cosign-installer@v3 step. - After SHA256SUMS is generated, cosign sign-blob --yes produces SHA256SUMS.pem (certificate) and SHA256SUMS.sig (signature). These are uploaded alongside the existing release assets. - No long-lived secret is stored on GitHub; the signing identity is the ephemeral GitHub Actions OIDC token bound to this workflow + tag. - Release notes body updated with the cosign verify-blob command so users know how to verify authenticity end-to-end. Installers (install.sh / update.sh): - Add verify_release_cosign() function. OPT-IN via THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_COSIGN=1 (off by default to keep the curl|bash UX simple — SHA256SUMS integrity is already fail-closed). - When enabled AND cosign is installed, downloads SHA256SUMS.pem + SHA256SUMS.sig and runs cosign verify-blob against the identity 'https://github.com/<repo>/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>'. - If cosign is missing or the release predates signing, prints a warning and continues (does not hard-fail). - If verification runs and FAILS, aborts (fail-closed, bypassable via THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1). Threat model: - Before: SHA256SUMS provided integrity but not authenticity — an attacker who could modify the release assets could also modify SHA256SUMS, defeating the checksum. - After: cosign signature ties SHA256SUMS to the GitHub Actions OIDC identity, so a modified sums file fails signature verification even if the attacker controls the release CDN. Verification command (for end users): cosign verify-blob \ --certificate SHA256SUMS.pem \ --signature SHA256SUMS.sig \ --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/kazeyukiro/3m-ui/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>' \ --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \ SHA256SUMS feat(release): cosign keyless signing of SHA256SUMS Closes M-10 (supply-chain authenticity). Replaces the TODO comment with a working cosign keyless OIDC signing flow. Workflow (release.yml): - Add id-token: write permission (required for GitHub OIDC token). - Add sigstore/cosign-installer@v3 step. - After SHA256SUMS is generated, cosign sign-blob --yes produces SHA256SUMS.pem (certificate) and SHA256SUMS.sig (signature). These are uploaded alongside the existing release assets. - No long-lived secret is stored on GitHub; the signing identity is the ephemeral GitHub Actions OIDC token bound to this workflow + tag. - Release notes body updated with the cosign verify-blob command so users know how to verify authenticity end-to-end. Installers (install.sh / update.sh): - Add verify_release_cosign() function. OPT-IN via THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_COSIGN=1 (off by default to keep the curl|bash UX simple — SHA256SUMS integrity is already fail-closed). - When enabled AND cosign is installed, downloads SHA256SUMS.pem + SHA256SUMS.sig and runs cosign verify-blob against the identity 'https://github.com/<repo>/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>'. - If cosign is missing or the release predates signing, prints a warning and continues (does not hard-fail). - If verification runs and FAILS, aborts (fail-closed, bypassable via THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1). Threat model: - Before: SHA256SUMS provided integrity but not authenticity — an attacker who could modify the release assets could also modify SHA256SUMS, defeating the checksum. - After: cosign signature ties SHA256SUMS to the GitHub Actions OIDC identity, so a modified sums file fails signature verification even if the attacker controls the release CDN. Verification command (for end users): cosign verify-blob \ --certificate SHA256SUMS.pem \ --signature SHA256SUMS.sig \ --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/kazeyukiro/3m-ui/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>' \ --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \ SHA256SUMS feat(release): cosign keyless signing of SHA256SUMS Closes M-10 (supply-chain authenticity). Replaces the TODO comment with a working cosign keyless OIDC signing flow. Workflow (release.yml): - Add id-token: write permission (required for GitHub OIDC token). - Add sigstore/cosign-installer@v3 step. - After SHA256SUMS is generated, cosign sign-blob --yes produces SHA256SUMS.pem (certificate) and SHA256SUMS.sig (signature). These are uploaded alongside the existing release assets. - No long-lived secret is stored on GitHub; the signing identity is the ephemeral GitHub Actions OIDC token bound to this workflow + tag. - Release notes body updated with the cosign verify-blob command so users know how to verify authenticity end-to-end. Installers (install.sh / update.sh): - Add verify_release_cosign() function. OPT-IN via THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_COSIGN=1 (off by default to keep the curl|bash UX simple — SHA256SUMS integrity is already fail-closed). - When enabled AND cosign is installed, downloads SHA256SUMS.pem + SHA256SUMS.sig and runs cosign verify-blob against the identity 'https://github.com/<repo>/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>'. - If cosign is missing or the release predates signing, prints a warning and continues (does not hard-fail). - If verification runs and FAILS, aborts (fail-closed, bypassable via THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1). Threat model: - Before: SHA256SUMS provided integrity but not authenticity — an attacker who could modify the release assets could also modify SHA256SUMS, defeating the checksum. - After: cosign signature ties SHA256SUMS to the GitHub Actions OIDC identity, so a modified sums file fails signature verification even if the attacker controls the release CDN. Verification command (for end users): cosign verify-blob \ --certificate SHA256SUMS.pem \ --signature SHA256SUMS.sig \ --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/kazeyukiro/3m-ui/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>' \ --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \ SHA256SUMS feat(release): cosign keyless signing of SHA256SUMS Closes M-10 (supply-chain authenticity). Replaces the TODO comment with a working cosign keyless OIDC signing flow. Workflow (release.yml): - Add id-token: write permission (required for GitHub OIDC token). - Add sigstore/cosign-installer@v3 step. - After SHA256SUMS is generated, cosign sign-blob --yes produces SHA256SUMS.pem (certificate) and SHA256SUMS.sig (signature). These are uploaded alongside the existing release assets. - No long-lived secret is stored on GitHub; the signing identity is the ephemeral GitHub Actions OIDC token bound to this workflow + tag. - Release notes body updated with the cosign verify-blob command so users know how to verify authenticity end-to-end. Installers (install.sh / update.sh): - Add verify_release_cosign() function. OPT-IN via THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_COSIGN=1 (off by default to keep the curl|bash UX simple — SHA256SUMS integrity is already fail-closed). - When enabled AND cosign is installed, downloads SHA256SUMS.pem + SHA256SUMS.sig and runs cosign verify-blob against the identity 'https://github.com/<repo>/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>'. - If cosign is missing or the release predates signing, prints a warning and continues (does not hard-fail). - If verification runs and FAILS, aborts (fail-closed, bypassable via THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1). Threat model: - Before: SHA256SUMS provided integrity but not authenticity — an attacker who could modify the release assets could also modify SHA256SUMS, defeating the checksum. - After: cosign signature ties SHA256SUMS to the GitHub Actions OIDC identity, so a modified sums file fails signature verification even if the attacker controls the release CDN. Verification command (for end users): cosign verify-blob \ --certificate SHA256SUMS.pem \ --signature SHA256SUMS.sig \ --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/kazeyukiro/3m-ui/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>' \ --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \ SHA256SUMS feat(release): cosign keyless signing of SHA256SUMS Closes M-10 (supply-chain authenticity). Replaces the TODO comment with a working cosign keyless OIDC signing flow. Workflow (release.yml): - Add id-token: write permission (required for GitHub OIDC token). - Add sigstore/cosign-installer@v3 step. - After SHA256SUMS is generated, cosign sign-blob --yes produces SHA256SUMS.pem (certificate) and SHA256SUMS.sig (signature). These are uploaded alongside the existing release assets. - No long-lived secret is stored on GitHub; the signing identity is the ephemeral GitHub Actions OIDC token bound to this workflow + tag. - Release notes body updated with the cosign verify-blob command so users know how to verify authenticity end-to-end. Installers (install.sh / update.sh): - Add verify_release_cosign() function. OPT-IN via THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_COSIGN=1 (off by default to keep the curl|bash UX simple — SHA256SUMS integrity is already fail-closed). - When enabled AND cosign is installed, downloads SHA256SUMS.pem + SHA256SUMS.sig and runs cosign verify-blob against the identity 'https://github.com/<repo>/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>'. - If cosign is missing or the release predates signing, prints a warning and continues (does not hard-fail). - If verification runs and FAILS, aborts (fail-closed, bypassable via THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1). Threat model: - Before: SHA256SUMS provided integrity but not authenticity — an attacker who could modify the release assets could also modify SHA256SUMS, defeating the checksum. - After: cosign signature ties SHA256SUMS to the GitHub Actions OIDC identity, so a modified sums file fails signature verification even if the attacker controls the release CDN. Verification command (for end users): cosign verify-blob \ --certificate SHA256SUMS.pem \ --signature SHA256SUMS.sig \ --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/kazeyukiro/3m-ui/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>' \ --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \ SHA256SUMS feat(release): cosign keyless signing of SHA256SUMS Closes M-10 (supply-chain authenticity). Replaces the TODO comment with a working cosign keyless OIDC signing flow. Workflow (release.yml): - Add id-token: write permission (required for GitHub OIDC token). - Add sigstore/cosign-installer@v3 step. - After SHA256SUMS is generated, cosign sign-blob --yes produces SHA256SUMS.pem (certificate) and SHA256SUMS.sig (signature). These are uploaded alongside the existing release assets. - No long-lived secret is stored on GitHub; the signing identity is the ephemeral GitHub Actions OIDC token bound to this workflow + tag. - Release notes body updated with the cosign verify-blob command so users know how to verify authenticity end-to-end. Installers (install.sh / update.sh): - Add verify_release_cosign() function. OPT-IN via THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_COSIGN=1 (off by default to keep the curl|bash UX simple — SHA256SUMS integrity is already fail-closed). - When enabled AND cosign is installed, downloads SHA256SUMS.pem + SHA256SUMS.sig and runs cosign verify-blob against the identity 'https://github.com/<repo>/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>'. - If cosign is missing or the release predates signing, prints a warning and continues (does not hard-fail). - If verification runs and FAILS, aborts (fail-closed, bypassable via THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1). Threat model: - Before: SHA256SUMS provided integrity but not authenticity — an attacker who could modify the release assets could also modify SHA256SUMS, defeating the checksum. - After: cosign signature ties SHA256SUMS to the GitHub Actions OIDC identity, so a modified sums file fails signature verification even if the attacker controls the release CDN. Verification command (for end users): cosign verify-blob \ --certificate SHA256SUMS.pem \ --signature SHA256SUMS.sig \ --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/kazeyukiro/3m-ui/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>' \ --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \ SHA256SUMS feat(release): cosign keyless signing of SHA256SUMS Closes M-10 (supply-chain authenticity). Replaces the TODO comment with a working cosign keyless OIDC signing flow. Workflow (release.yml): - Add id-token: write permission (required for GitHub OIDC token). - Add sigstore/cosign-installer@v3 step. - After SHA256SUMS is generated, cosign sign-blob --yes produces SHA256SUMS.pem (certificate) and SHA256SUMS.sig (signature). These are uploaded alongside the existing release assets. - No long-lived secret is stored on GitHub; the signing identity is the ephemeral GitHub Actions OIDC token bound to this workflow + tag. - Release notes body updated with the cosign verify-blob command so users know how to verify authenticity end-to-end. Installers (install.sh / update.sh): - Add verify_release_cosign() function. OPT-IN via THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_COSIGN=1 (off by default to keep the curl|bash UX simple — SHA256SUMS integrity is already fail-closed). - When enabled AND cosign is installed, downloads SHA256SUMS.pem + SHA256SUMS.sig and runs cosign verify-blob against the identity 'https://github.com/<repo>/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>'. - If cosign is missing or the release predates signing, prints a warning and continues (does not hard-fail). - If verification runs and FAILS, aborts (fail-closed, bypassable via THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1). Threat model: - Before: SHA256SUMS provided integrity but not authenticity — an attacker who could modify the release assets could also modify SHA256SUMS, defeating the checksum. - After: cosign signature ties SHA256SUMS to the GitHub Actions OIDC identity, so a modified sums file fails signature verification even if the attacker controls the release CDN. Verification command (for end users): cosign verify-blob \ --certificate SHA256SUMS.pem \ --signature SHA256SUMS.sig \ --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/kazeyukiro/3m-ui/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>' \ --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \ SHA256SUMS feat(release): cosign keyless signing of SHA256SUMS Closes M-10 (supply-chain authenticity). Replaces the TODO comment with a working cosign keyless OIDC signing flow. Workflow (release.yml): - Add id-token: write permission (required for GitHub OIDC token). - Add sigstore/cosign-installer@v3 step. - After SHA256SUMS is generated, cosign sign-blob --yes produces SHA256SUMS.pem (certificate) and SHA256SUMS.sig (signature). These are uploaded alongside the existing release assets. - No long-lived secret is stored on GitHub; the signing identity is the ephemeral GitHub Actions OIDC token bound to this workflow + tag. - Release notes body updated with the cosign verify-blob command so users know how to verify authenticity end-to-end. Installers (install.sh / update.sh): - Add verify_release_cosign() function. OPT-IN via THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_COSIGN=1 (off by default to keep the curl|bash UX simple — SHA256SUMS integrity is already fail-closed). - When enabled AND cosign is installed, downloads SHA256SUMS.pem + SHA256SUMS.sig and runs cosign verify-blob against the identity 'https://github.com/<repo>/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>'. - If cosign is missing or the release predates signing, prints a warning and continues (does not hard-fail). - If verification runs and FAILS, aborts (fail-closed, bypassable via THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1). Threat model: - Before: SHA256SUMS provided integrity but not authenticity — an attacker who could modify the release assets could also modify SHA256SUMS, defeating the checksum. - After: cosign signature ties SHA256SUMS to the GitHub Actions OIDC identity, so a modified sums file fails signature verification even if the attacker controls the release CDN. Verification command (for end users): cosign verify-blob \ --certificate SHA256SUMS.pem \ --signature SHA256SUMS.sig \ --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/kazeyukiro/3m-ui/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>' \ --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \ SHA256SUMS feat(release): cosign keyless signing of SHA256SUMS Closes M-10 (supply-chain authenticity). Replaces the TODO comment with a working cosign keyless OIDC signing flow. Workflow (release.yml): - Add id-token: write permission (required for GitHub OIDC token). - Add sigstore/cosign-installer@v3 step. - After SHA256SUMS is generated, cosign sign-blob --yes produces SHA256SUMS.pem (certificate) and SHA256SUMS.sig (signature). These are uploaded alongside the existing release assets. - No long-lived secret is stored on GitHub; the signing identity is the ephemeral GitHub Actions OIDC token bound to this workflow + tag. - Release notes body updated with the cosign verify-blob command so users know how to verify authenticity end-to-end. Installers (install.sh / update.sh): - Add verify_release_cosign() function. OPT-IN via THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_COSIGN=1 (off by default to keep the curl|bash UX simple — SHA256SUMS integrity is already fail-closed). - When enabled AND cosign is installed, downloads SHA256SUMS.pem + SHA256SUMS.sig and runs cosign verify-blob against the identity 'https://github.com/<repo>/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>'. - If cosign is missing or the release predates signing, prints a warning and continues (does not hard-fail). - If verification runs and FAILS, aborts (fail-closed, bypassable via THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1). Threat model: - Before: SHA256SUMS provided integrity but not authenticity — an attacker who could modify the release assets could also modify SHA256SUMS, defeating the checksum. - After: cosign signature ties SHA256SUMS to the GitHub Actions OIDC identity, so a modified sums file fails signature verification even if the attacker controls the release CDN. Verification command (for end users): cosign verify-blob \ --certificate SHA256SUMS.pem \ --signature SHA256SUMS.sig \ --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/kazeyukiro/3m-ui/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>' \ --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \ SHA256SUMS feat(release): cosign keyless signing of SHA256SUMS Closes M-10 (supply-chain authenticity). Replaces the TODO comment with a working cosign keyless OIDC signing flow. Workflow (release.yml): - Add id-token: write permission (required for GitHub OIDC token). - Add sigstore/cosign-installer@v3 step. - After SHA256SUMS is generated, cosign sign-blob --yes produces SHA256SUMS.pem (certificate) and SHA256SUMS.sig (signature). These are uploaded alongside the existing release assets. - No long-lived secret is stored on GitHub; the signing identity is the ephemeral GitHub Actions OIDC token bound to this workflow + tag. - Release notes body updated with the cosign verify-blob command so users know how to verify authenticity end-to-end. Installers (install.sh / update.sh): - Add verify_release_cosign() function. OPT-IN via THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_COSIGN=1 (off by default to keep the curl|bash UX simple — SHA256SUMS integrity is already fail-closed). - When enabled AND cosign is installed, downloads SHA256SUMS.pem + SHA256SUMS.sig and runs cosign verify-blob against the identity 'https://github.com/<repo>/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>'. - If cosign is missing or the release predates signing, prints a warning and continues (does not hard-fail). - If verification runs and FAILS, aborts (fail-closed, bypassable via THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1). Threat model: - Before: SHA256SUMS provided integrity but not authenticity — an attacker who could modify the release assets could also modify SHA256SUMS, defeating the checksum. - After: cosign signature ties SHA256SUMS to the GitHub Actions OIDC identity, so a modified sums file fails signature verification even if the attacker controls the release CDN. Verification command (for end users): cosign verify-blob \ --certificate SHA256SUMS.pem \ --signature SHA256SUMS.sig \ --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/kazeyukiro/3m-ui/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>' \ --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \ SHA256SUMS feat(release): cosign keyless signing of SHA256SUMS Closes M-10 (supply-chain authenticity). Replaces the TODO comment with a working cosign keyless OIDC signing flow. Workflow (release.yml): - Add id-token: write permission (required for GitHub OIDC token). - Add sigstore/cosign-installer@v3 step. - After SHA256SUMS is generated, cosign sign-blob --yes produces SHA256SUMS.pem (certificate) and SHA256SUMS.sig (signature). These are uploaded alongside the existing release assets. - No long-lived secret is stored on GitHub; the signing identity is the ephemeral GitHub Actions OIDC token bound to this workflow + tag. - Release notes body updated with the cosign verify-blob command so users know how to verify authenticity end-to-end. Installers (install.sh / update.sh): - Add verify_release_cosign() function. OPT-IN via THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_COSIGN=1 (off by default to keep the curl|bash UX simple — SHA256SUMS integrity is already fail-closed). - When enabled AND cosign is installed, downloads SHA256SUMS.pem + SHA256SUMS.sig and runs cosign verify-blob against the identity 'https://github.com/<repo>/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>'. - If cosign is missing or the release predates signing, prints a warning and continues (does not hard-fail). - If verification runs and FAILS, aborts (fail-closed, bypassable via THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1). Threat model: - Before: SHA256SUMS provided integrity but not authenticity — an attacker who could modify the release assets could also modify SHA256SUMS, defeating the checksum. - After: cosign signature ties SHA256SUMS to the GitHub Actions OIDC identity, so a modified sums file fails signature verification even if the attacker controls the release CDN. Verification command (for end users): cosign verify-blob \ --certificate SHA256SUMS.pem \ --signature SHA256SUMS.sig \ --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/kazeyukiro/3m-ui/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>' \ --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \ SHA256SUMS feat(release): cosign keyless signing of SHA256SUMS Closes M-10 (supply-chain authenticity). Replaces the TODO comment with a working cosign keyless OIDC signing flow. Workflow (release.yml): - Add id-token: write permission (required for GitHub OIDC token). - Add sigstore/cosign-installer@v3 step. - After SHA256SUMS is generated, cosign sign-blob --yes produces SHA256SUMS.pem (certificate) and SHA256SUMS.sig (signature). These are uploaded alongside the existing release assets. - No long-lived secret is stored on GitHub; the signing identity is the ephemeral GitHub Actions OIDC token bound to this workflow + tag. - Release notes body updated with the cosign verify-blob command so users know how to verify authenticity end-to-end. Installers (install.sh / update.sh): - Add verify_release_cosign() function. OPT-IN via THREE_M_UI_VERIFY_COSIGN=1 (off by default to keep the curl|bash UX simple — SHA256SUMS integrity is already fail-closed). - When enabled AND cosign is installed, downloads SHA256SUMS.pem + SHA256SUMS.sig and runs cosign verify-blob against the identity 'https://github.com/<repo>/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>'. - If cosign is missing or the release predates signing, prints a warning and continues (does not hard-fail). - If verification runs and FAILS, aborts (fail-closed, bypassable via THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1). Threat model: - Before: SHA256SUMS provided integrity but not authenticity — an attacker who could modify the release assets could also modify SHA256SUMS, defeating the checksum. - After: cosign signature ties SHA256SUMS to the GitHub Actions OIDC identity, so a modified sums file fails signature verification even if the attacker controls the release CDN. Verification command (for end users): cosign verify-blob \ --certificate SHA256SUMS.pem \ --signature SHA256SUMS.sig \ --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/kazeyukiro/3m-ui/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag>' \ --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \ SHA256SUMS |
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風雪
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39608cd0fb |
fix(infra): fail-closed checksums, sandbox hardening, non-root Docker
Critical (supply chain): - C-3: Mihomo binary download had no checksum. Add verify_mihomo_sha256() downloading MetaCubeX SHA256SUMS and verifying the .gz BEFORE decompression. Mismatch is fatal. - C-4: verify_release_sha256 soft-failed (return 0) when SHA256SUMS was missing or asset unlisted. Now fail-closed: err exit unless the operator sets THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 (prints a loud WARNING). sha256 tooling is now a hard dependency. - C-5: Downloaded binaries were executed as root (--version / -v) for smoke-testing. Remove every invocation; rely on checksum + 'file' ELF check instead. - H-1: Drop raw.githubusercontent.com fallback for helper scripts. Missing release asset now hard-fails (supply-chain posture). Sandbox: - H-2: systemd unit gains UMask=0077, ProtectSystem=strict, ProtectHome, PrivateTmp, PrivateDevices, ProtectKernelTunables/ Modules/Logs, ProtectControlGroups, ReadWritePaths, RestrictAddressFamilies, RestrictNamespaces, RestrictRealtime, RestrictSUIDSGID, LockPersonality, SystemCallArchitectures=native, SystemCallFilter=@system-service ~@privileged @resources. CapabilityBoundingSet now includes CAP_NET_ADMIN for Mihomo TUN. - C-4(Docker): Dockerfile creates non-root user 3m-ui (UID 10001), pre-creates & chowns volumes, sets USER 10001:10001. - M-3: docker-compose ports 8080:8080 -> 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 (loopback-only by default; operator uses reverse proxy). - M-9: docker-compose gains security notes (reverse-proxy guidance, admin/admin + forced first-login change, THREE_M_UI_ADMIN_PASSWORD example, UID 10001 volume ownership). - M-10: release.yml gains a TODO comment for cosign keyless signing. - LOW: AGENTS.md Go 1.24+ -> Go 1.25+; install.sh final message now 'Initial administrator: admin / admin. You MUST change the password on first login.' fix(infra): fail-closed checksums, sandbox hardening, non-root Docker Critical (supply chain): - C-3: Mihomo binary download had no checksum. Add verify_mihomo_sha256() downloading MetaCubeX SHA256SUMS and verifying the .gz BEFORE decompression. Mismatch is fatal. - C-4: verify_release_sha256 soft-failed (return 0) when SHA256SUMS was missing or asset unlisted. Now fail-closed: err exit unless the operator sets THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 (prints a loud WARNING). sha256 tooling is now a hard dependency. - C-5: Downloaded binaries were executed as root (--version / -v) for smoke-testing. Remove every invocation; rely on checksum + 'file' ELF check instead. - H-1: Drop raw.githubusercontent.com fallback for helper scripts. Missing release asset now hard-fails (supply-chain posture). Sandbox: - H-2: systemd unit gains UMask=0077, ProtectSystem=strict, ProtectHome, PrivateTmp, PrivateDevices, ProtectKernelTunables/ Modules/Logs, ProtectControlGroups, ReadWritePaths, RestrictAddressFamilies, RestrictNamespaces, RestrictRealtime, RestrictSUIDSGID, LockPersonality, SystemCallArchitectures=native, SystemCallFilter=@system-service ~@privileged @resources. CapabilityBoundingSet now includes CAP_NET_ADMIN for Mihomo TUN. - C-4(Docker): Dockerfile creates non-root user 3m-ui (UID 10001), pre-creates & chowns volumes, sets USER 10001:10001. - M-3: docker-compose ports 8080:8080 -> 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 (loopback-only by default; operator uses reverse proxy). - M-9: docker-compose gains security notes (reverse-proxy guidance, admin/admin + forced first-login change, THREE_M_UI_ADMIN_PASSWORD example, UID 10001 volume ownership). - M-10: release.yml gains a TODO comment for cosign keyless signing. - LOW: AGENTS.md Go 1.24+ -> Go 1.25+; install.sh final message now 'Initial administrator: admin / admin. You MUST change the password on first login.' fix(infra): fail-closed checksums, sandbox hardening, non-root Docker Critical (supply chain): - C-3: Mihomo binary download had no checksum. Add verify_mihomo_sha256() downloading MetaCubeX SHA256SUMS and verifying the .gz BEFORE decompression. Mismatch is fatal. - C-4: verify_release_sha256 soft-failed (return 0) when SHA256SUMS was missing or asset unlisted. Now fail-closed: err exit unless the operator sets THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 (prints a loud WARNING). sha256 tooling is now a hard dependency. - C-5: Downloaded binaries were executed as root (--version / -v) for smoke-testing. Remove every invocation; rely on checksum + 'file' ELF check instead. - H-1: Drop raw.githubusercontent.com fallback for helper scripts. Missing release asset now hard-fails (supply-chain posture). Sandbox: - H-2: systemd unit gains UMask=0077, ProtectSystem=strict, ProtectHome, PrivateTmp, PrivateDevices, ProtectKernelTunables/ Modules/Logs, ProtectControlGroups, ReadWritePaths, RestrictAddressFamilies, RestrictNamespaces, RestrictRealtime, RestrictSUIDSGID, LockPersonality, SystemCallArchitectures=native, SystemCallFilter=@system-service ~@privileged @resources. CapabilityBoundingSet now includes CAP_NET_ADMIN for Mihomo TUN. - C-4(Docker): Dockerfile creates non-root user 3m-ui (UID 10001), pre-creates & chowns volumes, sets USER 10001:10001. - M-3: docker-compose ports 8080:8080 -> 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 (loopback-only by default; operator uses reverse proxy). - M-9: docker-compose gains security notes (reverse-proxy guidance, admin/admin + forced first-login change, THREE_M_UI_ADMIN_PASSWORD example, UID 10001 volume ownership). - M-10: release.yml gains a TODO comment for cosign keyless signing. - LOW: AGENTS.md Go 1.24+ -> Go 1.25+; install.sh final message now 'Initial administrator: admin / admin. You MUST change the password on first login.' fix(infra): fail-closed checksums, sandbox hardening, non-root Docker Critical (supply chain): - C-3: Mihomo binary download had no checksum. Add verify_mihomo_sha256() downloading MetaCubeX SHA256SUMS and verifying the .gz BEFORE decompression. Mismatch is fatal. - C-4: verify_release_sha256 soft-failed (return 0) when SHA256SUMS was missing or asset unlisted. Now fail-closed: err exit unless the operator sets THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 (prints a loud WARNING). sha256 tooling is now a hard dependency. - C-5: Downloaded binaries were executed as root (--version / -v) for smoke-testing. Remove every invocation; rely on checksum + 'file' ELF check instead. - H-1: Drop raw.githubusercontent.com fallback for helper scripts. Missing release asset now hard-fails (supply-chain posture). Sandbox: - H-2: systemd unit gains UMask=0077, ProtectSystem=strict, ProtectHome, PrivateTmp, PrivateDevices, ProtectKernelTunables/ Modules/Logs, ProtectControlGroups, ReadWritePaths, RestrictAddressFamilies, RestrictNamespaces, RestrictRealtime, RestrictSUIDSGID, LockPersonality, SystemCallArchitectures=native, SystemCallFilter=@system-service ~@privileged @resources. CapabilityBoundingSet now includes CAP_NET_ADMIN for Mihomo TUN. - C-4(Docker): Dockerfile creates non-root user 3m-ui (UID 10001), pre-creates & chowns volumes, sets USER 10001:10001. - M-3: docker-compose ports 8080:8080 -> 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 (loopback-only by default; operator uses reverse proxy). - M-9: docker-compose gains security notes (reverse-proxy guidance, admin/admin + forced first-login change, THREE_M_UI_ADMIN_PASSWORD example, UID 10001 volume ownership). - M-10: release.yml gains a TODO comment for cosign keyless signing. - LOW: AGENTS.md Go 1.24+ -> Go 1.25+; install.sh final message now 'Initial administrator: admin / admin. You MUST change the password on first login.' fix(infra): fail-closed checksums, sandbox hardening, non-root Docker Critical (supply chain): - C-3: Mihomo binary download had no checksum. Add verify_mihomo_sha256() downloading MetaCubeX SHA256SUMS and verifying the .gz BEFORE decompression. Mismatch is fatal. - C-4: verify_release_sha256 soft-failed (return 0) when SHA256SUMS was missing or asset unlisted. Now fail-closed: err exit unless the operator sets THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 (prints a loud WARNING). sha256 tooling is now a hard dependency. - C-5: Downloaded binaries were executed as root (--version / -v) for smoke-testing. Remove every invocation; rely on checksum + 'file' ELF check instead. - H-1: Drop raw.githubusercontent.com fallback for helper scripts. Missing release asset now hard-fails (supply-chain posture). Sandbox: - H-2: systemd unit gains UMask=0077, ProtectSystem=strict, ProtectHome, PrivateTmp, PrivateDevices, ProtectKernelTunables/ Modules/Logs, ProtectControlGroups, ReadWritePaths, RestrictAddressFamilies, RestrictNamespaces, RestrictRealtime, RestrictSUIDSGID, LockPersonality, SystemCallArchitectures=native, SystemCallFilter=@system-service ~@privileged @resources. CapabilityBoundingSet now includes CAP_NET_ADMIN for Mihomo TUN. - C-4(Docker): Dockerfile creates non-root user 3m-ui (UID 10001), pre-creates & chowns volumes, sets USER 10001:10001. - M-3: docker-compose ports 8080:8080 -> 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 (loopback-only by default; operator uses reverse proxy). - M-9: docker-compose gains security notes (reverse-proxy guidance, admin/admin + forced first-login change, THREE_M_UI_ADMIN_PASSWORD example, UID 10001 volume ownership). - M-10: release.yml gains a TODO comment for cosign keyless signing. - LOW: AGENTS.md Go 1.24+ -> Go 1.25+; install.sh final message now 'Initial administrator: admin / admin. You MUST change the password on first login.' fix(infra): fail-closed checksums, sandbox hardening, non-root Docker Critical (supply chain): - C-3: Mihomo binary download had no checksum. Add verify_mihomo_sha256() downloading MetaCubeX SHA256SUMS and verifying the .gz BEFORE decompression. Mismatch is fatal. - C-4: verify_release_sha256 soft-failed (return 0) when SHA256SUMS was missing or asset unlisted. Now fail-closed: err exit unless the operator sets THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 (prints a loud WARNING). sha256 tooling is now a hard dependency. - C-5: Downloaded binaries were executed as root (--version / -v) for smoke-testing. Remove every invocation; rely on checksum + 'file' ELF check instead. - H-1: Drop raw.githubusercontent.com fallback for helper scripts. Missing release asset now hard-fails (supply-chain posture). Sandbox: - H-2: systemd unit gains UMask=0077, ProtectSystem=strict, ProtectHome, PrivateTmp, PrivateDevices, ProtectKernelTunables/ Modules/Logs, ProtectControlGroups, ReadWritePaths, RestrictAddressFamilies, RestrictNamespaces, RestrictRealtime, RestrictSUIDSGID, LockPersonality, SystemCallArchitectures=native, SystemCallFilter=@system-service ~@privileged @resources. CapabilityBoundingSet now includes CAP_NET_ADMIN for Mihomo TUN. - C-4(Docker): Dockerfile creates non-root user 3m-ui (UID 10001), pre-creates & chowns volumes, sets USER 10001:10001. - M-3: docker-compose ports 8080:8080 -> 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 (loopback-only by default; operator uses reverse proxy). - M-9: docker-compose gains security notes (reverse-proxy guidance, admin/admin + forced first-login change, THREE_M_UI_ADMIN_PASSWORD example, UID 10001 volume ownership). - M-10: release.yml gains a TODO comment for cosign keyless signing. - LOW: AGENTS.md Go 1.24+ -> Go 1.25+; install.sh final message now 'Initial administrator: admin / admin. You MUST change the password on first login.' fix(infra): fail-closed checksums, sandbox hardening, non-root Docker Critical (supply chain): - C-3: Mihomo binary download had no checksum. Add verify_mihomo_sha256() downloading MetaCubeX SHA256SUMS and verifying the .gz BEFORE decompression. Mismatch is fatal. - C-4: verify_release_sha256 soft-failed (return 0) when SHA256SUMS was missing or asset unlisted. Now fail-closed: err exit unless the operator sets THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 (prints a loud WARNING). sha256 tooling is now a hard dependency. - C-5: Downloaded binaries were executed as root (--version / -v) for smoke-testing. Remove every invocation; rely on checksum + 'file' ELF check instead. - H-1: Drop raw.githubusercontent.com fallback for helper scripts. Missing release asset now hard-fails (supply-chain posture). Sandbox: - H-2: systemd unit gains UMask=0077, ProtectSystem=strict, ProtectHome, PrivateTmp, PrivateDevices, ProtectKernelTunables/ Modules/Logs, ProtectControlGroups, ReadWritePaths, RestrictAddressFamilies, RestrictNamespaces, RestrictRealtime, RestrictSUIDSGID, LockPersonality, SystemCallArchitectures=native, SystemCallFilter=@system-service ~@privileged @resources. CapabilityBoundingSet now includes CAP_NET_ADMIN for Mihomo TUN. - C-4(Docker): Dockerfile creates non-root user 3m-ui (UID 10001), pre-creates & chowns volumes, sets USER 10001:10001. - M-3: docker-compose ports 8080:8080 -> 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 (loopback-only by default; operator uses reverse proxy). - M-9: docker-compose gains security notes (reverse-proxy guidance, admin/admin + forced first-login change, THREE_M_UI_ADMIN_PASSWORD example, UID 10001 volume ownership). - M-10: release.yml gains a TODO comment for cosign keyless signing. - LOW: AGENTS.md Go 1.24+ -> Go 1.25+; install.sh final message now 'Initial administrator: admin / admin. You MUST change the password on first login.' fix(infra): fail-closed checksums, sandbox hardening, non-root Docker Critical (supply chain): - C-3: Mihomo binary download had no checksum. Add verify_mihomo_sha256() downloading MetaCubeX SHA256SUMS and verifying the .gz BEFORE decompression. Mismatch is fatal. - C-4: verify_release_sha256 soft-failed (return 0) when SHA256SUMS was missing or asset unlisted. Now fail-closed: err exit unless the operator sets THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 (prints a loud WARNING). sha256 tooling is now a hard dependency. - C-5: Downloaded binaries were executed as root (--version / -v) for smoke-testing. Remove every invocation; rely on checksum + 'file' ELF check instead. - H-1: Drop raw.githubusercontent.com fallback for helper scripts. Missing release asset now hard-fails (supply-chain posture). Sandbox: - H-2: systemd unit gains UMask=0077, ProtectSystem=strict, ProtectHome, PrivateTmp, PrivateDevices, ProtectKernelTunables/ Modules/Logs, ProtectControlGroups, ReadWritePaths, RestrictAddressFamilies, RestrictNamespaces, RestrictRealtime, RestrictSUIDSGID, LockPersonality, SystemCallArchitectures=native, SystemCallFilter=@system-service ~@privileged @resources. CapabilityBoundingSet now includes CAP_NET_ADMIN for Mihomo TUN. - C-4(Docker): Dockerfile creates non-root user 3m-ui (UID 10001), pre-creates & chowns volumes, sets USER 10001:10001. - M-3: docker-compose ports 8080:8080 -> 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 (loopback-only by default; operator uses reverse proxy). - M-9: docker-compose gains security notes (reverse-proxy guidance, admin/admin + forced first-login change, THREE_M_UI_ADMIN_PASSWORD example, UID 10001 volume ownership). - M-10: release.yml gains a TODO comment for cosign keyless signing. - LOW: AGENTS.md Go 1.24+ -> Go 1.25+; install.sh final message now 'Initial administrator: admin / admin. You MUST change the password on first login.' fix(infra): fail-closed checksums, sandbox hardening, non-root Docker Critical (supply chain): - C-3: Mihomo binary download had no checksum. Add verify_mihomo_sha256() downloading MetaCubeX SHA256SUMS and verifying the .gz BEFORE decompression. Mismatch is fatal. - C-4: verify_release_sha256 soft-failed (return 0) when SHA256SUMS was missing or asset unlisted. Now fail-closed: err exit unless the operator sets THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 (prints a loud WARNING). sha256 tooling is now a hard dependency. - C-5: Downloaded binaries were executed as root (--version / -v) for smoke-testing. Remove every invocation; rely on checksum + 'file' ELF check instead. - H-1: Drop raw.githubusercontent.com fallback for helper scripts. Missing release asset now hard-fails (supply-chain posture). Sandbox: - H-2: systemd unit gains UMask=0077, ProtectSystem=strict, ProtectHome, PrivateTmp, PrivateDevices, ProtectKernelTunables/ Modules/Logs, ProtectControlGroups, ReadWritePaths, RestrictAddressFamilies, RestrictNamespaces, RestrictRealtime, RestrictSUIDSGID, LockPersonality, SystemCallArchitectures=native, SystemCallFilter=@system-service ~@privileged @resources. CapabilityBoundingSet now includes CAP_NET_ADMIN for Mihomo TUN. - C-4(Docker): Dockerfile creates non-root user 3m-ui (UID 10001), pre-creates & chowns volumes, sets USER 10001:10001. - M-3: docker-compose ports 8080:8080 -> 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 (loopback-only by default; operator uses reverse proxy). - M-9: docker-compose gains security notes (reverse-proxy guidance, admin/admin + forced first-login change, THREE_M_UI_ADMIN_PASSWORD example, UID 10001 volume ownership). - M-10: release.yml gains a TODO comment for cosign keyless signing. - LOW: AGENTS.md Go 1.24+ -> Go 1.25+; install.sh final message now 'Initial administrator: admin / admin. You MUST change the password on first login.' fix(infra): fail-closed checksums, sandbox hardening, non-root Docker Critical (supply chain): - C-3: Mihomo binary download had no checksum. Add verify_mihomo_sha256() downloading MetaCubeX SHA256SUMS and verifying the .gz BEFORE decompression. Mismatch is fatal. - C-4: verify_release_sha256 soft-failed (return 0) when SHA256SUMS was missing or asset unlisted. Now fail-closed: err exit unless the operator sets THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 (prints a loud WARNING). sha256 tooling is now a hard dependency. - C-5: Downloaded binaries were executed as root (--version / -v) for smoke-testing. Remove every invocation; rely on checksum + 'file' ELF check instead. - H-1: Drop raw.githubusercontent.com fallback for helper scripts. Missing release asset now hard-fails (supply-chain posture). Sandbox: - H-2: systemd unit gains UMask=0077, ProtectSystem=strict, ProtectHome, PrivateTmp, PrivateDevices, ProtectKernelTunables/ Modules/Logs, ProtectControlGroups, ReadWritePaths, RestrictAddressFamilies, RestrictNamespaces, RestrictRealtime, RestrictSUIDSGID, LockPersonality, SystemCallArchitectures=native, SystemCallFilter=@system-service ~@privileged @resources. CapabilityBoundingSet now includes CAP_NET_ADMIN for Mihomo TUN. - C-4(Docker): Dockerfile creates non-root user 3m-ui (UID 10001), pre-creates & chowns volumes, sets USER 10001:10001. - M-3: docker-compose ports 8080:8080 -> 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 (loopback-only by default; operator uses reverse proxy). - M-9: docker-compose gains security notes (reverse-proxy guidance, admin/admin + forced first-login change, THREE_M_UI_ADMIN_PASSWORD example, UID 10001 volume ownership). - M-10: release.yml gains a TODO comment for cosign keyless signing. - LOW: AGENTS.md Go 1.24+ -> Go 1.25+; install.sh final message now 'Initial administrator: admin / admin. You MUST change the password on first login.' fix(infra): fail-closed checksums, sandbox hardening, non-root Docker Critical (supply chain): - C-3: Mihomo binary download had no checksum. Add verify_mihomo_sha256() downloading MetaCubeX SHA256SUMS and verifying the .gz BEFORE decompression. Mismatch is fatal. - C-4: verify_release_sha256 soft-failed (return 0) when SHA256SUMS was missing or asset unlisted. Now fail-closed: err exit unless the operator sets THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 (prints a loud WARNING). sha256 tooling is now a hard dependency. - C-5: Downloaded binaries were executed as root (--version / -v) for smoke-testing. Remove every invocation; rely on checksum + 'file' ELF check instead. - H-1: Drop raw.githubusercontent.com fallback for helper scripts. Missing release asset now hard-fails (supply-chain posture). Sandbox: - H-2: systemd unit gains UMask=0077, ProtectSystem=strict, ProtectHome, PrivateTmp, PrivateDevices, ProtectKernelTunables/ Modules/Logs, ProtectControlGroups, ReadWritePaths, RestrictAddressFamilies, RestrictNamespaces, RestrictRealtime, RestrictSUIDSGID, LockPersonality, SystemCallArchitectures=native, SystemCallFilter=@system-service ~@privileged @resources. CapabilityBoundingSet now includes CAP_NET_ADMIN for Mihomo TUN. - C-4(Docker): Dockerfile creates non-root user 3m-ui (UID 10001), pre-creates & chowns volumes, sets USER 10001:10001. - M-3: docker-compose ports 8080:8080 -> 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 (loopback-only by default; operator uses reverse proxy). - M-9: docker-compose gains security notes (reverse-proxy guidance, admin/admin + forced first-login change, THREE_M_UI_ADMIN_PASSWORD example, UID 10001 volume ownership). - M-10: release.yml gains a TODO comment for cosign keyless signing. - LOW: AGENTS.md Go 1.24+ -> Go 1.25+; install.sh final message now 'Initial administrator: admin / admin. You MUST change the password on first login.' fix(infra): fail-closed checksums, sandbox hardening, non-root Docker Critical (supply chain): - C-3: Mihomo binary download had no checksum. Add verify_mihomo_sha256() downloading MetaCubeX SHA256SUMS and verifying the .gz BEFORE decompression. Mismatch is fatal. - C-4: verify_release_sha256 soft-failed (return 0) when SHA256SUMS was missing or asset unlisted. Now fail-closed: err exit unless the operator sets THREE_M_UI_INSECURE=1 (prints a loud WARNING). sha256 tooling is now a hard dependency. - C-5: Downloaded binaries were executed as root (--version / -v) for smoke-testing. Remove every invocation; rely on checksum + 'file' ELF check instead. - H-1: Drop raw.githubusercontent.com fallback for helper scripts. Missing release asset now hard-fails (supply-chain posture). Sandbox: - H-2: systemd unit gains UMask=0077, ProtectSystem=strict, ProtectHome, PrivateTmp, PrivateDevices, ProtectKernelTunables/ Modules/Logs, ProtectControlGroups, ReadWritePaths, RestrictAddressFamilies, RestrictNamespaces, RestrictRealtime, RestrictSUIDSGID, LockPersonality, SystemCallArchitectures=native, SystemCallFilter=@system-service ~@privileged @resources. CapabilityBoundingSet now includes CAP_NET_ADMIN for Mihomo TUN. - C-4(Docker): Dockerfile creates non-root user 3m-ui (UID 10001), pre-creates & chowns volumes, sets USER 10001:10001. - M-3: docker-compose ports 8080:8080 -> 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 (loopback-only by default; operator uses reverse proxy). - M-9: docker-compose gains security notes (reverse-proxy guidance, admin/admin + forced first-login change, THREE_M_UI_ADMIN_PASSWORD example, UID 10001 volume ownership). - M-10: release.yml gains a TODO comment for cosign keyless signing. - LOW: AGENTS.md Go 1.24+ -> Go 1.25+; install.sh final message now 'Initial administrator: admin / admin. You MUST change the password on first login.' |
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風雪
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1d1a69bf74 | feat(nat): custom panel port/listen/public_url via env, API, settings UI, install.sh | ||
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風雪
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bb875405b3 | fix(scripts): update.sh match SHA256SUMS with or without ./ prefix | ||
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風雪
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5cdbedaabf | fix: restore install.sh + SHA256SUMS basename matching | ||
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風雪
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52a66c88cc | fix: SHA256SUMS basename match; attach scripts to release assets | ||
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風雪
|
1a79102cac |
revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions
revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions |
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風雪
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29ccad2597 |
revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions
revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions revert(scripts): restore pre-s-ui menu/banner versions |
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風雪
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6a859d2e60 | feat(install): s-ui style finish banner with panel URLs | ||
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風雪
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392649c005 | feat(scripts): s-ui style installer UX — colors, menu, panel URL, one-liner | ||
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風雪
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4585f304a6 | fix(scripts): checksum verify, versioned update, backup retention, safer traps | ||
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風雪
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82713edf82 |
fix: panel must start even if Mihomo/SSL fails on boot
- Soft-fail ApplyConfig / config generation / SSL bind so the management UI remains reachable after deploy - Preserve os.IsNotExist in ConfigManager.ReadConfig (first-boot path) - systemd unit: CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE + LimitNOFILE for optional ACME fix: panel must start even if Mihomo/SSL fails on boot - Soft-fail ApplyConfig / config generation / SSL bind so the management UI remains reachable after deploy - Preserve os.IsNotExist in ConfigManager.ReadConfig (first-boot path) - systemd unit: CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE + LimitNOFILE for optional ACME fix: panel must start even if Mihomo/SSL fails on boot - Soft-fail ApplyConfig / config generation / SSL bind so the management UI remains reachable after deploy - Preserve os.IsNotExist in ConfigManager.ReadConfig (first-boot path) - systemd unit: CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE + LimitNOFILE for optional ACME fix: panel must start even if Mihomo/SSL fails on boot - Soft-fail ApplyConfig / config generation / SSL bind so the management UI remains reachable after deploy - Preserve os.IsNotExist in ConfigManager.ReadConfig (first-boot path) - systemd unit: CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE + LimitNOFILE for optional ACME fix: panel must start even if Mihomo/SSL fails on boot - Soft-fail ApplyConfig / config generation / SSL bind so the management UI remains reachable after deploy - Preserve os.IsNotExist in ConfigManager.ReadConfig (first-boot path) - systemd unit: CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE + LimitNOFILE for optional ACME fix: panel must start even if Mihomo/SSL fails on boot - Soft-fail ApplyConfig / config generation / SSL bind so the management UI remains reachable after deploy - Preserve os.IsNotExist in ConfigManager.ReadConfig (first-boot path) - systemd unit: CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE + LimitNOFILE for optional ACME fix: panel must start even if Mihomo/SSL fails on boot - Soft-fail ApplyConfig / config generation / SSL bind so the management UI remains reachable after deploy - Preserve os.IsNotExist in ConfigManager.ReadConfig (first-boot path) - systemd unit: CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE + LimitNOFILE for optional ACME fix: panel must start even if Mihomo/SSL fails on boot - Soft-fail ApplyConfig / config generation / SSL bind so the management UI remains reachable after deploy - Preserve os.IsNotExist in ConfigManager.ReadConfig (first-boot path) - systemd unit: CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE + LimitNOFILE for optional ACME fix: panel must start even if Mihomo/SSL fails on boot - Soft-fail ApplyConfig / config generation / SSL bind so the management UI remains reachable after deploy - Preserve os.IsNotExist in ConfigManager.ReadConfig (first-boot path) - systemd unit: CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE + LimitNOFILE for optional ACME fix: panel must start even if Mihomo/SSL fails on boot - Soft-fail ApplyConfig / config generation / SSL bind so the management UI remains reachable after deploy - Preserve os.IsNotExist in ConfigManager.ReadConfig (first-boot path) - systemd unit: CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE + LimitNOFILE for optional ACME fix: panel must start even if Mihomo/SSL fails on boot - Soft-fail ApplyConfig / config generation / SSL bind so the management UI remains reachable after deploy - Preserve os.IsNotExist in ConfigManager.ReadConfig (first-boot path) - systemd unit: CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE + LimitNOFILE for optional ACME fix: panel must start even if Mihomo/SSL fails on boot - Soft-fail ApplyConfig / config generation / SSL bind so the management UI remains reachable after deploy - Preserve os.IsNotExist in ConfigManager.ReadConfig (first-boot path) - systemd unit: CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE + LimitNOFILE for optional ACME |
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風雪
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4d6241740d |
feat: complete panel ACME SSL, sub HTML templates, Telegram alerts wiring
Wire acme/subpage into app and router, native v2ray/base64 subscription, Delete depleted UI, Settings panels for SSL and subscription theme, Telegram traffic/expiry thresholds. Docker + static multi-arch scripts. feat: complete panel ACME SSL, sub HTML templates, Telegram alerts wiring Wire acme/subpage into app and router, native v2ray/base64 subscription, Delete depleted UI, Settings panels for SSL and subscription theme, Telegram traffic/expiry thresholds. Docker + static multi-arch scripts. feat: complete panel ACME SSL, sub HTML templates, Telegram alerts wiring Wire acme/subpage into app and router, native v2ray/base64 subscription, Delete depleted UI, Settings panels for SSL and subscription theme, Telegram traffic/expiry thresholds. Docker + static multi-arch scripts. feat: complete panel ACME SSL, sub HTML templates, Telegram alerts wiring Wire acme/subpage into app and router, native v2ray/base64 subscription, Delete depleted UI, Settings panels for SSL and subscription theme, Telegram traffic/expiry thresholds. Docker + static multi-arch scripts. feat: complete panel ACME SSL, sub HTML templates, Telegram alerts wiring Wire acme/subpage into app and router, native v2ray/base64 subscription, Delete depleted UI, Settings panels for SSL and subscription theme, Telegram traffic/expiry thresholds. Docker + static multi-arch scripts. feat: complete panel ACME SSL, sub HTML templates, Telegram alerts wiring Wire acme/subpage into app and router, native v2ray/base64 subscription, Delete depleted UI, Settings panels for SSL and subscription theme, Telegram traffic/expiry thresholds. Docker + static multi-arch scripts. feat: complete panel ACME SSL, sub HTML templates, Telegram alerts wiring Wire acme/subpage into app and router, native v2ray/base64 subscription, Delete depleted UI, Settings panels for SSL and subscription theme, Telegram traffic/expiry thresholds. Docker + static multi-arch scripts. feat: complete panel ACME SSL, sub HTML templates, Telegram alerts wiring Wire acme/subpage into app and router, native v2ray/base64 subscription, Delete depleted UI, Settings panels for SSL and subscription theme, Telegram traffic/expiry thresholds. Docker + static multi-arch scripts. feat: complete panel ACME SSL, sub HTML templates, Telegram alerts wiring Wire acme/subpage into app and router, native v2ray/base64 subscription, Delete depleted UI, Settings panels for SSL and subscription theme, Telegram traffic/expiry thresholds. Docker + static multi-arch scripts. feat: complete panel ACME SSL, sub HTML templates, Telegram alerts wiring Wire acme/subpage into app and router, native v2ray/base64 subscription, Delete depleted UI, Settings panels for SSL and subscription theme, Telegram traffic/expiry thresholds. Docker + static multi-arch scripts. feat: complete panel ACME SSL, sub HTML templates, Telegram alerts wiring Wire acme/subpage into app and router, native v2ray/base64 subscription, Delete depleted UI, Settings panels for SSL and subscription theme, Telegram traffic/expiry thresholds. Docker + static multi-arch scripts. feat: complete panel ACME SSL, sub HTML templates, Telegram alerts wiring Wire acme/subpage into app and router, native v2ray/base64 subscription, Delete depleted UI, Settings panels for SSL and subscription theme, Telegram traffic/expiry thresholds. Docker + static multi-arch scripts. |
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風雪
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40ab85ee74 | feat(scripts): update.sh multi-arch static download + README docs | ||
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風雪
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2d647ef468 | feat(scripts): full Linux arch/distro support; README static multi-arch docs | ||
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風雪
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d9dacf0f6f | fix: preserve default initial admin password in installer | ||
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風雪
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5442b1c3a2 | fix: update installer bootstrap credential message | ||
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風雪
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43a1d4767f | fix updater repository owner | ||
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風雪
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6613dd925a | fix installer repository owner | ||
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dzx941
|
5b4cb63a73 |
fix: align listener generation with mihomo official spec
- Port now supports mihomo ports format (single/range/list) - Add explicit RoutingMark field support - Auto-propagate UDP flag for vmess/vless/trojan/anytls/trusttunnel - Update validator to accept port ranges - Sync visual config and client converter port types - Rename module from dzx941 to kazeyukiro - Fix missing ExpiresAt in JWTClaims - Fix nodeDTO Port type to string - Fix frontend tsconfig and add missing dependencies |