Files
3m-ui/backend/internal/node/uri_credentials.go
T
Z User 0754e6a9d6 fix(format-mismatch): TUIC v5 URI UUID key, cluster JWT auth doc, visual port type, access token entropy
Hunt for format-mismatch bugs (like the backup zip vs raw db bug) found
4 issues across the codebase. All fixed.
== Critical 1: TUIC v5 share URI uses Username instead of UUID ==
uri_credentials.go ClientURIsWithCredentials built the users map for
TUIC keyed by credential.Username, but the server-side compiler
(asUsersMapUUID) keys by UUID. Official Mihomo TUIC v5 spec requires
users: {UUID: PASSWORD}. The URI tuic://alice:pass@host failed auth
because the server looked up users['alice'] not users['UUID'].
Fix: split 'tuic' from the 'anytls/hysteria2/mieru' case; use UUID
as key (fallback to Username when UUID empty), matching asUsersMapUUID.
== Critical 2: Cluster APIToken sent as Bearer JWT to remote panel ==
cluster/service.go sends 'Authorization: Bearer <api_token>' but the
remote panel's RequireAuth middleware expects a signed JWT (HS256).
Opaque tokens fail jwt.Parse → 401 on all auth-protected endpoints.
Fix: documented that api_token must be a valid JWT obtained from
POST /api/v1/auth/login on the remote panel. Added comments at both
Bearer header sites. (Full opaque-token auth path requires a separate
middleware on the remote — tracked as future feature.)
== Medium 3: VisualConfig ProxyEntry.Port string → quoted YAML ==
visual.go ProxyEntry.Port was string type, causing yaml.Marshal to
emit port: '8080' (quoted). Mihomo expects port: 8080 (integer).
Changed to interface{} so JSON/YAML can carry int or string.
== Low 4: AccessToken entropy inconsistency ==
router/access_token.go used 24 bytes (192-bit) for token generation,
but node/api.go CreateClientAccess used only 16 bytes (128-bit).
Aligned both to 24 bytes (192-bit, NIST SP 800-63A minimum).
== Verification ==
- go build ./... : PASS
- go vet ./... : PASS
- go test ./... : 16 packages all PASS
- gofmt : clean
fix(format-mismatch): TUIC v5 URI UUID key, cluster JWT auth doc, visual port type, access token entropy
Hunt for format-mismatch bugs (like the backup zip vs raw db bug) found
4 issues across the codebase. All fixed.
== Critical 1: TUIC v5 share URI uses Username instead of UUID ==
uri_credentials.go ClientURIsWithCredentials built the users map for
TUIC keyed by credential.Username, but the server-side compiler
(asUsersMapUUID) keys by UUID. Official Mihomo TUIC v5 spec requires
users: {UUID: PASSWORD}. The URI tuic://alice:pass@host failed auth
because the server looked up users['alice'] not users['UUID'].
Fix: split 'tuic' from the 'anytls/hysteria2/mieru' case; use UUID
as key (fallback to Username when UUID empty), matching asUsersMapUUID.
== Critical 2: Cluster APIToken sent as Bearer JWT to remote panel ==
cluster/service.go sends 'Authorization: Bearer <api_token>' but the
remote panel's RequireAuth middleware expects a signed JWT (HS256).
Opaque tokens fail jwt.Parse → 401 on all auth-protected endpoints.
Fix: documented that api_token must be a valid JWT obtained from
POST /api/v1/auth/login on the remote panel. Added comments at both
Bearer header sites. (Full opaque-token auth path requires a separate
middleware on the remote — tracked as future feature.)
== Medium 3: VisualConfig ProxyEntry.Port string → quoted YAML ==
visual.go ProxyEntry.Port was string type, causing yaml.Marshal to
emit port: '8080' (quoted). Mihomo expects port: 8080 (integer).
Changed to interface{} so JSON/YAML can carry int or string.
== Low 4: AccessToken entropy inconsistency ==
router/access_token.go used 24 bytes (192-bit) for token generation,
but node/api.go CreateClientAccess used only 16 bytes (128-bit).
Aligned both to 24 bytes (192-bit, NIST SP 800-63A minimum).
== Verification ==
- go build ./... : PASS
- go vet ./... : PASS
- go test ./... : 16 packages all PASS
- gofmt : clean
fix(format-mismatch): TUIC v5 URI UUID key, cluster JWT auth doc, visual port type, access token entropy
Hunt for format-mismatch bugs (like the backup zip vs raw db bug) found
4 issues across the codebase. All fixed.
== Critical 1: TUIC v5 share URI uses Username instead of UUID ==
uri_credentials.go ClientURIsWithCredentials built the users map for
TUIC keyed by credential.Username, but the server-side compiler
(asUsersMapUUID) keys by UUID. Official Mihomo TUIC v5 spec requires
users: {UUID: PASSWORD}. The URI tuic://alice:pass@host failed auth
because the server looked up users['alice'] not users['UUID'].
Fix: split 'tuic' from the 'anytls/hysteria2/mieru' case; use UUID
as key (fallback to Username when UUID empty), matching asUsersMapUUID.
== Critical 2: Cluster APIToken sent as Bearer JWT to remote panel ==
cluster/service.go sends 'Authorization: Bearer <api_token>' but the
remote panel's RequireAuth middleware expects a signed JWT (HS256).
Opaque tokens fail jwt.Parse → 401 on all auth-protected endpoints.
Fix: documented that api_token must be a valid JWT obtained from
POST /api/v1/auth/login on the remote panel. Added comments at both
Bearer header sites. (Full opaque-token auth path requires a separate
middleware on the remote — tracked as future feature.)
== Medium 3: VisualConfig ProxyEntry.Port string → quoted YAML ==
visual.go ProxyEntry.Port was string type, causing yaml.Marshal to
emit port: '8080' (quoted). Mihomo expects port: 8080 (integer).
Changed to interface{} so JSON/YAML can carry int or string.
== Low 4: AccessToken entropy inconsistency ==
router/access_token.go used 24 bytes (192-bit) for token generation,
but node/api.go CreateClientAccess used only 16 bytes (128-bit).
Aligned both to 24 bytes (192-bit, NIST SP 800-63A minimum).
== Verification ==
- go build ./... : PASS
- go vet ./... : PASS
- go test ./... : 16 packages all PASS
- gofmt : clean
fix(format-mismatch): TUIC v5 URI UUID key, cluster JWT auth doc, visual port type, access token entropy
Hunt for format-mismatch bugs (like the backup zip vs raw db bug) found
4 issues across the codebase. All fixed.
== Critical 1: TUIC v5 share URI uses Username instead of UUID ==
uri_credentials.go ClientURIsWithCredentials built the users map for
TUIC keyed by credential.Username, but the server-side compiler
(asUsersMapUUID) keys by UUID. Official Mihomo TUIC v5 spec requires
users: {UUID: PASSWORD}. The URI tuic://alice:pass@host failed auth
because the server looked up users['alice'] not users['UUID'].
Fix: split 'tuic' from the 'anytls/hysteria2/mieru' case; use UUID
as key (fallback to Username when UUID empty), matching asUsersMapUUID.
== Critical 2: Cluster APIToken sent as Bearer JWT to remote panel ==
cluster/service.go sends 'Authorization: Bearer <api_token>' but the
remote panel's RequireAuth middleware expects a signed JWT (HS256).
Opaque tokens fail jwt.Parse → 401 on all auth-protected endpoints.
Fix: documented that api_token must be a valid JWT obtained from
POST /api/v1/auth/login on the remote panel. Added comments at both
Bearer header sites. (Full opaque-token auth path requires a separate
middleware on the remote — tracked as future feature.)
== Medium 3: VisualConfig ProxyEntry.Port string → quoted YAML ==
visual.go ProxyEntry.Port was string type, causing yaml.Marshal to
emit port: '8080' (quoted). Mihomo expects port: 8080 (integer).
Changed to interface{} so JSON/YAML can carry int or string.
== Low 4: AccessToken entropy inconsistency ==
router/access_token.go used 24 bytes (192-bit) for token generation,
but node/api.go CreateClientAccess used only 16 bytes (128-bit).
Aligned both to 24 bytes (192-bit, NIST SP 800-63A minimum).
== Verification ==
- go build ./... : PASS
- go vet ./... : PASS
- go test ./... : 16 packages all PASS
- gofmt : clean
fix(format-mismatch): TUIC v5 URI UUID key, cluster JWT auth doc, visual port type, access token entropy
Hunt for format-mismatch bugs (like the backup zip vs raw db bug) found
4 issues across the codebase. All fixed.
== Critical 1: TUIC v5 share URI uses Username instead of UUID ==
uri_credentials.go ClientURIsWithCredentials built the users map for
TUIC keyed by credential.Username, but the server-side compiler
(asUsersMapUUID) keys by UUID. Official Mihomo TUIC v5 spec requires
users: {UUID: PASSWORD}. The URI tuic://alice:pass@host failed auth
because the server looked up users['alice'] not users['UUID'].
Fix: split 'tuic' from the 'anytls/hysteria2/mieru' case; use UUID
as key (fallback to Username when UUID empty), matching asUsersMapUUID.
== Critical 2: Cluster APIToken sent as Bearer JWT to remote panel ==
cluster/service.go sends 'Authorization: Bearer <api_token>' but the
remote panel's RequireAuth middleware expects a signed JWT (HS256).
Opaque tokens fail jwt.Parse → 401 on all auth-protected endpoints.
Fix: documented that api_token must be a valid JWT obtained from
POST /api/v1/auth/login on the remote panel. Added comments at both
Bearer header sites. (Full opaque-token auth path requires a separate
middleware on the remote — tracked as future feature.)
== Medium 3: VisualConfig ProxyEntry.Port string → quoted YAML ==
visual.go ProxyEntry.Port was string type, causing yaml.Marshal to
emit port: '8080' (quoted). Mihomo expects port: 8080 (integer).
Changed to interface{} so JSON/YAML can carry int or string.
== Low 4: AccessToken entropy inconsistency ==
router/access_token.go used 24 bytes (192-bit) for token generation,
but node/api.go CreateClientAccess used only 16 bytes (128-bit).
Aligned both to 24 bytes (192-bit, NIST SP 800-63A minimum).
== Verification ==
- go build ./... : PASS
- go vet ./... : PASS
- go test ./... : 16 packages all PASS
- gofmt : clean
fix(format-mismatch): TUIC v5 URI UUID key, cluster JWT auth doc, visual port type, access token entropy
Hunt for format-mismatch bugs (like the backup zip vs raw db bug) found
4 issues across the codebase. All fixed.
== Critical 1: TUIC v5 share URI uses Username instead of UUID ==
uri_credentials.go ClientURIsWithCredentials built the users map for
TUIC keyed by credential.Username, but the server-side compiler
(asUsersMapUUID) keys by UUID. Official Mihomo TUIC v5 spec requires
users: {UUID: PASSWORD}. The URI tuic://alice:pass@host failed auth
because the server looked up users['alice'] not users['UUID'].
Fix: split 'tuic' from the 'anytls/hysteria2/mieru' case; use UUID
as key (fallback to Username when UUID empty), matching asUsersMapUUID.
== Critical 2: Cluster APIToken sent as Bearer JWT to remote panel ==
cluster/service.go sends 'Authorization: Bearer <api_token>' but the
remote panel's RequireAuth middleware expects a signed JWT (HS256).
Opaque tokens fail jwt.Parse → 401 on all auth-protected endpoints.
Fix: documented that api_token must be a valid JWT obtained from
POST /api/v1/auth/login on the remote panel. Added comments at both
Bearer header sites. (Full opaque-token auth path requires a separate
middleware on the remote — tracked as future feature.)
== Medium 3: VisualConfig ProxyEntry.Port string → quoted YAML ==
visual.go ProxyEntry.Port was string type, causing yaml.Marshal to
emit port: '8080' (quoted). Mihomo expects port: 8080 (integer).
Changed to interface{} so JSON/YAML can carry int or string.
== Low 4: AccessToken entropy inconsistency ==
router/access_token.go used 24 bytes (192-bit) for token generation,
but node/api.go CreateClientAccess used only 16 bytes (128-bit).
Aligned both to 24 bytes (192-bit, NIST SP 800-63A minimum).
== Verification ==
- go build ./... : PASS
- go vet ./... : PASS
- go test ./... : 16 packages all PASS
- gofmt : clean
fix(format-mismatch): TUIC v5 URI UUID key, cluster JWT auth doc, visual port type, access token entropy
Hunt for format-mismatch bugs (like the backup zip vs raw db bug) found
4 issues across the codebase. All fixed.
== Critical 1: TUIC v5 share URI uses Username instead of UUID ==
uri_credentials.go ClientURIsWithCredentials built the users map for
TUIC keyed by credential.Username, but the server-side compiler
(asUsersMapUUID) keys by UUID. Official Mihomo TUIC v5 spec requires
users: {UUID: PASSWORD}. The URI tuic://alice:pass@host failed auth
because the server looked up users['alice'] not users['UUID'].
Fix: split 'tuic' from the 'anytls/hysteria2/mieru' case; use UUID
as key (fallback to Username when UUID empty), matching asUsersMapUUID.
== Critical 2: Cluster APIToken sent as Bearer JWT to remote panel ==
cluster/service.go sends 'Authorization: Bearer <api_token>' but the
remote panel's RequireAuth middleware expects a signed JWT (HS256).
Opaque tokens fail jwt.Parse → 401 on all auth-protected endpoints.
Fix: documented that api_token must be a valid JWT obtained from
POST /api/v1/auth/login on the remote panel. Added comments at both
Bearer header sites. (Full opaque-token auth path requires a separate
middleware on the remote — tracked as future feature.)
== Medium 3: VisualConfig ProxyEntry.Port string → quoted YAML ==
visual.go ProxyEntry.Port was string type, causing yaml.Marshal to
emit port: '8080' (quoted). Mihomo expects port: 8080 (integer).
Changed to interface{} so JSON/YAML can carry int or string.
== Low 4: AccessToken entropy inconsistency ==
router/access_token.go used 24 bytes (192-bit) for token generation,
but node/api.go CreateClientAccess used only 16 bytes (128-bit).
Aligned both to 24 bytes (192-bit, NIST SP 800-63A minimum).
== Verification ==
- go build ./... : PASS
- go vet ./... : PASS
- go test ./... : 16 packages all PASS
- gofmt : clean
fix(format-mismatch): TUIC v5 URI UUID key, cluster JWT auth doc, visual port type, access token entropy
Hunt for format-mismatch bugs (like the backup zip vs raw db bug) found
4 issues across the codebase. All fixed.
== Critical 1: TUIC v5 share URI uses Username instead of UUID ==
uri_credentials.go ClientURIsWithCredentials built the users map for
TUIC keyed by credential.Username, but the server-side compiler
(asUsersMapUUID) keys by UUID. Official Mihomo TUIC v5 spec requires
users: {UUID: PASSWORD}. The URI tuic://alice:pass@host failed auth
because the server looked up users['alice'] not users['UUID'].
Fix: split 'tuic' from the 'anytls/hysteria2/mieru' case; use UUID
as key (fallback to Username when UUID empty), matching asUsersMapUUID.
== Critical 2: Cluster APIToken sent as Bearer JWT to remote panel ==
cluster/service.go sends 'Authorization: Bearer <api_token>' but the
remote panel's RequireAuth middleware expects a signed JWT (HS256).
Opaque tokens fail jwt.Parse → 401 on all auth-protected endpoints.
Fix: documented that api_token must be a valid JWT obtained from
POST /api/v1/auth/login on the remote panel. Added comments at both
Bearer header sites. (Full opaque-token auth path requires a separate
middleware on the remote — tracked as future feature.)
== Medium 3: VisualConfig ProxyEntry.Port string → quoted YAML ==
visual.go ProxyEntry.Port was string type, causing yaml.Marshal to
emit port: '8080' (quoted). Mihomo expects port: 8080 (integer).
Changed to interface{} so JSON/YAML can carry int or string.
== Low 4: AccessToken entropy inconsistency ==
router/access_token.go used 24 bytes (192-bit) for token generation,
but node/api.go CreateClientAccess used only 16 bytes (128-bit).
Aligned both to 24 bytes (192-bit, NIST SP 800-63A minimum).
== Verification ==
- go build ./... : PASS
- go vet ./... : PASS
- go test ./... : 16 packages all PASS
- gofmt : clean
fix(format-mismatch): TUIC v5 URI UUID key, cluster JWT auth doc, visual port type, access token entropy
Hunt for format-mismatch bugs (like the backup zip vs raw db bug) found
4 issues across the codebase. All fixed.
== Critical 1: TUIC v5 share URI uses Username instead of UUID ==
uri_credentials.go ClientURIsWithCredentials built the users map for
TUIC keyed by credential.Username, but the server-side compiler
(asUsersMapUUID) keys by UUID. Official Mihomo TUIC v5 spec requires
users: {UUID: PASSWORD}. The URI tuic://alice:pass@host failed auth
because the server looked up users['alice'] not users['UUID'].
Fix: split 'tuic' from the 'anytls/hysteria2/mieru' case; use UUID
as key (fallback to Username when UUID empty), matching asUsersMapUUID.
== Critical 2: Cluster APIToken sent as Bearer JWT to remote panel ==
cluster/service.go sends 'Authorization: Bearer <api_token>' but the
remote panel's RequireAuth middleware expects a signed JWT (HS256).
Opaque tokens fail jwt.Parse → 401 on all auth-protected endpoints.
Fix: documented that api_token must be a valid JWT obtained from
POST /api/v1/auth/login on the remote panel. Added comments at both
Bearer header sites. (Full opaque-token auth path requires a separate
middleware on the remote — tracked as future feature.)
== Medium 3: VisualConfig ProxyEntry.Port string → quoted YAML ==
visual.go ProxyEntry.Port was string type, causing yaml.Marshal to
emit port: '8080' (quoted). Mihomo expects port: 8080 (integer).
Changed to interface{} so JSON/YAML can carry int or string.
== Low 4: AccessToken entropy inconsistency ==
router/access_token.go used 24 bytes (192-bit) for token generation,
but node/api.go CreateClientAccess used only 16 bytes (128-bit).
Aligned both to 24 bytes (192-bit, NIST SP 800-63A minimum).
== Verification ==
- go build ./... : PASS
- go vet ./... : PASS
- go test ./... : 16 packages all PASS
- gofmt : clean
fix(format-mismatch): TUIC v5 URI UUID key, cluster JWT auth doc, visual port type, access token entropy
Hunt for format-mismatch bugs (like the backup zip vs raw db bug) found
4 issues across the codebase. All fixed.
== Critical 1: TUIC v5 share URI uses Username instead of UUID ==
uri_credentials.go ClientURIsWithCredentials built the users map for
TUIC keyed by credential.Username, but the server-side compiler
(asUsersMapUUID) keys by UUID. Official Mihomo TUIC v5 spec requires
users: {UUID: PASSWORD}. The URI tuic://alice:pass@host failed auth
because the server looked up users['alice'] not users['UUID'].
Fix: split 'tuic' from the 'anytls/hysteria2/mieru' case; use UUID
as key (fallback to Username when UUID empty), matching asUsersMapUUID.
== Critical 2: Cluster APIToken sent as Bearer JWT to remote panel ==
cluster/service.go sends 'Authorization: Bearer <api_token>' but the
remote panel's RequireAuth middleware expects a signed JWT (HS256).
Opaque tokens fail jwt.Parse → 401 on all auth-protected endpoints.
Fix: documented that api_token must be a valid JWT obtained from
POST /api/v1/auth/login on the remote panel. Added comments at both
Bearer header sites. (Full opaque-token auth path requires a separate
middleware on the remote — tracked as future feature.)
== Medium 3: VisualConfig ProxyEntry.Port string → quoted YAML ==
visual.go ProxyEntry.Port was string type, causing yaml.Marshal to
emit port: '8080' (quoted). Mihomo expects port: 8080 (integer).
Changed to interface{} so JSON/YAML can carry int or string.
== Low 4: AccessToken entropy inconsistency ==
router/access_token.go used 24 bytes (192-bit) for token generation,
but node/api.go CreateClientAccess used only 16 bytes (128-bit).
Aligned both to 24 bytes (192-bit, NIST SP 800-63A minimum).
== Verification ==
- go build ./... : PASS
- go vet ./... : PASS
- go test ./... : 16 packages all PASS
- gofmt : clean
fix(format-mismatch): TUIC v5 URI UUID key, cluster JWT auth doc, visual port type, access token entropy
Hunt for format-mismatch bugs (like the backup zip vs raw db bug) found
4 issues across the codebase. All fixed.
== Critical 1: TUIC v5 share URI uses Username instead of UUID ==
uri_credentials.go ClientURIsWithCredentials built the users map for
TUIC keyed by credential.Username, but the server-side compiler
(asUsersMapUUID) keys by UUID. Official Mihomo TUIC v5 spec requires
users: {UUID: PASSWORD}. The URI tuic://alice:pass@host failed auth
because the server looked up users['alice'] not users['UUID'].
Fix: split 'tuic' from the 'anytls/hysteria2/mieru' case; use UUID
as key (fallback to Username when UUID empty), matching asUsersMapUUID.
== Critical 2: Cluster APIToken sent as Bearer JWT to remote panel ==
cluster/service.go sends 'Authorization: Bearer <api_token>' but the
remote panel's RequireAuth middleware expects a signed JWT (HS256).
Opaque tokens fail jwt.Parse → 401 on all auth-protected endpoints.
Fix: documented that api_token must be a valid JWT obtained from
POST /api/v1/auth/login on the remote panel. Added comments at both
Bearer header sites. (Full opaque-token auth path requires a separate
middleware on the remote — tracked as future feature.)
== Medium 3: VisualConfig ProxyEntry.Port string → quoted YAML ==
visual.go ProxyEntry.Port was string type, causing yaml.Marshal to
emit port: '8080' (quoted). Mihomo expects port: 8080 (integer).
Changed to interface{} so JSON/YAML can carry int or string.
== Low 4: AccessToken entropy inconsistency ==
router/access_token.go used 24 bytes (192-bit) for token generation,
but node/api.go CreateClientAccess used only 16 bytes (128-bit).
Aligned both to 24 bytes (192-bit, NIST SP 800-63A minimum).
== Verification ==
- go build ./... : PASS
- go vet ./... : PASS
- go test ./... : 16 packages all PASS
- gofmt : clean
fix(format-mismatch): TUIC v5 URI UUID key, cluster JWT auth doc, visual port type, access token entropy
Hunt for format-mismatch bugs (like the backup zip vs raw db bug) found
4 issues across the codebase. All fixed.
== Critical 1: TUIC v5 share URI uses Username instead of UUID ==
uri_credentials.go ClientURIsWithCredentials built the users map for
TUIC keyed by credential.Username, but the server-side compiler
(asUsersMapUUID) keys by UUID. Official Mihomo TUIC v5 spec requires
users: {UUID: PASSWORD}. The URI tuic://alice:pass@host failed auth
because the server looked up users['alice'] not users['UUID'].
Fix: split 'tuic' from the 'anytls/hysteria2/mieru' case; use UUID
as key (fallback to Username when UUID empty), matching asUsersMapUUID.
== Critical 2: Cluster APIToken sent as Bearer JWT to remote panel ==
cluster/service.go sends 'Authorization: Bearer <api_token>' but the
remote panel's RequireAuth middleware expects a signed JWT (HS256).
Opaque tokens fail jwt.Parse → 401 on all auth-protected endpoints.
Fix: documented that api_token must be a valid JWT obtained from
POST /api/v1/auth/login on the remote panel. Added comments at both
Bearer header sites. (Full opaque-token auth path requires a separate
middleware on the remote — tracked as future feature.)
== Medium 3: VisualConfig ProxyEntry.Port string → quoted YAML ==
visual.go ProxyEntry.Port was string type, causing yaml.Marshal to
emit port: '8080' (quoted). Mihomo expects port: 8080 (integer).
Changed to interface{} so JSON/YAML can carry int or string.
== Low 4: AccessToken entropy inconsistency ==
router/access_token.go used 24 bytes (192-bit) for token generation,
but node/api.go CreateClientAccess used only 16 bytes (128-bit).
Aligned both to 24 bytes (192-bit, NIST SP 800-63A minimum).
== Verification ==
- go build ./... : PASS
- go vet ./... : PASS
- go test ./... : 16 packages all PASS
- gofmt : clean
2026-08-30 13:04:59 +00:00

72 lines
2.3 KiB
Go

package node
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"github.com/kazeyukiro/3m-ui/backend/internal/database/models"
"github.com/kazeyukiro/3m-ui/backend/internal/user"
)
// ClientURIsWithCredentials bridges node URI export with the canonical
// credential service. Listener.Config is server configuration and is not the
// source of truth for users managed by 3m-ui.
func ClientURIsWithCredentials(listener models.Listener, host string, credentials []user.Credential) ([]string, error) {
var cfg map[string]interface{}
if listener.Config != "" {
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(listener.Config), &cfg); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid listener configuration: %w", err)
}
}
if cfg == nil {
cfg = map[string]interface{}{}
}
// Prefer panel credentials; merge server-side flow for Vision when present.
flow, _ := cfg["flow"].(string)
if len(credentials) > 0 {
switch listener.Protocol {
case "tuic":
// TUIC v5 uses users: {UUID: PASSWORD} per official Mihomo docs.
// Must match asUsersMapUUID in compile.go which keys by UUID.
users := make(map[string]interface{}, len(credentials))
for _, credential := range credentials {
key := credential.UUID
if key == "" {
key = credential.Username
}
if key != "" {
users[key] = credential.Password
}
}
cfg["users"] = users
case "anytls", "hysteria2", "mieru":
users := make(map[string]interface{}, len(credentials))
for _, credential := range credentials {
if credential.Username != "" {
users[credential.Username] = credential.Password
}
}
cfg["users"] = users
default:
users := make([]interface{}, 0, len(credentials))
for _, credential := range credentials {
row := map[string]interface{}{"username": credential.Username, "password": credential.Password, "uuid": credential.UUID}
if flow != "" && (listener.Protocol == "vless" || listener.Protocol == "vmess") {
row["flow"] = flow
}
users = append(users, row)
}
cfg["users"] = users
}
if listener.Protocol == "shadowsocks" {
cfg["password"] = credentials[0].Password
}
}
encoded, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to prepare URI configuration: %w", err)
}
listener.Config = string(encoded)
return ClientURIs(listener, host)
}