# Minimal Deployment Last verified against upstream documentation: 2026-08-24. This page records production running exact deployed application/runtime revision `55511773b2f9118802440fdec90ad06080b19772`, release `5551177`, and the single Browser `screener-v12` contract. Product direction and pending work are owned by [project memory](./project-memory.md) and [the TODO ledger](./todo.md). This section documents the accepted UDP-only deployment contract: one Node.js process provides the built Web client, room API, and WebSocket signaling behind Caddy or nginx; ordinary peer ICE advertises only STUN, while Browser LiveKit PCs configure no external ICE server and retain LiveKit-signaled UDP candidates. LiveKit supplies bounded SFU capacity. Normal media remains distributed through direct or peer edges whenever those paths work. Production includes Browser SFU ICE isolation and leaves representation construction and selection to pinned LiveKit with Dynacast and server send-side BWE. A deployment may additionally provide one dedicated single-node LiveKit process as the current controller's automatic final media fallback. This capacity is dormant unless the complete public URL, private API URL, key, secret, and capacity tuple is configured. It does not replace the P2P path, the peer-assisted experiment, or required STUN discovery. LiveKit remains ICE/UDP only. Ordinary peer ICE remains STUN-only and production coturn uses the tracked STUN-only configuration with TCP/TLS disabled. The source and production configure no TURN, ICE/TCP, media TCP, or TLS-relayed media. Production runs exact `55511773b2f9118802440fdec90ad06080b19772`, release `5551177`, from `/opt/screener/releases/5551177`. The immutable runtime tar SHA-256 is `3688b348fd8757e19fc1acb5523d2ecc90aa3553a30cd3a640e0a9a011e696e3`. Its 39-file path/size/hash manifest SHA-256 is `279fb808ccff21c0fa07d0ff7f7afddc1d33de09446ca8446489e4970ee6d8d5`. Local and public `/healthz` return 200; Screener, LiveKit, coturn, and nginx are active with `NRestarts=0`. The public main Browser asset is `assets/index-uQk7n3NE.js` with SHA-256 `14012100209475b3fc8851774a1985b3fb17de18a1f80e6fb0c0cf773dcfe0ff`. The release deploys the single Browser `screener-v12` wire and one internal, content-independent H.264 sender gate with VP8 fallback across Browser direct, browser-relay, and SFU video. It retains pinned LiveKit default screen-share representations, Dynacast and server send-side BWE without an application layer selector, video `contentHint = "motion"`, no codec selector/state/wire, random four-digit memory rooms with a 24-hour dormant lease, a room-lived 22-character grant, orthogonal `open | private` grant/code admission, 20-Viewer room admission, the uniform endpoint media-copy cap `2`, and the one-controller exact-candidate route runtime. Exact predecessor release `b68c471` production postflight verified open code entry, private invitation-only and password entry, grant rotation/revocation, typed missing-room failure, and stale `screener-v11` rejection with `INVALID_MESSAGE` and WebSocket close 1008 before room authority. The service unit has no writable room StateDirectory; all room authority is process-memory-only. LiveKit is dedicated, has `room.auto_create: false` and `max_participants: 21`, and the application derives deployment admission as 9,000 publication ingress plus `9000 * MAX_VIEWERS_PER_ROOM` subscription egress handles. Coturn listens only on UDP 3478 for STUN; LiveKit media listens on UDP 7882. The stable application firewall table `inet bonfire_filter` has SHA-256 `afaf9d066e9f292d8bd19032b38c0978ccf60dd01c2fe7f210968ff751f90534`, and `/etc/nftables.conf` has SHA-256 `d57cab70b455e6ddd5cd4688c354b9af5e1d4fb9e9b67c6b85ade0da347cb1d0`; the whole live ruleset is not a stable identity because fail2ban owns a dynamic address set. These bounds are fail-safe admissions, not throughput or quality claims. The retained local 20-Viewer Browser smoke and open real-network boundaries are owned by [verification status](./verification-status.md). ## Topology and prerequisites Use two DNS names, for example `share.example.com` and `stun.example.com`. They may resolve to the same public IP: the Web ingress owns TCP 443 while the self-hosted STUN listener owns UDP 3478. ```text browser -- HTTPS/WSS --> Caddy or nginx :443 --> Node.js :8787 browser <------------ DTLS-SRTP P2P ------------> browser browser -- ordinary-peer STUN/UDP --> coturn :3478 browser <---------- DTLS-SRTP/UDP ----------> LiveKit :7882 ``` The minimum runtime is Node.js 24 LTS and coturn 4.17.2 or a newer patched release. Provision a valid TLS certificate for the Web name. Enable operating system time synchronization and keep the Node application port reachable only from its reverse proxy. A single Node process is intentional. Rooms, participants, and signaling remain in process memory; a restart intentionally invalidates every room and does not restore live WebRTC connections. Build and validate the exact revision on a build host before starting it: ```sh npm ci npm run check npm start ``` Do not run the repository full check, typecheck, or build on the current 960 MiB no-swap production host. An inactive-release check before the `261e980c` cutover temporarily starved HTTP and SSH; exact `691863e` remained current and all four services stayed at `NRestarts=0`. The retained production path uses a locally verified dist artifact plus one `npm ci --omit=dev --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund` in a transient unit bounded to 30% CPU, 160 MiB memory high, 256 MiB memory max, no swap, and 120 seconds. It then runs only runtime imports and the artifact/inode/permission gates. Each immutable release must own an independent dependency tree. Never hard-link `node_modules` or another file that deployment may `chown`, `chmod`, replace, or remove: metadata changes would also mutate another immutable release. A copy or copy-on-write reflink is acceptable only after an inode audit confirms that the old and new regular-file sets have zero shared inodes. Do not recursively change permissions until that check passes. Routine application releases use the tracked [`package-app-release.mjs`](../scripts/package-app-release.mjs) build-host entry and [`release-app.sh`](../deploy/release-app.sh) server entry. The packager accepts only a clean exact Git revision and already-built `dist`, emits one normalized `tar.gz`, an exact path/size/hash manifest, and a non-secret release descriptor, then extracts and verifies its own result. The archive also carries the full Git revision. The server entry accepts only that descriptor, verifies the uploaded hashes and revision, extracts into a new release directory, compares the exact regular-file set with the manifest, installs an independent runtime dependency tree under the existing resource bounds, and performs the atomic cutover and bounded recovery checks. Release-specific scripts must not be copied and edited. Infrastructure, configuration, secrets, and persistent state are outside this application wrapper. A release that changes one of those surfaces uses a separate scoped transaction with its own pre-change value and recovery path; it must not make the routine application primitive conditional on that one-off change. A routine application-only cutover leaves infrastructure, configuration, secrets, and persistent state untouched. Verify a new immutable artifact, switch to it atomically, and guarantee the pre-cutover application release only through bounded health and postflight checks. It has no retention contract afterward and is not a maintained backup. When a task actually changes infrastructure, configuration, secrets, persistent state, or an irreversible surface, define and verify recovery only for the touched surfaces before changing them. In a strict-shell deployment, expected service states are data, not command failures. Do not call `systemctl is-active` bare under `set -e`/`ERR`: an intentionally stopped service returns a nonzero status and can trigger a false failure path. Read `ActiveState` with `systemctl show`, compare the returned string explicitly, and keep stop, symlink switch, start, health check, and any release restoration as separate steps. Preflight every inspection dependency before changing a service. After a start, poll health for a short bounded window instead of treating one request during startup as a failed release; retain the last failure while still enforcing the deadline. After starting coturn, likewise wait boundedly for its UDP 3478 socket before asserting STUN readiness; `ActiveState=active` can precede socket readiness. Run `npm start` under a service supervisor that injects the environment, restarts on failure, and applies bounded logs. For a simple untracked environment file, the equivalent direct launch is `node --env-file=.env.production dist/server/server/index.js`. Do not expose port 8787 to the Internet. The application default is `0.0.0.0` for LAN development and container compatibility, while the bare-metal production baseline below explicitly sets `LISTEN_HOST=127.0.0.1` because only the same-host reverse proxy should connect. A container can instead use `0.0.0.0` and enforce the intended boundary with port publishing rules or a host firewall. The optional same-host LiveKit layout needs no additional public hostname: `LIVEKIT_URL=wss://share.example.com` and nginx proxies only current `/rtc/v1*` requests to LiveKit. Retired `/rtc` and `/rtc/validate` endpoints return 404 without request-target logging. LiveKit's HTTP/WebSocket listener on TCP 7880 is private to nginx and the Screener process uses `LIVEKIT_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:7880` for `RoomService`; WebRTC media reaches LiveKit directly on UDP 7882. No unrelated application may create rooms on this instance, and its tracked configuration sets `room.auto_create: false`. Install [`screener-livekit-readiness.conf.example`](../deploy/systemd/screener-livekit-readiness.conf.example) as a `screener.service.d` drop-in on this layout. `After=` orders the services, while the bounded `ExecStartPre` waits for TCP 7880 readiness; ActiveState alone does not prove the LiveKit control listener is accepting connections. ## Candidate boundary and recovery The accepted target for `share.bonfire.icu` remains distributed and automatic: direct/peer UDP first, with one Host publication available to authorized SFU subscriptions when a logical edge cannot use peer transport. SFU-fed and peer-fed endpoints use the same provisional-child transaction, and the exact candidate child's first newly decoded frame commits that edge. Server-assisted subscriptions and allocations use independent deployment admission rather than an endpoint-cap or fixed-root rule. The repository requires STUN and ordinary peer connections receive STUN-only ICE. An existing logical edge prefers direct/peer UDP; the only application suffix is the Host publication/SFU path. LiveKit participants receive only revision-bound `sfu-config` URL/token messages and negotiate within LiveKit's separate UDP-only ICE domain. The accepted Browser publisher and subscriber connect contract provides an explicit empty ICE-server list, retains the UDP candidates delivered through LiveKit signaling, and lets standard ICE select a nominated non-relay pair. Candidate type, count, address family, and Browser socket allocation remain implementation observations. This does not remove ordinary-peer STUN or the deployment STUN used by LiveKit to discover its own public address. `PEER_ASSISTED_MEDIA=true` is the process-wide topology/SFU switch. Every normal room gets its own bounded controller state and ordinary peer connections remain STUN-only. Run route or infrastructure candidates on an isolated instance/hostname and keep the current release unchanged. If the candidate fails, stop it and restore only the recovery boundary defined for its changed surfaces; do not add a permanent dual-transport branch. A memory-room release starts with empty process authority. Starting the candidate invalidates every current production room, Host token, invitation, password verifier, and route; open pages must refresh or explicitly create a replacement room. No room state crosses a release boundary in either direction. Guarantee the pre-cutover immutable application release only through the bounded postflight; it has no retention contract afterward and is not a maintained backup. An application-only cutover leaves the environment, unit, LiveKit, coturn, firewall, and reverse proxy unchanged; any task that changes one of those surfaces must establish its scoped recovery before the change. A shared-public-IP instance can test candidate behavior, but it cannot prove the clean-port boundary or approve broad migration. The room-1 smoke uses this shape: nginx owns 443, LiveKit 1.13.5 owns UDP 7882, and LiveKit is fail-closed under a 192 MiB high/256 MiB hard cgroup limit with restart disabled. Prefer a separate VM/IP for the full gate and verify representative external networks and devices. Coturn provides STUN binding only and must reject allocation requests. HTTPS/WSS always remains TLS/TCP independently of the UDP-only media ladder. ## Production application environment Keep the real values in the process secret store or an untracked, access-restricted environment file. Node.js 24 can load such a file with `--env-file`; the tracked `.env.example` is only a schema. Generate independent secrets with a password manager or a cross-platform Node command such as: ```sh node -e "console.log(require('node:crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))" ``` Use this production baseline template: ```dotenv NODE_ENV=production LISTEN_HOST=127.0.0.1 PORT=8787 PUBLIC_BASE_URL=https://share.example.com ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://share.example.com SITE_ACCESS_PASSWORD= ROOM_LEASE_SECONDS=86400 MAX_VIEWERS_PER_ROOM=20 ENDPOINT_MEDIA_COPY_CAPACITY=2 STUN_URLS=stun:stun.example.com:3478 ``` To make automatic SFU fallback capacity available, add the complete tuple: ```dotenv PEER_ASSISTED_MEDIA=true LIVEKIT_URL=wss://share.example.com LIVEKIT_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:7880 LIVEKIT_API_KEY= LIVEKIT_API_SECRET= ``` Supplying any stale `PEER_ICE_TURN_*` or `SELECTED_EDGE_TURN_*` key, even blank, fails startup. Production contains none of those keys, uses the tracked STUN-only coturn configuration, and keeps TCP 3478/5349 plus every relay range closed. An application-only release leaves the environment, coturn configuration, and firewall unchanged; a task that changes any of them must define recovery for that exact set before modification. `PEER_ASSISTED_ROOM_IDS` is retired. Supplying it, even blank, fails startup so that a stale room-1 deployment cannot silently retain the old scope. With `PEER_ASSISTED_MEDIA=true`, every normal room receives peer-assisted routing, optional LiveKit fallback, and the same deployment resource/fanout/failure guards. Every ordinary peer connection remains STUN-only. There is no browser control, percentage rollout, or second router. `ALLOWED_ORIGINS` must list exact `http` or `https` origins, never `*`. `SITE_ACCESS_PASSWORD` is required in production and must contain 8 through 128 visible ASCII bytes (`0x21` through `0x7e`). It must not be reused for LiveKit, TLS, or another service. It authorizes room creation, Host role, and code-only Viewer attempts; it does not replace a private room grant or password. Local development and tests may omit it. Supplying a removed access key, even blank, fails startup. `ROOM_LEASE_SECONDS` defaults to 86,400 seconds and owns the dormant room lifetime. An actively connected Host prevents expiry; explicit stop or Host disconnect starts the lease, and only the exact Host token renews it before expiry. Viewer activity never renews ownership. Optional `ROOM_DATABASE_PATH` enables the exact-schema SQLite stable room-authority mode; unset keeps the lightweight memory mode. `ROOM_TTL_SECONDS` remains invalid. Production accepts 1 through 20 and explicitly selects 20. This is an admission limit, not evidence that every publisher, network, or quality profile can sustain that many streams. `ENDPOINT_MEDIA_COPY_CAPACITY` defaults to 2 and accepts only 1, 2, or 3. It is the single server-authoritative steady outbound media-copy cap for Host and Viewer endpoints; role, browser, UA, and visibility do not create another tier. A peer child or the Host's single SFU publication consumes one copy and upstream receive is free. Transition work may reach only `min(C + 1, 3)`. A Host already sending three copies at `C=3` must fail or wait before a fourth endpoint copy is issued. Supplying the removed `MAX_PEER_RELAY_DOWNSTREAM_EDGES`, even blank, fails startup. Production release `5551177` runs the deployed server and Browser assets atomically on `screener-v12`; every stale Browser or executable-sender wire fails before room authority. Native senders and helpers are outside this release. The four `LIVEKIT_*` values must either all be absent or all be present, and a complete tuple requires `PEER_ASSISTED_MEDIA=true`. The four-digit code space fixes ingress at 9,000 Host publications; egress is 9,000 multiplied by `MAX_VIEWERS_PER_ROOM`. There is no separate SFU capacity configuration. An empty tuple keeps the optional SDK and server path dormant. `LIVEKIT_URL` must be a plain `ws:` or `wss:` origin with no `/rtc` suffix; production requires `wss:`. `LIVEKIT_API_URL` must be a plain `http:` or `https:` origin with no path; production permits plaintext only on loopback and otherwise requires `https:`. `LIVEKIT_API_SECRET` must contain at least 32 bytes and must not reuse `SITE_ACCESS_PASSWORD`. These credentials authorize short-lived LiveKit room tokens and do not provide E2EE: the LiveKit operator can access ordinary SFU media. The LiveKit instance is dedicated to this Screener process and has `room.auto_create: false`. Screener first binds the configured application listener exclusively; a competing process that cannot bind makes no LiveKit call. While bound but not initialized it returns `503` and has no signaling upgrade handler. It then rejects any foreign room name, deletes every stale managed room, confirms the namespace empty, and begins serving. Each exact-generation room is then created before its token is issued. Reserved, committed, and draining generations remain charged until `DeleteRoom` succeeds and a follow-up lookup proves absence. Run only one application process until a shared atomic admission and lifecycle owner exists. For the first candidate canary, use an isolated instance and one recorded room. Restart the application, verify startup removes the now-stale managed LiveKit room before serving traffic, and create a fresh application room after startup. Hold the application port with another process and verify a competing startup makes zero LiveKit calls. Verify that both the replacement room and a second normal room contain `mediaMode: "peer-assisted"`, with independent route revisions and no shared room state or capacity bypass. Exercise join, offer and answer, stale-token reconnect after abort, Host signaling loss with and without a live Host participant, stop, restart, and room deletion in both rooms. Confirm each drain keeps capacity charged until the room is absent. Ordinary Web clients remain STUN-only. Roll back by stopping Screener, proving every managed LiveKit room absent, and restoring the exact recorded application environment, application release, LiveKit configuration, coturn configuration, and firewall snapshot as one unit; or direct traffic to the unchanged old instance. During migration, remove retired route configuration in the same coherent change; the process flag explicitly enables the all-room controller. Only `POST /api/site-access` accepts the site access secret in an `Authorization: Bearer` header from an exact allowed Origin. Success returns a 12-hour stateless HMAC-SHA256 cookie with `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Strict`, `Path=/`, bounded `Max-Age`, and, under production HTTPS, `Secure` plus an `__Host-` name. The cookie contains no account or server-side session ID. There is no account database, JWT, session map, or logout endpoint. Before an access-boundary release, set `CHROME_PATH` to a local Chrome or Chromium executable and run `npm run gate:access-privacy`. The gate creates a loopback in-memory room with an isolated browser profile, navigates the fragment through CDP rather than a process argument, disposes that context, and emits only fixed booleans and counts. It checks tracked request/nginx/application logs, browser storage, fragment cleanup, absence of a persistent room file, and runs the complete signaling suite containing the strong rotate/revoke teardown case. It never connects to production or accepts a production credential; exact production request/nginx/journal inspection remains separate. nginx limits this exact endpoint per source at `5r/m` with `burst=5 nodelay` and returns 429 when exhausted. The limiter uses nginx shared memory; do not add the secret, Authorization header, request body, or a new source-address field to logs. `POST /api/rooms` accepts only the site-access cookie and strict JSON with an explicit code-entry policy and optional room password; a Bearer header is not an alternate creation path. `/signal` still admits a cookie-free browser after Origin and capacity checks and records the cookie state at upgrade. Host requires it with the room Host token. A Viewer may omit it only when presenting a valid, unexpired grant for that exact room; otherwise the server rejects before evaluating code entry. Every room receives an independent invitation `/r/{code}#v={room-scoped-grant}`; the fragment does not enter HTTP or WebSocket request targets. The page validates it, writes it only to that room's `sessionStorage`, and immediately replaces the visible URL with `/r/{code}`. The Host may update or revoke that grant without changing code-entry policy. Room allocation and lifetime use one deliberately small model: - random unallocated codes come only from `1000` through `9999`, never duplicate an active code, use the fixed 9,000-room capacity, and return on room release; - active Host sharing does not expire; stop, capture-track end, or Host disconnect starts `ROOM_LEASE_SECONDS`; - only the exact Host token resumes and renews before expiry, Viewer activity cannot, and expiry invalidates the code, credentials, verifier, participants, and routes; and - lightweight-mode process restart has the same fail-closed effect; stable mode restores only unexpired room authority and requires fresh sessions/routes. The server keeps only digests/verifiers for Host tokens, Viewer grants, and optional room passwords. In stable mode those room-authority values, policy, authorization generation and lease use one exact SQLite schema; live members, routes and SFU state remain memory-only. The same browser keeps its raw Host token, creation profile and non-expiring preferred code locally. Production stable-mode activation requires a separately verified writable directory, configuration and database backup/restore boundary before setting `ROOM_DATABASE_PATH`. Production startup requires one to eight syntactically valid `stun:` URLs before the server listens. This validates shape only; it does not prove DNS, firewall, NAT mappings, or external STUN reachability. The current application rejects `TURN_URLS`, `TURN_SHARED_SECRET`, or `TURN_CREDENTIAL_TTL_SECONDS` when any key is present, including with an empty value. Remove those obsolete keys from the candidate environment; startup fails instead of pretending they enable compatibility. The rejected `PEER_ICE_TURN_*` and `SELECTED_EDGE_TURN_*` candidate names must remain absent from production and fail startup even when blank. Ordinary peer edges remain STUN-only and the application has no TURN configuration surface. ## HTTPS and WSS ingress Terminate public TLS at Caddy or nginx and proxy every application path to the single Node process. `/signal` must preserve the WebSocket upgrade, `Host`, and `Origin`, and its idle/read timeout must be longer than a normal sharing session. Do not cache `/api/*` responses. Caddy's minimal same-host form is: ```caddyfile share.example.com { reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8787 } ``` An equivalent nginx location is: ```nginx location / { proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8787; proxy_http_version 1.1; proxy_set_header Host $host; proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade; proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade"; proxy_read_timeout 1h; } ``` The tracked [`share.bonfire.icu.conf.example`](../deploy/nginx/share.bonfire.icu.conf.example) follows this simple model and listens directly on public TCP 443. It does not need an SNI transport router. Exact `/rtc` and pinned-v0 `/rtc/validate` requests return 404 with access and request-line error logging disabled; only `/rtc/v1*` is proxied. Current versioned requests carry a short-lived LiveKit JWT in the query string, so no `/rtc*` target may fall through to the site's ordinary logs. When Certbot manages the Web certificate, install the tracked [`reload-nginx.sh`](../deploy/certbot/reload-nginx.sh) as an executable under `/etc/letsencrypt/renewal-hooks/deploy/`. Run `certbot renew --dry-run` after the first certificate is installed. This hook reloads only the Web ingress. Keep the proxy's access-log retention bounded and access controlled. Requests to `/r/{code}` put the room code in the path, so access logs can contain room codes as well as network metadata. They must not be treated as public artifacts. For a private room, the grant remains in the fragment and is not part of that request target. For a process-level liveness probe, send `GET /healthz`. A running process returns HTTP 200 with `{"status":"ok"}` and `Cache-Control: no-store`; other methods return 405 with `Allow: GET`. The endpoint does not inspect room state, STUN/SFU reachability, or any external dependency, so use it only to decide whether the Node process can accept HTTP requests. It is not a deployment-readiness or end-to-end media check. ## Optional single-node LiveKit fallback Use the tracked [`livekit.yaml.example`](../deploy/livekit/livekit.yaml.example) and [`livekit.service.example`](../deploy/systemd/livekit.service.example) as the minimal single-node baseline. Install a reviewed, pinned LiveKit Server release from its official release assets, generate an independent key pair with `livekit-server generate-keys`, and place only the YAML key mapping in `/etc/livekit/keys.yaml`. Keep that file owned by the `livekit` service account with mode `0600`; put the same values in Screener's untracked process secrets. The example deliberately omits Redis and every recording, ingress, egress, webhook, external-TURN, and embedded-TURN service. It explicitly sets `tcp_port: 0` and `allow_tcp_fallback: false`, and points `stun_servers` at the deployment's self-hosted STUN listener for server-side public-IP discovery and to prevent pinned LiveKit from substituting a public default in its join response. Current Screener source gives Browser publisher/subscriber connects an explicit empty list, so those SFU PCs do not use either response after the pending application cutover. The tracked `rtc.congestion_control` enables `use_send_side_bwe` for LiveKit-owned per-subscriber simulcast selection. Do not add Redis for this one-node workload. The service journal is the diagnostic log; keep its retention finite and access restricted. Pinned LiveKit 1.13.5 includes raw PublisherOffer SDP in info-level join records, so the tracked production baseline uses `logging.level: warn` and `pion_level: error`. Raise either only in an isolated, short-lived canary and remove its journal afterward. Never persist JWTs, SDP, ICE candidates, API secrets, or full `/rtc` and `/rtc/*` request targets. Configure both the host firewall and the provider firewall independently: | Destination | Protocol | Exposure | Purpose | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | `127.0.0.1:7880` | TCP | Private | nginx to LiveKit signaling/API | | public host `:7882` | UDP | Public | WebRTC ICE/UDP mux | LiveKit may listen beyond loopback while it discovers and advertises public media addresses, so the public-firewall denial of TCP 7880 is mandatory; nginx must be its only ingress. UDP 7882 is a direct media listener and must not be placed behind the HTTP reverse proxy. If the host is behind NAT, forward it without port translation and verify the advertised candidate from an external network. UDP-blocked networks are expected to fail clearly in this candidate; do not set `rtc.tcp_port` above zero, enable TCP fallback, or add TURN to make a canary pass silently. ## Self-hosted STUN This subsection describes the accepted and deployed STUN-only boundary. Production uses the tracked configuration and keeps TCP 3478/5349 plus every relay range closed. Copy [`deploy/coturn/turnserver.conf.example`](../deploy/coturn/turnserver.conf.example) to an untracked service-owned location and use the tracked [`coturn.service.example`](../deploy/systemd/coturn.service.example). The config uses coturn's documented `stun-only` mode, ignores every TURN allocation request, and disables TCP and TLS client listeners. It has no auth secret, user database, relay port range, certificate, quota, or TURN REST credential. Pinned coturn 4.17.2 deprecates `no-dtls`, so the tracked config does not use that obsolete switch or claim a separate DTLS listener gate. On a single-homed public host, automatic listener selection is sufficient. On a multi-homed host, set `listening-ip` to the intended public interface. Open only UDP 3478 and keep TCP 3478/5349 plus every old relay range closed. The same public IP may serve HTTPS/WSS on TCP 443 and LiveKit media on UDP 7882. The example writes informational logs to stdout. Apply finite supervisor retention and restrict access because STUN sees client IP addresses. Do not enable `verbose` or `log-binding` continuously. `stun-only` is a hard candidate boundary, not a hidden unauthenticated TURN service. Open only these public listeners: | Destination | Protocol | Purpose | | --- | --- | --- | | `share.example.com:80` | TCP | HTTP redirect and ACME challenge | | `share.example.com:443` | TCP | HTTPS and WSS | | `stun.example.com:3478` | UDP | STUN binding only | | host public address `:7882` | UDP | LiveKit WebRTC ICE/UDP mux | ## Verification Run these checks from real external networks before closing route acceptance: 1. Open the official [Trickle ICE sample](https://webrtc.github.io/samples/src/content/peerconnection/trickle-ice/) and test the configured STUN URL. It must produce an `srflx` candidate over UDP and no `relay` candidate. Confirm TCP 3478/5349 and the old relay range are closed externally. 2. Create a normal Screener room on two different networks. Confirm media flows and the selected-pair stats report a non-relay path when direct ICE succeeds. 3. On a normal room, exhaust a peer route and verify exactly one Host publication serves only the admitted SFU subscriptions over LiveKit UDP 7882. Peer descendants stay on ordinary direct UDP and every non-server endpoint obeys the configured `ENDPOINT_MEDIA_COPY_CAPACITY`. On each Browser SFU PC, verify no local external STUN/TURN server is configured, a nominated non-relay UDP pair reaches an authorized LiveKit-signaled SFU candidate, and the exact Viewer presents a decoded frame. Do not gate on candidate type or count. 4. Block all UDP and verify bounded recovery ends clearly without ICE/TCP, TURN, or a long pseudo-connected path. 5. Exercise root departure, reconnect, SFU unavailable, route prepare rollback, stop, and source/profile changes. Unaffected subtrees must not migrate. 6. Repeat at 1, 3, 5, and 20 viewers across representative consumer networks. Record selected protocol, RTT, bitrate, frame rate, packet loss, publisher upload/encode load, LiveKit ingress/egress, and final decoded quality. A real public-network 1:20 session remains unverified; the passed local synthetic 1:20 smoke does not replace this heterogeneous-network quality gate. References: [coturn 4.17.2 release](https://github.com/coturn/coturn/releases/tag/4.17.2), [pinned turnserver documentation](https://github.com/coturn/coturn/blob/4.17.2/README.turnserver), the [pinned example configuration](https://github.com/coturn/coturn/blob/4.17.2/examples/etc/turnserver.conf), [RFC6265bis](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis/), [LiveKit firewall guidance](https://docs.livekit.io/deploy/admin/firewall/), and the [pinned LiveKit configuration sample](https://github.com/livekit/livekit/blob/v1.13.5/config-sample.yaml).