Piik/docs/deployment.md

Minimal Deployment

Last verified against upstream documentation: 2026-08-18.

This is the first production-shaped deployment for the WebRTC PoC: one Node.js process provides the built Web client, room API, and WebSocket signaling behind Caddy or nginx; coturn is the separate STUN/TURN service. Normal media remains browser-to-browser. Only an ICE pair that cannot connect directly consumes TURN bandwidth.

This workstation does not have coturn installed, so the coturn configuration and public-network procedures below have not been run locally. Treat deployment as unverified until the direct, relay, and mixed-network checks at the end pass.

Topology and prerequisites

Use two DNS names, for example share.example.com and turn.example.com. The simplest deployment gives the TURN name a separate public IP so coturn can bind TCP 443; otherwise use an explicitly validated layer-4/SNI gateway:

browser -- HTTPS/WSS --> Caddy or nginx :443 --> Node.js :8787
browser <------------ DTLS-SRTP P2P ------------> browser
browser -- TURN only for failed ICE pairs --> coturn

The minimum runtime is Node.js 24 LTS and coturn 4.17.2 or a newer patched release. Provision a valid TLS certificate for each public name, enable operating system time synchronization, and keep the Node application port reachable only from its reverse proxy. A single Node process is intentional: rooms are held in memory, so restarting it ends signaling and invalidates room state.

Build and validate the exact revision before starting it:

npm ci
npm run check
npm start

Run npm start under a service supervisor that injects the environment, restarts on failure, and applies bounded logs. For a simple untracked environment file, the equivalent direct launch is node --env-file=.env.production dist/server/server/index.js. Do not expose port 8787 to the Internet.

Production application environment

Keep the real values in the process secret store or an untracked, access-restricted environment file. Node.js 24 can load such a file with --env-file; the tracked .env.example is only a schema. Generate independent secrets with a password manager or a cross-platform Node command such as:

node -e "console.log(require('node:crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'))"

Use this production baseline:

NODE_ENV=production
PORT=8787
PUBLIC_BASE_URL=https://share.example.com
ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://share.example.com
ROOM_CREATION_TOKEN=<INDEPENDENT_RANDOM_SECRET>
ROOM_TTL_SECONDS=14400
MAX_ROOMS=1000

STUN_URLS=stun:turn.example.com:3478
TURN_URLS=turn:turn.example.com:3478?transport=udp,turn:turn.example.com:3478?transport=tcp,turns:turn.example.com:443?transport=tcp
TURN_SHARED_SECRET=<SAME_VALUE_AS_COTURN_STATIC_AUTH_SECRET>
TURN_CREDENTIAL_TTL_SECONDS=3600

ALLOWED_ORIGINS must list exact http or https origins, never *. ROOM_CREATION_TOKEN and TURN_SHARED_SECRET must each contain at least 32 bytes. They must be independently generated rather than reused. TURN_SHARED_SECRET stays only in the Node environment and coturn configuration; browsers receive HMAC-SHA1-derived, time-limited credentials after room authentication. Keep host clocks synchronized because the credential username contains its Unix expiry time.

HTTPS and WSS ingress

Terminate public TLS at Caddy or nginx and proxy every application path to the single Node process. /signal must preserve the WebSocket upgrade, Host, and Origin, and its idle/read timeout must be longer than a normal sharing session. Do not cache /api/* responses. Caddy's minimal same-host form is:

share.example.com {
    reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8787
}

An equivalent nginx location is:

location / {
    proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8787;
    proxy_http_version 1.1;
    proxy_set_header Host $host;
    proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
    proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade";
    proxy_read_timeout 1h;
}

Keep the proxy's access-log retention bounded and access controlled. Viewer tokens are URL fragments and therefore are not sent in HTTP requests, but logs still contain network metadata and must not be treated as public artifacts.

coturn

Copy deploy/coturn/turnserver.conf.example to an untracked service-owned location. Replace the FQDN, certificate paths, and secret. The static-auth-secret value must exactly match the application's TURN_SHARED_SECRET; do not configure no-auth or permanent browser users.

On a host with a public address directly on its interface, coturn can select the single listen/relay address automatically. On a multi-homed host, set listening-ip and relay-ip explicitly. Behind 1:1 NAT, also set external-ip=<PUBLIC_IP>/<LOCAL_RELAY_IP> and forward the complete relay range without port translation. A normal consumer NAT that changes relay port numbers is not a supported TURN-host topology.

The example binds TURN/TLS to 443 because that is the required restrictive-network fallback. It requires a separate public IP for turn.example.com or an ingress that explicitly supports TURN at layer 4/SNI. A normal HTTPS reverse proxy and coturn cannot both bind the same IP and port.

Open only these public listeners:

Destination	Protocol	Purpose
share.example.com:443	TCP	HTTPS and WSS
turn.example.com:3478	UDP and TCP	STUN, TURN/UDP, and TURN/TCP
turn.example.com:443	TCP	TURN/TLS on a dedicated IP or L4/SNI route
turn.example.com:49152-49251	UDP, bidirectional	Relayed media endpoints

The 100-port relay range is an initial small-room limit, not a universal sizing rule. Monitor 508/allocation failures and concurrent allocations before widening it. The example also sets user-quota=8, total-quota=100, and a per-allocation max-bps of 2,000,000 bytes/s. Tune these from measured 1080p60 traffic and the purchased egress capacity; never remove all quotas as a shortcut.

coturn 4.17.2 denies loopback peers unless allow-loopback-peers is enabled; the example deliberately does not enable it and additionally denies common private, carrier-grade NAT, link-local, and benchmark ranges. Keep no-multicast-peers and no-cli. If the TURN host must intentionally reach an internal peer, narrow an exception to that exact address instead of removing the deny list.

The example writes informational logs to stdout. Configure the supervisor to rotate by size and time with a finite retention, such as seven days initially, then reduce or extend it only for a documented operational need. coturn and the reverse proxy necessarily see client IP addresses; restrict log access, do not enable verbose or log-binding continuously, and never log credentials, SDP, ICE candidates, or the shared secret. Reload or restart coturn after certificate renewal and confirm time synchronization remains healthy.

Verification

Run these checks from real external networks before calling the deployment usable:

1. Open the official Trickle ICE sample and test each configured TURN URL separately with a short-lived credential. Each UDP, TCP, and TLS test must produce a relay candidate; a successful STUN-only srflx candidate does not prove TURN works.
2. Create a normal Screener room on two different networks. Confirm media flows and the selected-pair stats report a non-relay path when direct ICE succeeds.
3. Open the host at https://share.example.com/?relay=1, create a new room, and connect a viewer. This diagnostic flag sets iceTransportPolicy=relay; media must still flow and the stats panel must report relay.
4. Block UDP on a test client while leaving the TURN/TLS endpoint reachable. Confirm a new session succeeds through the configured turns: URL.
5. Repeat with three viewers and a mixed direct/restrictive-network cohort. Record the selected path, RTT, bitrate, frame rate, packet loss, and coturn egress for each viewer. Verify a direct viewer does not start consuming relay bandwidth merely because another viewer needs TURN.

References: coturn 4.17.2 release, turnserver documentation, and the official example configuration.