Squash integration of the reviewed Go core, frontend audit fixes, release tooling, and deployment hygiene. CI passed all Server/Client jobs.
4.7 KiB
Configuration And Ports
The tracked .env.example is the executable schema
companion; internal/server/config is validation truth. Keep real values in the
service secret store or an untracked access-restricted environment file.
Application Environment
| Variable | Contract |
|---|---|
SCREENER_ENV |
development or production, default development; required for every server deployment: production enables production-only validation and the Secure site-access cookie. |
LISTEN_HOST |
Defaults to 0.0.0.0; bare-metal production normally uses 127.0.0.1. |
PORT |
Positive TCP port, default 8787; the tracked release wrapper supports only that default. |
PUBLIC_BASE_URL |
Exact public HTTP(S) origin; production requires HTTPS. |
ALLOWED_ORIGINS |
Comma-separated exact HTTP(S) origins; wildcard is invalid. |
SITE_ACCESS_PASSWORD |
Production-required independent 8-128 visible-ASCII byte secret. |
ROOM_LEASE_SECONDS |
Positive dormant lease, default 86400; active Host prevents expiry. |
ROOM_DATABASE_PATH |
Optional absolute SQLite file path; unset selects memory mode. |
MAX_VIEWERS_PER_ROOM |
1..20, default 8. |
ENDPOINT_MEDIA_COPY_CAPACITY |
Shared endpoint steady-copy cap 1..3, default 2. |
STUN_URLS |
Comma-separated stun: URLs; at least one is required in production. |
NAT_PREDICTION_ENABLED |
Optional bounded NAT prediction capability, default false; requires an ordinary STUN_URLS endpoint on UDP 3478 plus reachable same-host UDP 3479/3480 listeners. |
Automatic SFU fallback is enabled when all four values below are present:
| Variable | Contract |
|---|---|
LIVEKIT_URL |
Browser ws:/wss: origin with no path; production requires WSS. |
LIVEKIT_API_URL |
RoomService http:/https: origin with no path; production plaintext is loopback-only. |
LIVEKIT_API_KEY |
Independent LiveKit API key. |
LIVEKIT_API_SECRET |
Independent secret of at least 32 bytes. |
The site-access password, LiveKit API key, and LiveKit secret must not reuse one another. LiveKit tokens are short-lived media credentials and do not provide application E2EE.
Removed access, room TTL, endpoint-tier, room-rollout, and TURN variables fail
startup even when blank. A present NODE_ENV fails the same way, so a stale
environment file cannot silently drop a deployment out of production. The
private deployment is upgraded atomically; there are no compatibility aliases or
dual configuration readers.
During pre-release route canaries, SCREENER_DEBUG=route enables sanitized room
and participant-ordinal events. It records route reasons, candidates, revisions,
quality states and commit/failure outcomes, but not raw Peer IDs, SDP, ICE
candidates, tokens or media credentials.
Public And Private Ports
| Port | Scope | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| TCP 80/443 | public | HTTP redirect and HTTPS/WSS reverse proxy |
| UDP 3478 | public | STUN-only coturn |
| UDP 3479/3480 | public when NAT prediction is enabled | auxiliary STUN-only coturn listeners |
| UDP 7882 | public when SFU enabled | LiveKit WebRTC media |
| TCP 8787 | private | Screener application |
| TCP 7880 | private when SFU enabled | LiveKit signaling/control |
TCP 3478, TCP/TLS 5349, TURN relay ranges, LiveKit media TCP, and other media ports remain closed. HTTPS/WSS transport is independent of the UDP-only media contract.
When NAT_PREDICTION_ENABLED=true, the server derives
stun:<same-hostname>:3479 and :3480 from the first ordinary STUN authority
on UDP 3478. The Host sees a pre-share switch that defaults on and may disable
it. The capability adds no media route or third-party service. It needs both
cloud security-group rules and the host's /etc/nftables.conf rule; coturn must
bind both auxiliary listeners with aux-server. Opening a cloud port without a
listener has no effect, and no new DNS record is required. Disable the
capability before removing either listener or firewall rule. Same-IP ports
expose destination-port allocation behavior; a full RFC 5780 alternate-address
test requires a second public IPv4.
Bounds
- Site-access requests are rate-limited at the reverse proxy and use constant- time secret comparison in the application.
- HTTP body, WebSocket payload, total/unauthed connections, room count, Viewer count, output buffers, endpoint copies, and SFU resources are bounded.
- The four-digit code space fixes the maximum managed Host publications at 9,000; maximum subscription admission is that capacity times the configured per-room Viewer limit. These are admission bounds, not throughput claims.
- One application process owns room authority and LiveKit admission. Multiple processes require a new shared atomic owner.