Termind/Memory/ARCHITECTURE.md

Termind architecture

Termind is one application target, one unit-test target, and one first-party package: AgentKit, developed in a sibling repository and consumed through SPM. Inside the app target, directories describe dependency boundaries even though Swift does not enforce them as separate modules. The package boundary is enforced, which is the point of it.

Dependency direction

• Domain contains platform-independent values and rules.
• Application contains repositories, feature state, use cases, events, and service protocols.
• Infrastructure implements persistence, security, SSH, and SFTP clients.
• Features contains SwiftUI presentation and sends intents to Application.
• Platform/macOS contains AppKit adapters.
• App constructs dependencies and owns application/window lifetimes.

There is deliberately no Core or generic shared layer. A value belongs to Domain, orchestration and ports belong to Application, concrete I/O belongs to Infrastructure, and presentation-only parsing or formatting stays with its Feature. This prevents a catch-all directory from bypassing dependency review.

Domain must not import SwiftUI, SwiftData, AppKit, Ghostty, CSSH2, or OpenSSL. Views must not construct network clients, access SwiftData/Keychain directly, or coordinate cross-domain cleanup. Runtime side effects belong to application services and durable outbox handlers.

The app remains one target, so ArchitectureBoundaryTests enforces the framework and concrete-client restrictions that directory layout alone cannot — including that no type AgentKit owns is redefined here.

State lifetimes

• Repository snapshots are application-wide and shared by every window.
• A window owns one top-level shell, quick-open, and context-panel state.
• The shell always starts with Vault and Assistant; Settings is the final Navigator page after the dynamic SSH/SFTP Workspaces.
• Vault owns its navigation column, including quick-connect Recents, and routes for Hosts, Keychain, Snippets, Welcome, and Host Editor. These routes never enter the Workspace deck.
• Known Hosts management belongs to the Host Editor draft for both new and existing Hosts. Context-panel Host details are read-only.
• Assistant owns its conversation list through AssistantLibraryModel; conversations are not panes and do not participate in Workspace drag, split, close, or reconnect lifecycles.
• A workspace owns SSH/SFTP/serial panes plus its session-scoped assistant conversation. Workspace content is full width and has no left sidebar.
• Session models own live SSH/SFTP/serial resources and terminal/file-browser state.
• Settings uses app-wide preference storage but window-scoped navigation. It opens as a top-level window destination, remembers the content it replaced, and restores that destination when its index page goes back.
• App appearance is an app-wide UserDefaults preference, defaulting to the system. The app delegate owns AppAppearanceController, which applies changes through NSApplication.appearance so existing and new windows, native controls, and terminal surfaces inherit one appearance without rebuilding sessions. Following the system clears the override; explicit light/dark choices reuse the corresponding terminal theme.
• Opening at login is SMAppService's registration, not a preference. The user can revoke it in System Settings without telling the app, so LoginItemController reads the system status every time Settings is shown rather than mirroring it into UserDefaults. Only how that launch behaves is stored here. A quiet login launch hides the app rather than suppressing its window, because Termind terminates with its last window.

Repository data is persistent truth. Runtime connection state is kept in a connection registry and is never persisted onto domain records.

SSH command history is created only after an authenticated shell-integration start event. A matching completion event enriches that row with exit status and the duration measured by the remote shell; both remain optional so interrupted commands, old protocol events, and history migrated from older versions preserve an honest unknown outcome. Duration is never inferred from client receive time, because SSH buffering can deliver start and completion events together.

Feature views receive aggregate-facing Application Models rather than a generic store API: HostLibraryModel, CredentialLibraryModel, SnippetLibraryModel, ForwardingLibraryModel, TransferLibraryModel, AIConfigurationModel, SkillLibraryModel, CommandHistoryModel, and ToolAuditModel. Aggregates that share one persisted vault snapshot still expose separate intent surfaces, so a feature cannot gain unrelated write operations merely because its records are saved together.

The shared Vault transaction is isolated behind VaultStore. Feature facades keep their backing aggregate private, and Terminal/SFTP sessions depend on the narrow RemoteSessionHostStore port rather than the complete Vault mutation surface.

Serial sessions are temporary and local: IOKit/termios discovery and descriptors stay in Infrastructure, parameters live only with the open pane, and no serial path is persisted or exposed as an Agent host.

Window navigation has one Navigator plus three tool sidebars: Assistant, Snippets, and History. Dynamic SSH/SFTP containers are consistently named Workspaces; “tab” is reserved for keyboard or native UI tab semantics. Vault selection belongs to VaultPageStates, not to sidebar state.

Speech authorization and callbacks

Speech service and coordinator state belong to MainActor. System authorization callbacks can arrive on arbitrary queues; SFSpeechRecognizer.queue controls recognition callbacks, not authorization callbacks. The speech authorization handler is created in a nonisolated factory as an explicitly Sendable closure that only resumes its checked continuation. The awaiting service returns to MainActor to interpret the result. Moving work to the main queue inside an actor-inherited callback is too late to avoid its entry isolation check.

Authorization does not own a recording session: the coordinator rechecks its session token after waiting, so a cancelled request's late result cannot start recording or affect a newer session.

Agent runtime and security

The runtime is AgentKit, a separate package with no dependencies and no knowledge of hosts, transports, or SwiftUI. What Termind keeps is everything that reaches a machine or a person: the SSH and SFTP tools, the connection pool, the Vault resolver, the SwiftData store, and every view.

The two meet at four seams, all additive:

• AgentToolCatalog.registry(builtIn:additional:). The package's built-in tools are selected by AgentToolGroup — scratch, web, user interaction, planning, tasks, skills, MCP — and TermindAgentTools supplies ours after them, so a Termind name can never shadow a built-in and a remote MCP name can shadow neither.
• AgentToolServices, a typed bag a run carries to the tools it registered. AgentSSHInteraction travels in it, which is what keeps credential and host-key prompts out of the package's own protocols — and, structurally, off AgentEventChannel and out of durable history.
• TermindAgentPolicy, which owns the texts and judgements that are ours: the system prompt, the plan contract, and the ssh_exec rule injected into AgentPlanModeHook.hostDecision. The package ships neutral defaults for each and Termind's stay byte-identical to what shipped, because every provider cache is a prefix cache.
• TermindAgentPresentation, which extends the package's open card vocabularies with the values only we need — sshConnecting, remoteFile, and the rest. Their raw values are unchanged, so cards persisted before the split still decode and still render.

AgentRuntime is an actor holding a run's state — transcript snapshot, tool registry, steering queue, secret broker — and the loop over it. Each phase of the loop is a separate value it drives:

• AgentContextPipeline rewrites what is sent at the model boundary: tool results reordered to match the calls they answer, orphaned results dropped, older results trimmed head-and-tail, session context inserted in front of the turn it describes. It shapes only the request. Run snapshots and stored history keep everything.
• AgentTurnDriver streams one assistant turn and assembles its tool calls.
• AgentToolScheduler plans and runs the turn's batch.
• AgentToolExecutor takes one call through schema validation, preflight, the card, hooks, authorization, and execution, in that order.
• AgentEventChannel is the single ordered path for events, fanning out to the UI and to a serial durable recorder.

OpenAI Responses, OpenAI Chat Completions, Anthropic Messages, and Gemini are adapters at the LLM boundary. Models without tool capability receive no tools. Stop cancels the active stream and actions that have not started; steering messages are consumed at the next turn boundary.

A turn's tool calls run concurrently only when every call in it is marked parallel; one sequential call makes the whole turn serial rather than being fenced into its own segment. Concurrency is declared per tool and may be overridden per call by preflight — ssh_exec is parallel exactly when CommandRiskClassifier proves the command safe, the same evidence that decides its safety. MCP tools are parallel by default; a server's destructive hint or Ask First makes them sequential, so remote metadata can only tighten concurrency, never grant it. Whatever the order of execution, results reach the transcript in the order the model asked for them, and every call is answered even when the turn is cancelled or refused — an assistant turn with unanswered tool calls is rejected outright on the next request.

Approvals and agent questions are queued and presented one at a time. Run state is derived from what is outstanding rather than asserted by whichever call moved last.

Extension points, all additive: AgentToolCatalog registrations for tool definitions, AgentToolServices for what a host lends them, AgentLoopHook for willExecute / didExecute / shouldStop, AgentContextTransforming for the model boundary, AgentModelStreaming for providers. Authorization is deliberately not among them — AgentApprovalHandling is a structural stage of the executor that no configuration can remove, and hooks run on either side of it.

Skills are the one exception to "tool output is data". A skill is a Markdown procedure the user installed through Settings; only SkillLibraryModel writes one, so no tool, MCP server or fetched page can add, edit or enable a skill. That provenance is what lets load_skill return a body outside the <untrusted-data> framing every other built-in result carries, and the system prompt states the boundary: the instructions may be followed, whatever they then cause to be read comes back through the ordinary tools and is untrusted as usual. A skill authorizes nothing — imported allowed-tools is recorded and never honoured, on the same footing as an MCP annotation. The catalog the model sees is names and descriptions only, injected at the model boundary by AgentSkillCatalogInjection rather than into the system prompt, for the prefix-cache reason AgentSessionContextInjection states; bodies arrive only through load_skill, which is .locallyReadOnly and therefore allowed in every permission mode and while planning. The enabled set is snapshotted when the run starts, like isPlanning, and is empty for a model without tool capability, so the catalog never names a tool the run was not given. A loaded skill is exempt from AgentToolResultTrimming — it is the procedure still being followed rather than output already reasoned about — and bounded instead by AgentSkill.maximumBodyBytes. AgentSkillLibrary ships starter skills that are copied in once, tracked by a generation mark so a deleted one never returns; the only way back is resetToBuiltInSkills, which replaces the library wholesale and is confirmed before it runs.

Tools never receive a reference to the interactive PTY. Server commands use a dedicated SSH exec channel and file operations use run-scoped SFTP clients. Vault secrets are resolved behind AgentHostResolver. User-entered secrets are single-use handles bound to run, tool, host, and purpose; plaintext is passed directly to the executor and is excluded from model input, reviews, events, logs, and SwiftData. Fetch treats public HTTP(S) reads as locally read-only and routes private or otherwise non-public unicast targets through the active permission policy. DNS is revalidated on every redirect; a redirect that first enters a restricted origin pauses for another authorization decision. Explicit request headers follow every redirect, including cross-origin redirects, to match curl -H -L; sensitive values are redacted from review, UI, and durable history. MCP discovery retains schemas and annotations, but remote annotations are risk hints rather than proof of safety.

AgentScratchWorkspace is a per-conversation staging directory under Application Support, inside the sandbox container, named for the app that owns it (TermindAgentPolicy.scratchDirectoryName) and deleted with the conversation that owns it. Paths are relative, .. is refused rather than resolved, symlinks are refused even when they point back inside, and every resolved path is proven to still be under the scope; writes are bounded per file, per conversation, and by entry count. It is an actor, so it is also the per-path mutation queue — a read and a write of the same file in one batch serialize there rather than by taking the whole turn serial, which is why every scratch tool is parallel. scratch_pull and scratch_push move bytes between a host and the workspace without the bytes entering the transcript, so a remote file can be pulled, edited and pushed back without a copy of it crossing the model boundary in either direction; scratch_edit returns a unified diff rather than the new file for the same reason. scratch_search recursively searches UTF-8 content inside that same scope and returns bounded matching-line previews, so locating a small region does not require reading a large staged file into the transcript. scratch_pull and scratch_push are Termind's rather than the package's, precisely because they are the two ends that touch a host. The SFTP tools are unchanged and know nothing about the workspace. Because a push is approved by filename rather than by content, its preflight puts the size, digest and a redacted head into the approval reasons, and binds the approval to that digest through execution-only metadata so a file rewritten while the user was deciding is refused rather than written.

The permission modes share structural validation but differ at the action gate. Safety is a property of the call, established locally: locallyReadOnly for calls proven to change nothing, locallyContained for calls that change only storage the app owns, and requiresAuthorization for everything else. The first two are allowed in every mode — a staging area that has to be approved into is not a staging area, and dialogs nobody can act on teach the reader to click through the one that matters.

• Ask for approval executes locally proven read-only and contained calls and presents every other action to the user.
• Approve for me sends those same non-read-only actions to Security Review. Missing credentials, timeout, transport errors, or malformed review JSON fail closed and are persisted as review failures.
• Full access skips action approval and Security Review while retaining host-key, secret, schema, host/path, fetch protocol/header/address-classification, sandbox, and tool-capability boundaries.

Agent conversations, runs, visible messages, tool calls/results, and reviews are stored in SwiftData after truncation and redaction. Launch marks unfinished runs interrupted; history is restored but remote actions are never resumed or replayed.

A process that dies mid-batch — force quit, crash, the OS reclaiming the app — leaves tool calls that nothing answered, which the next request would be rejected for. Restore closes that in two steps. Results are recorded as each tool finishes but their transcript rows wait for the run's next snapshot save, so loadConversations first materializes any recorded result whose transcript row was never written. Whatever is still unanswered is answered at the model boundary by AgentUnansweredToolCallRepair, which says the outcome is unknown rather than that the tool did not run: the process died after the command was dispatched, and a model told otherwise would repeat it.

Pro purchases and trial access

ProAccessController owns application-wide StoreKit access and purchase activity. The permanent non-consumable Pro product supports Family Sharing; the separate, zero-price non-consumable trial does not. Trial eligibility comes from verified StoreKit history, including revoked purchases, rather than current entitlements alone. Resolution also includes the verified purchase/update being delivered because history caches may lag behind that result. Concurrent refreshes await the latest resolution before purchase preflight proceeds. The trial expires exactly 14 × 24 hours after originalPurchaseDate; restores and repeated transactions never restart it. A valid permanent entitlement always wins. Product metadata loading is independent of entitlement resolution, and purchasing/pending approval does not replace existing access with an operation state. The trial purchase path checks zero price, product type, sharing settings, and availability of the permanent price before invoking the App Store.

Domain's ProTrial contains only date and history rules; StoreKit stays outside Domain. Infrastructure's TrialClock persists a per-original-transaction maximum observed date in UserDefaults. This best-effort rollback guard can only shorten a verified trial and is never a second source of purchase eligibility. Legacy local proofs, trial Keychain keys, and trial CloudKit records are neither read nor written; previous trial users may claim the new IAP. Vault sync and credential storage remain separate from commerce.

Trial expiration is rechecked on app activation and at most every minute while an active trial is observed. Expiration disables gated features, but previously granted workspace composition remains available for the current launch so an existing workspace is not dismantled. A fresh launch has no such workspace grant. The review demo only simulates expired access and cannot grant paid or trial access.