fix: address code review - fallback to homedir, validate baseDir, use afterAll

Address all 3 points from @op7418's review:

1. No baseDir fallback (severe): Both /api/files and /api/files/preview
   now fall back to os.homedir() when no baseDir is provided, preventing
   access to arbitrary system directories/files.

2. baseDir bypass via baseDir=/ (medium): Both APIs now validate that
   baseDir itself is within the user's home directory. Setting baseDir=/
   will be rejected with 403.

3. Test cleanup (minor): Replaced 'it(cleanup...)' with proper after()
   hook. Added 6 new tests for baseDir validation (18 total, all pass).
This commit is contained in:
liuxiaopai-ai committed 2026-02-08 21:36:56 +08:00
1 parent 84de2d1de8
commit 0f05e4fd0f
3 files changed
+74 -8

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+41 -3
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@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
* 4. Edge cases (root, same path, trailing separators) are handled
*/
import { describe, it } from 'node:test';
import { describe, it, after } from 'node:test';
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
import path from 'path';
import os from 'os';
@@ -112,8 +112,46 @@ describe('File API path traversal scenarios', () => {
});
}
// Cleanup
it('cleanup test fixtures', () => {
// Cleanup test fixtures
after(() => {
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
});
describe('baseDir validation', () => {
it('should reject baseDir set to root (bypass attempt)', () => {
// If baseDir=/, every path would pass isPathSafe — must be blocked
const homeDir = os.homedir();
assert.equal(isPathSafe(homeDir, '/'), false);
});
it('should reject baseDir outside home directory', () => {
const homeDir = os.homedir();
assert.equal(isPathSafe(homeDir, '/tmp'), false);
assert.equal(isPathSafe(homeDir, '/etc'), false);
assert.equal(isPathSafe(homeDir, '/var/log'), false);
});
it('should allow baseDir inside home directory', () => {
const homeDir = os.homedir();
const projectDir = path.join(homeDir, 'projects', 'myapp');
assert.equal(isPathSafe(homeDir, projectDir), true);
});
it('should allow baseDir equal to home directory', () => {
const homeDir = os.homedir();
assert.equal(isPathSafe(homeDir, homeDir), true);
});
it('should block files outside home when no baseDir provided (fallback)', () => {
const homeDir = os.homedir();
assert.equal(isPathSafe(homeDir, '/etc/passwd'), false);
assert.equal(isPathSafe(homeDir, '/tmp/malicious'), false);
});
it('should allow files inside home when no baseDir provided (fallback)', () => {
const homeDir = os.homedir();
const filePath = path.join(homeDir, 'documents', 'file.txt');
assert.equal(isPathSafe(homeDir, filePath), true);
});
});
+11 -2
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@@ -15,14 +15,25 @@ export async function GET(request: NextRequest) {
}
const path = require('path');
const os = require('os');
const resolvedPath = path.resolve(filePath);
const homeDir = os.homedir();
// Validate that the file is within the session's working directory.
// The baseDir parameter should be the session's working directory,
// which acts as the trust boundary for file access.
// The baseDir itself must be under the user's home directory to prevent
// attackers from setting baseDir=/ to bypass all restrictions.
const baseDir = searchParams.get('baseDir');
if (baseDir) {
const resolvedBase = path.resolve(baseDir);
// Ensure baseDir is within the home directory (prevent baseDir=/ bypass)
if (!isPathSafe(homeDir, resolvedBase)) {
return NextResponse.json<ErrorResponse>(
{ error: 'Base directory is outside the allowed scope' },
{ status: 403 }
);
}
if (!isPathSafe(resolvedBase, resolvedPath)) {
return NextResponse.json<ErrorResponse>(
{ error: 'File is outside the project scope' },
@@ -32,8 +43,6 @@ export async function GET(request: NextRequest) {
} else {
// Fallback: without a baseDir, restrict to the user's home directory
// to prevent reading arbitrary system files like /etc/passwd
const os = require('os');
const homeDir = os.homedir();
if (!isPathSafe(homeDir, resolvedPath)) {
return NextResponse.json<ErrorResponse>(
{ error: 'File is outside the allowed scope' },
+22 -3
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@@ -15,21 +15,40 @@ export async function GET(request: NextRequest) {
}
const path = require('path');
const os = require('os');
const resolvedDir = path.resolve(dir);
const homeDir = os.homedir();
// Use baseDir (the session's working directory) as the trust boundary.
// If no baseDir is provided, fall back to the requested directory itself
// (preserves backward compatibility while still preventing traversal
// when the frontend supplies the session working directory).
// The baseDir itself must be under the user's home directory to prevent
// attackers from setting baseDir=/ to bypass all restrictions.
// If no baseDir is provided, fall back to the user's home directory
// to prevent scanning arbitrary system directories.
const baseDir = searchParams.get('baseDir');
if (baseDir) {
const resolvedBase = path.resolve(baseDir);
// Ensure baseDir is within the home directory (prevent baseDir=/ bypass)
if (!isPathSafe(homeDir, resolvedBase)) {
return NextResponse.json<ErrorResponse>(
{ error: 'Base directory is outside the allowed scope' },
{ status: 403 }
);
}
if (!isPathSafe(resolvedBase, resolvedDir)) {
return NextResponse.json<ErrorResponse>(
{ error: 'Directory is outside the project scope' },
{ status: 403 }
);
}
} else {
// Fallback: without a baseDir, restrict to the user's home directory
// to prevent scanning arbitrary system directories like /etc
if (!isPathSafe(homeDir, resolvedDir)) {
return NextResponse.json<ErrorResponse>(
{ error: 'Directory is outside the allowed scope' },
{ status: 403 }
);
}
}
try {