fix(security): F-03 history HMAC 完整性 + F-04 0o600/at-rest 文档 (#609)
history.json 此前明文存储且无完整性校验，本地攻击者可注入伪造的 assistant 历史污染对话感知 polish 的 LLM 上下文（CWE-349）。 F-03（HMAC 完整性）： - 新增依赖 hmac=0.12（复用已有 sha2=0.10）+ getrandom=0.3（密钥生成）。 - HMAC 密钥 32 字节随机，存系统凭据库（独立 account history.hmac_key.v1， 不掺进 chunked CredsRoot），OnceLock 进程内缓存。 - 写入算 HMAC-SHA256 写 sidecar history.json.hmac；读取常量时间比对， 不匹配 → log::warn + fail-safe 返回空历史，绝不把被篡改历史喂给下游 LLM。 - 向后兼容：老用户无 .hmac → 视为 legacy，首次读接受并立即补写 sidecar 迁移。 - keyring 不可用 → 退化为不校验（保持可用，不提供完整性保证）。 - 读写逻辑抽成纯函数 read/write_history_with_key(key) 便于单测。 F-04（明文存储 0o600 + 文档化）： - 写 history.json 与 sidecar 后，unix 收紧权限到 0o600（仅属主可读写）； Windows 走 %APPDATA% per-user ACL。 - HistoryStore 文档化 at-rest 行为：明文 JSON + OS 文件权限 + HMAC 完整性； 完整静态加密为已知残留留待后续（issue #609 F-04 明确允许 clearly document）。 新增 7 个单测：HMAC/hex 往返、常量时间比较、写后读通过、篡改 fail-safe、 legacy 迁移、无密钥读、unix 0o600 权限。 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -3717,7 +3717,9 @@ dependencies = [
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"ferrous-opencc",
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"foundry-local-sdk",
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"futures-util",
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"getrandom 0.3.4",
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"global-hotkey",
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"hmac",
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"keyring",
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"libc",
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"log",
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@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ serde_json = "1"
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# OpenRouter ASR 把音频以标准 base64（带 padding）放进 JSON body（issue #582）。
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base64 = "0.22"
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sha2 = "0.10"
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# issue #609 F-03：history.json 完整性校验（HMAC-SHA256），密钥存系统凭据库。
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hmac = "0.12"
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# F-03 的 HMAC 密钥首次生成用 OS CSPRNG。0.3.x 已在依赖树里，提升为直接依赖零额外编译成本。
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getrandom = "0.3"
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bzip2 = "0.4"
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tar = "0.4"
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tokio = { version = "1", features = ["full"] }
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@@ -48,6 +48,13 @@ const LEGACY_CREDS_FILE: &str = "credentials.json";
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const KEYRING_CREDENTIALS_ACCOUNT: &str = "credentials.v1";
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const KEYRING_CREDENTIALS_CHUNK_PREFIX: &str = "credentials.v1.chunk.";
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/// issue #609 F-03：history.json HMAC 完整性密钥的 keyring account。和凭据共用
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/// `CredentialsVault::SERVICE_NAME`，但走独立 account，不掺进 chunked CredsRoot。
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const KEYRING_HISTORY_HMAC_ACCOUNT: &str = "history.hmac_key.v1";
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/// HMAC 密钥长度（字节）。
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const HISTORY_HMAC_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
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/// history HMAC sidecar 文件后缀：`history.json.hmac`。
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const HISTORY_HMAC_SUFFIX: &str = ".hmac";
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// Windows Credential Manager caps one credential blob at 2560 bytes. keyring stores
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// passwords as UTF-16 on Windows, so keep each JSON chunk comfortably below that.
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const KEYRING_CHUNK_MAX_UTF16_UNITS: usize = 1000;
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@@ -762,6 +769,100 @@ fn delete_keyring_password(account: &str) {
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}
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}
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// ───────────── issue #609 F-03：history.json HMAC 完整性 ─────────────
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/// 进程内缓存的 history HMAC 密钥，避免每次读写都打 keyring。
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static HISTORY_HMAC_KEY: OnceLock<Option<Vec<u8>>> = OnceLock::new();
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/// 取（必要时生成）history HMAC 密钥。
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///
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/// 首次用时从 keyring 读 32 字节 hex；不存在则用 OS CSPRNG 生成并写回 keyring。
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/// keyring 不可用（如 Linux 无 secret service）→ 返回 None，调用方据此**退化为不
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/// 校验**（保持可用，但不提供完整性保证）；用 `OnceLock` 把这个状态固化到进程。
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fn history_hmac_key() -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
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HISTORY_HMAC_KEY
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.get_or_init(|| match load_or_create_history_hmac_key() {
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Ok(key) => Some(key),
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Err(e) => {
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log::warn!(
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"[history] HMAC 密钥不可用，本次运行跳过完整性校验（仍按内容读写）：{e}"
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);
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None
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}
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})
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.clone()
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}
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fn load_or_create_history_hmac_key() -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
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let _guard = credentials_lock().lock();
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if let Some(hex_key) = get_keyring_password(KEYRING_HISTORY_HMAC_ACCOUNT)? {
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let key =
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decode_hex(&hex_key).with_context(|| "history HMAC key in keyring is not valid hex")?;
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if key.len() == HISTORY_HMAC_KEY_LEN {
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return Ok(key);
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}
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log::warn!("[history] keyring 里的 HMAC 密钥长度异常，重新生成");
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}
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// 生成 32 字节随机密钥并落盘 keyring。
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let mut key = vec![0u8; HISTORY_HMAC_KEY_LEN];
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getrandom::fill(&mut key).map_err(|e| anyhow!("OS CSPRNG 生成 HMAC 密钥失败：{e}"))?;
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let hex_key = encode_hex(&key);
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keyring_entry_for(KEYRING_HISTORY_HMAC_ACCOUNT)?
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.set_password(&hex_key)
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.context("写入 history HMAC 密钥到系统凭据库失败")?;
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Ok(key)
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}
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fn encode_hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
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let mut s = String::with_capacity(bytes.len() * 2);
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for b in bytes {
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s.push_str(&format!("{b:02x}"));
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}
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s
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}
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fn decode_hex(s: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
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let s = s.trim();
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if s.len() % 2 != 0 {
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return Err(anyhow!("hex 长度为奇数"));
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}
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(0..s.len())
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.step_by(2)
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.map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&s[i..i + 2], 16).map_err(|e| anyhow!("hex 解析失败：{e}")))
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.collect()
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}
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/// 计算 `HMAC-SHA256(key, bytes)`，返回 hex。
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fn compute_history_hmac(key: &[u8], bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
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use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
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// 标准 HMAC：new_from_slice 接受任意长度 key（内部按 RFC2104 处理 key padding）。
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let mut mac = <Hmac<sha2::Sha256> as Mac>::new_from_slice(key).expect("HMAC 接受任意长度 key");
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mac.update(bytes);
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encode_hex(&mac.finalize().into_bytes())
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}
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fn history_hmac_sidecar_path(history_path: &Path) -> PathBuf {
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let mut name = history_path
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.file_name()
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.map(|n| n.to_string_lossy().into_owned())
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.unwrap_or_else(|| HISTORY_FILE.to_string());
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name.push_str(HISTORY_HMAC_SUFFIX);
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history_path.with_file_name(name)
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}
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/// 常量时间比较两段 hex HMAC，避免计时侧信道。两者都是定长 hex，长度不等直接 false。
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fn hmac_hex_eq(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
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let (a, b) = (a.trim().as_bytes(), b.trim().as_bytes());
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if a.len() != b.len() {
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return false;
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}
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let mut diff = 0u8;
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for (x, y) in a.iter().zip(b.iter()) {
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diff |= x ^ y;
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}
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diff == 0
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}
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fn load_keyring_credentials() -> Result<Option<CredsRoot>> {
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let Some(json_or_manifest) = get_keyring_password(KEYRING_CREDENTIALS_ACCOUNT)? else {
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return Ok(None);
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@@ -1049,6 +1150,20 @@ fn write_account(root: &mut CredsRoot, account: CredentialAccount, value: Option
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// ───────────────────────── HistoryStore ─────────────────────────
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/// 听写历史（`history.json`）。
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///
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/// **At-rest 行为（issue #609 F-03 / F-04）**：
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/// - 内容以**明文 JSON** 落盘（`DictationSession[]`），便于用户导出/审阅。
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/// - 机密性靠 **OS 文件系统权限**：unix 下写入后收紧到 `0o600`（仅属主可读写）；
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/// Windows 走 `%APPDATA%` 的 per-user ACL。
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/// - 完整性靠 **HMAC-SHA256**（F-03）：密钥 32 字节随机、存系统凭据库
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/// （`KEYRING_HISTORY_HMAC_ACCOUNT`）；每次写入算 HMAC 写 sidecar
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/// `history.json.hmac`；读取时校验，不匹配则 fail-safe 返回空历史，绝不把被篡改
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/// 的历史喂给下游 LLM。
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///
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/// **已知残留**：尚未做**完整静态加密（at-rest encryption）**——本地能读文件的
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/// 攻击者仍可读到明文历史（但无法在不被发现的情况下篡改）。完整加密（用 keyring
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/// 派生密钥加密整个文件）留待后续，见 issue #609 F-04（明确允许"clearly document"）。
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pub struct HistoryStore {
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path: PathBuf,
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lock: Mutex<()>,
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@@ -1143,13 +1258,108 @@ impl HistoryStore {
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self.write_locked(&Vec::<DictationSession>::new())
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}
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/// issue #609 F-03：读 history 前先做 HMAC 完整性校验。
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///
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/// - HMAC 密钥不可用（keyring 缺失等）→ 退化为不校验，按内容直接读（保持可用）。
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/// - 文件不存在 / 为空 → 空历史（正常首次启动）。
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/// - sidecar 存在且 HMAC 不匹配 → **判定被投毒/损坏，fail-safe 返回空历史**并
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/// log::warn，绝不把被篡改的历史喂给下游 LLM（对话感知 polish）。
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/// - sidecar 缺失但 history 非空 → legacy 文件：接受当前内容并**立即补写 sidecar**
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/// 完成迁移，让此后写入都带完整性标记。
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fn read_locked(&self) -> Result<Vec<DictationSession>> {
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read_or_default::<Vec<DictationSession>>(&self.path)
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read_history_with_key(&self.path, history_hmac_key().as_deref())
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}
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/// issue #609 F-03/F-04：写 history 后算 HMAC 写 sidecar；unix 下把两文件都设 0o600。
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fn write_locked(&self, sessions: &[DictationSession]) -> Result<()> {
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let json = serde_json::to_vec_pretty(sessions).context("encode history failed")?;
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atomic_write(&self.path, &json)
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write_history_with_key(&self.path, &json, history_hmac_key().as_deref())
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}
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}
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/// 读 history 并按 `key` 做 HMAC 完整性校验（纯函数，便于单测）。
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///
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/// `key == None`：无密钥，退化为不校验，按内容直接读（与历史行为一致）。
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/// 详细语义见 `HistoryStore::read_locked` 的文档。
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fn read_history_with_key(path: &Path, key: Option<&[u8]>) -> Result<Vec<DictationSession>> {
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let Some(key) = key else {
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return read_or_default::<Vec<DictationSession>>(path);
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};
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if !path.exists() {
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return Ok(Vec::new());
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}
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let bytes = fs::read(path).with_context(|| format!("read failed: {}", path.display()))?;
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if bytes.is_empty() {
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return Ok(Vec::new());
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}
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let sidecar = history_hmac_sidecar_path(path);
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let expected = compute_history_hmac(key, &bytes);
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match fs::read_to_string(&sidecar) {
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Ok(stored) => {
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if !hmac_hex_eq(stored.trim(), &expected) {
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// 投毒/损坏：fail-safe，不解析、不喂下游。
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log::warn!(
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"[history] HMAC 校验失败（疑似被篡改或损坏），fail-safe 返回空历史：{}",
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path.display()
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);
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return Ok(Vec::new());
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}
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serde_json::from_slice::<Vec<DictationSession>>(&bytes)
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.with_context(|| format!("decode failed: {}", path.display()))
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}
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Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {
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// legacy：老用户的 history.json 没有 .hmac → 接受并补写 sidecar 迁移。
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log::info!("[history] 未发现 HMAC sidecar，视为 legacy 文件，接受并补写完整性标记");
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if let Err(err) = write_hmac_sidecar(&sidecar, &expected) {
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log::warn!("[history] 迁移补写 HMAC sidecar 失败：{err}");
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}
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serde_json::from_slice::<Vec<DictationSession>>(&bytes)
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.with_context(|| format!("decode failed: {}", path.display()))
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}
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Err(e) => {
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Err(e).with_context(|| format!("read HMAC sidecar failed: {}", sidecar.display()))
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}
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}
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}
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/// 写 history JSON、收紧权限、按 `key` 写 HMAC sidecar（纯函数，便于单测）。
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fn write_history_with_key(path: &Path, json: &[u8], key: Option<&[u8]>) -> Result<()> {
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atomic_write(path, json)?;
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// F-04：history.json 是明文存储，at-rest 防护靠 OS 文件系统权限——unix 收紧到
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// 仅属主可读写（0o600）。Windows 走用户目录默认 ACL（%APPDATA% 已是 per-user）。
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restrict_file_permissions_best_effort(path);
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if let Some(key) = key {
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let sidecar = history_hmac_sidecar_path(path);
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let mac = compute_history_hmac(key, json);
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if let Err(e) = write_hmac_sidecar(&sidecar, &mac) {
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// sidecar 写失败不阻断主写入（数据已落盘），但记一笔——下次读会被当
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// legacy 迁移或（若 sidecar 部分写入损坏）触发 fail-safe。
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log::warn!("[history] 写 HMAC sidecar 失败：{e}");
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}
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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/// 写 HMAC sidecar 文件并（unix）设 0o600。
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fn write_hmac_sidecar(sidecar: &Path, hmac_hex: &str) -> Result<()> {
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atomic_write(sidecar, hmac_hex.as_bytes())?;
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restrict_file_permissions_best_effort(sidecar);
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Ok(())
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}
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/// issue #609 F-04：unix 下把文件权限收紧到 0o600（仅属主可读写）。
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/// Windows / 其他平台 no-op（依赖用户目录 ACL）。best-effort：失败只 warn。
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fn restrict_file_permissions_best_effort(path: &Path) {
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#[cfg(unix)]
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{
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use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
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if let Err(e) = fs::set_permissions(path, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)) {
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log::warn!("[history] 设置 {} 权限 0o600 失败：{e}", path.display());
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}
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}
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#[cfg(not(unix))]
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{
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let _ = path;
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}
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}
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@@ -2419,14 +2629,135 @@ impl CredentialsVault {
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::{
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chunk_json_payload, list_vocab_presets, read_preferences, save_vocab_presets,
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sync_style_pack_preferences, validate_correction_rule_syntax,
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KEYRING_CHUNK_MAX_UTF16_UNITS,
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chunk_json_payload, compute_history_hmac, decode_hex, encode_hex,
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history_hmac_sidecar_path, hmac_hex_eq, list_vocab_presets, read_history_with_key,
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read_preferences, save_vocab_presets, sync_style_pack_preferences,
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validate_correction_rule_syntax, write_history_with_key, KEYRING_CHUNK_MAX_UTF16_UNITS,
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};
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use crate::types::{builtin_style_packs, CustomStylePrompts, VocabPreset, VocabPresetStore};
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use std::fs;
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use std::path::PathBuf;
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fn history_test_dir() -> PathBuf {
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let dir =
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std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("openless-history-hmac-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
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fs::create_dir_all(&dir).expect("create temp dir");
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dir
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}
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// 一条最小但合法的 DictationSession JSON 数组，足够 serde 往返。
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// DictationSession 是 camelCase 序列化。
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const SAMPLE_HISTORY_JSON: &str = r#"[{
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"id": "s1",
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"createdAt": "2026-06-07T00:00:00Z",
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"rawTranscript": "你好",
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"finalText": "你好。",
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"mode": "light",
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"appBundleId": null,
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"appName": null,
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"insertStatus": "inserted",
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"errorCode": null,
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"durationMs": null,
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"dictionaryEntryCount": null
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}]"#;
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#[test]
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fn hex_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let bytes = [0u8, 1, 15, 16, 255, 128, 42];
|
||||
assert_eq!(decode_hex(&encode_hex(&bytes)).unwrap(), bytes);
|
||||
assert_eq!(encode_hex(&[0xab, 0xcd]), "abcd");
|
||||
assert!(decode_hex("xyz").is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn hmac_hex_eq_constant_time_matches() {
|
||||
let key = b"k";
|
||||
let a = compute_history_hmac(key, b"hello");
|
||||
let b = compute_history_hmac(key, b"hello");
|
||||
let c = compute_history_hmac(key, b"world");
|
||||
assert!(hmac_hex_eq(&a, &b));
|
||||
assert!(!hmac_hex_eq(&a, &c));
|
||||
assert!(!hmac_hex_eq(&a, "deadbeef"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn history_write_then_read_passes_verification() {
|
||||
let dir = history_test_dir();
|
||||
let path = dir.join("history.json");
|
||||
let key = [7u8; 32];
|
||||
write_history_with_key(&path, SAMPLE_HISTORY_JSON.as_bytes(), Some(&key)).unwrap();
|
||||
// sidecar 应存在。
|
||||
assert!(history_hmac_sidecar_path(&path).exists());
|
||||
let sessions = read_history_with_key(&path, Some(&key)).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(sessions.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(sessions[0].id, "s1");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn history_tampered_bytes_fail_safe_to_empty() {
|
||||
let dir = history_test_dir();
|
||||
let path = dir.join("history.json");
|
||||
let key = [9u8; 32];
|
||||
write_history_with_key(&path, SAMPLE_HISTORY_JSON.as_bytes(), Some(&key)).unwrap();
|
||||
// 攻击者篡改 history.json，但 sidecar 仍是旧 HMAC → 校验失败。
|
||||
let tampered = SAMPLE_HISTORY_JSON.replace("你好。", "被注入的内容");
|
||||
fs::write(&path, tampered.as_bytes()).unwrap();
|
||||
let sessions = read_history_with_key(&path, Some(&key)).unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
sessions.is_empty(),
|
||||
"篡改后必须 fail-safe 返回空历史，不喂下游"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn history_legacy_without_sidecar_is_accepted_and_migrated() {
|
||||
let dir = history_test_dir();
|
||||
let path = dir.join("history.json");
|
||||
let key = [3u8; 32];
|
||||
// 老用户：只有 history.json，没有 .hmac。
|
||||
fs::write(&path, SAMPLE_HISTORY_JSON.as_bytes()).unwrap();
|
||||
let sidecar = history_hmac_sidecar_path(&path);
|
||||
assert!(!sidecar.exists());
|
||||
// 首次读：接受并补写 sidecar。
|
||||
let sessions = read_history_with_key(&path, Some(&key)).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(sessions.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
sidecar.exists(),
|
||||
"legacy 读取后必须补写 HMAC sidecar 完成迁移"
|
||||
);
|
||||
// 迁移后再读，HMAC 已匹配，仍正常返回。
|
||||
let again = read_history_with_key(&path, Some(&key)).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(again.len(), 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn history_no_key_reads_without_verification() {
|
||||
let dir = history_test_dir();
|
||||
let path = dir.join("history.json");
|
||||
fs::write(&path, SAMPLE_HISTORY_JSON.as_bytes()).unwrap();
|
||||
// key=None：退化为不校验，按内容读。
|
||||
let sessions = read_history_with_key(&path, None).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(sessions.len(), 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(unix)]
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn history_write_sets_0600_permissions() {
|
||||
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
|
||||
let dir = history_test_dir();
|
||||
let path = dir.join("history.json");
|
||||
let key = [1u8; 32];
|
||||
write_history_with_key(&path, SAMPLE_HISTORY_JSON.as_bytes(), Some(&key)).unwrap();
|
||||
let mode = fs::metadata(&path).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777;
|
||||
assert_eq!(mode, 0o600, "history.json 应为 0o600");
|
||||
let sidecar_mode = fs::metadata(history_hmac_sidecar_path(&path))
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.permissions()
|
||||
.mode()
|
||||
& 0o777;
|
||||
assert_eq!(sidecar_mode, 0o600, "sidecar 应为 0o600");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn credential_payload_chunks_stay_under_windows_blob_limit() {
|
||||
let payload = format!(
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user