`cli-chat-proxy.grok.com` turns away requests that do not name a
supported client version — the failure mode #3952 was opened for. The
pin has sat at 0.2.93 since 2026-07-17, while https://x.ai/cli/stable
and `npm view @xai-official/grok version` both report 0.2.114.
The version was written out in three places, which is how they came to
drift:
- `repository/http_upstream.go` (OAuth traffic through the CLI proxy)
- `pkg/xai/billing.go` (billing and quota probes)
- `service/openai_gateway_grok.go` (gateway request headers)
`xai.CLIClientVersion` is now the single source, and the other two build
their own client identity from it, so the next bump is one line.
`internal/pkg/xai` is a leaf package both layers already import, so this
adds no cycle. `CLIUserAgent` derives from the same constant.
Checked against the real 0.2.114 binary rather than the version feed
alone: the `x-grok-client-version` header name, the `xai-grok-cli`
token-auth value, and the version string all match what the CLI sends.
The pinned value is also the floor an operator override must clear, so
some fixtures carried a meaning relative to it rather than a fixed
number. Those were moved, not search-and-replaced:
- the "valid override" case now uses 0.2.115-alpha.1; at 0.2.95-alpha.1
it would fall below the new floor, be dropped, and stop testing
acceptance at all
- the prerelease-at-the-minimum case tracks the pin to 0.2.114-beta.1,
or it becomes a copy of the below-minimum case
- three of the five malformed-semver entries sat below the new floor and
would have been turned away for being old, not for being malformed
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codex/OpenAI upstream switched from a WebSocket pool to HTTP/2. The
outbound H2 transport set neither ReadIdleTimeout nor ResponseHeaderTimeout
(the OpenAI profile forces ResponseHeaderTimeout=0), so a pooled H2
connection silently killed by a proxy/NAT becomes a "dead connection":
both ends believe it is alive and a request assigned to it hangs until the
OS TCP retransmit timeout (minutes) before the first byte — observed as an
8m37s TTFT with an eventual 200. Occasional (only when a request lands on a
dead pooled conn) and across all groups (shared OpenAI transport); worse on
larger idle pools.
Explicitly configure http2 on the openai_h2 transport and enable active
PING health checks (ReadIdleTimeout=15s, PingTimeout=15s) so dead
connections are detected and evicted at the source, instead of relying on
ResponseHeaderTimeout as an after-the-fact backstop. Scoped to the
openai_h2 path only; Claude/Gemini (default) and h1 modes are untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
增加请求阶段 DNS 解析校验，阻断重绑定到私网
补充默认透传 WWW-Authenticate 头，保留认证挑战
前端相对 URL 过滤拒绝 // 协议相对路径
测试: go test ./internal/repository -run TestGitHubReleaseServiceSuite
测试: go test ./internal/repository -run TestTurnstileServiceSuite
测试: go test ./internal/repository -run TestProxyProbeServiceSuite
测试: go test ./internal/repository -run TestClaudeUsageServiceSuite
IanShaw027